Guri Rosén

EU Confidential: The European Parliament's Involvement in EU Security and Defence Policy

In 2002, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council concluded an Interinstitutional Agreement that gave the EP privileged access to sensitive documents in the area of security and defence. It is argued that the Council let the EP become involved in this sensitive policy area because it accepted the legislatures argument for its right to access. In addition, the EPs bargaining strategy concretized the procedures and contributed to finalizing the deal after two years of negotiation. It is shown in this article that despite the EPs marginal powers in the area of security and defence and the traditional conception of this policy as an executive prerogative, it cannot be isolated from democratic principles. This article provides new evidence for previous claims that the EPs involvement in EU foreign policy is increasing due to legitimacy concerns. It also offers a theoretical account for why this is so.

The impact of norms on political decision-making: how to account for the European Parliament’s empowerment in EU external trade policy

ABSTRACT The Lisbon Treaty gave the European Parliament (EP) considerable new powers in the field of external trade policy. This is puzzling, as there is little to support dominant explanations such as bargaining on the part of the EP or member states making it a priority to enhance the EP’s role in trade. The article shows how the EP (together with the Commission) was able to convince the Convention that extending the EP’s trade powers was reasonable because there were no valid arguments for exempting trade from the general rule of linking qualified majority voting and codecision. The findings challenge established accounts of the EP’s empowerment by demonstrating how the principle of parliamentary representation is not an uncontested source of legitimacy, despite its constitutional status. In situations where institutional foundations are debated, even the principle of parliamentary representation may be put to the test. The article also adds to the debate about the role of norms in political decision-making, by focusing on mutual acceptability rather than truth-seeking as the key co-ordinating mechanism of arguing, clarifying its relevance to the study of political processes.

Trick and treat: how the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies*

Abstract Studies suggest that the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) influence the Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), despite it being formally an intergovernmental instrument. Few systematic attempts have been made to capture how the two institutions exert influence from an analytical perspective. This paper develops and explores a set of hypotheses (strategic coalition building, bargaining, community framing, circumvention and normative argumentation) in two cases: Naval mission Atalanta and the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). We find that the Commission drew on its bargaining leverage, circumvented the member states and framed the issues at stake in a manner that increased its own competence. It is also in a better position to influence CFSP decisions at an early stage. The EP’s influence is bigger in the post-decision phase. One would, however, expect that the influence of the supranational institutions will increase as the CFSP moves towards a comprehensive approach.

A match made in heaven? explaining patterns of cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament

Abstract At the beginning of the 1990s, the Commission saw the European Parliament (EP) as an immature and irresponsible actor lacking appropriate competence on international trade matters. Why then did the Commission become an ardent advocate for extending the EP’s role in trade during the European Convention resulting in a significant increase in the EP’s trade powers? Three potential explanations are investigated: that the Commission saw the EP as a strategic ally, that it wanted to avoid interinstitutional conflict, and that it sought to make EU policy more legitimate. All contribute in accounting for the Commission’s support, but the latter in particular sheds light on both the timing and the form of its change in position. It is suggested that the Commission will emphasise systematic cooperation with the EP when there is external normative pressure, but the article also underscores the extensive pragmatic relations between the EP and the Commission.

Influence beyond formal powers: The parliamentarisation of European Union security policy:

The European Union’s foreign and security policy is commonly described as an intergovernmental affair. Despite limited formal powers, several studies suggest that the European Parliament has increased its influence on the Union’s foreign and security policy. This article argues that, to gauge the significance of parliamentary participation, it is necessary to look beyond the notion of formal parliamentary rights and to take into account informal influence. The analysis shows how informal avenues of influence are crucial at certain stages of the decision-making process, and points to factors that constrain and enable parliamentary impact. Furthermore, it emphasises the important role that parliaments play in scrutinising security policy, which is a crucial component of democratic governance. In this particular field where there is little legislation, the establishment of solid procedures and practices for oversight and control can also be a significant indicator of parliamentary influence.

Unified in response to rising powers? China, Russia and EU-US relations

ABSTRACT How do the EU and the US respond to rising powers making territorial claims? Are they unified in their approaches, and if not, where do their policies diverge? Transatlantic unity or dissent in response to main geopolitical issues has implications for our understanding of transatlantic security relations and for the future of global power-relations more broadly. We explore EU-US positions and responses to Chinese advances in the South China Sea and Russia’s actions in the Ukraine. Two hypotheses guide our analysis: First, that they cooperate to balance against these powers, hence strengthening transatlantic relations. Secondly, that the EU is developing policies independently of the US, thus weakening EU-US relations. Our findings suggest that despite a general coherence of American and European stance in both cases, the level of coordination varies. Instead, we find signs of weakening EU-US security relations as the EU develops a more autonomous policy vis-à-vis the US.

Contestation and co-optation: why secrecy in EU external relations varies

Abstract The question posed in this article is how to explain that the governance of secrecy in EU external relations varies. While the Common Foreign and Security Policy appears to retain its secretive character, the EU’s external trade policy has recently seen a shift towards more transparency. This article argues that to understand this variation, one has to take into account the institutional power of the European Parliament as well as the extent to which the rules and practices of secrecy are perceived as legitimate. The empowerment of the Parliament in trade means that it has had recent success in pushing back secrecy in this area. However, a general finding is that the majority of parliamentarians seem only rarely to question the executive’s governance of secrecy in external relations. The analysis shows that perceptions of legitimacy are crucial to account for different secrecy regimes – a finding that is likely to be relevant for the understanding of secrecy in foreign policy beyond the EU.

How does expert knowledge travel between EU institutions? The case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

ABSTRACT Expertise has been highlighted as a central source of power and legitimacy within the European Union system, and has been pointed to as one explanation of the relative influence of EU institutions in policy-making processes. This paper investigates such inter-institutional differences by asking: To what extent, and how, does expertise from the Commission influence the European Parliament’s positions? We explore this question by analysing the transfer of expertise from the Commission to the Parliament in the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Our analysis finds clear differences in what type of expert knowledge the EP incorporated– as well as how they use expertise. In the beginning of the period analysed, the Commission’s expert input is broadly used by the EP and largely unquestioned. Some years later, there is much less reference to external expert and Commission sources and the EP is also much more critical, and explicitly questions conclusions that was supported two years earlier. In our final discussion, we propose that this change over time might be due to the politicisation of TTIP, and discuss how and why this is the case.