Gurcharan Singh

Does CEO duality give more influence over executive pay to the majority or minority shareholder? (A survey of Brazil)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to focus on comparing the influence of majority and minority shareholders on executive compensation under conditions of CEO duality, examining majority and minority shareholder influences by measuring their investment and return activity. The paper seeks to uncover how CEO duality changes the impact the two categories of shareholders have on executive compensation, especially in an emerging nation. Design/methodology/approach – In total, 30 corporations out of the 70 corporations listed on the BM & F Bovespa (a Brazilian stock market) were used for the paper. Quarterly data were collected on the companies from the Datastream database. The paper conducted a moderated regression analysis on the data to determine the conditional effects of majority and minority holders’ investment and returns on executive compensation. Findings – There are incentives for executives meeting majority shareholder objectives, but minority shareholders’ influences act as a disincentive for e...