Gustavo Grullon

Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis

We show that repurchases have not only became an important form of payout for U.S. corporations, but also that firms finance their share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends. We find that young firms have a higher propensity to pay cash through repurchases than they did in the past and that repurchases have become the preferred form of initiating a cash payout. Although large, established firms have generally not cut their dividends, they also show a higher propensity to pay out cash through repurchases. These findings indicate that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends. Our results also suggest that before 1983, regulatory constraints inhibited firms from aggressively repurchasing shares.

Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity

Firms that increase (decrease) dividends experience a significant decline (increase) in their systematic risk. The dividend-increasing firms do not increase their capital expenditure and experience a decline in profitability in the years after the dividend change. The positive market reaction to a dividend increase is significantly related to the subsequent decline in systematic risk. In the long run, the dividendincreasing firms with the largest decline in systematic risk also experience the largest increase in price over the next three years, suggesting that the market reaction to dividend changes may not incorporate the full extent of the decline in the cost of capital associated with dividend changes.

What Drove the Increase in Idiosyncratic Volatility during the Internet Boom

Aggregate idiosyncratic volatility spiked nearly fivefold during the Internet boom of the late 1990s, dwarfing in magnitude a moderately increasing trend. While some researchers argue that this rise in idiosyncratic risk was the result of changes in the characteristics of public firms, others argue that it was driven by the changing sentiment of irrational traders. We present evidence that the marketwide decline in maturity of the typical public firm can explain most of the increase in firm-specific risk during the Internet boom. Controlling for firm maturity, we find no evidence that investor sentiment drives idiosyncratic risk throughout the Internet boom.

The Real Effects of Short-Selling Constraints

We use a regulatory experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a random sample of U.S. stocks to test whether capital market frictions have an effect on stock prices and corporate decisions. We find that an increase in short-selling activity causes prices to fall, and that small firms react to these lower prices by reducing equity issues and investment. These results not only provide evidence that short-selling constraints affect asset prices, but also confirm that short-selling activity has a causal impact on financing and investment decisions.

Religion and Corporate (Mis)Behavior

We provide evidence that religiosity deters unethical corporate behavior. Firms headquartered in highly religious counties are less likely to backdate options, grant excessive compensation packages to their managers, practice aggressive earnings management, and be the target of class action securities lawsuits. Our results are strongest for locations with greater concentrations of Protestants, and especially of Mainline Protestants. Finally, we find that a regulatory change designed to curb option backdating has had a much larger effect in less religious counties, suggesting that in this case regulation and religion are substitute mechanisms for monitoring and control.

Corporate Financing Decisions, Managerial Market Timing, and Real Investment

Both market timing and investment-based theories of corporate financing predict underperformance after firms raise capital, but only market timing predicts that the composition of financing (equity compared to debt) should also forecast returns. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the amount of net financing is more important than its composition in explaining future stock returns. In the time-series, investment-based factor models explain abnormal stock performance following a variety of corporate financing events that previous studies link to market timing. At the aggregate level, the amount of new financing is also more important for future market returns than its composition. Overall, our joint tests reveal that measures of real investment are correlated with future returns while measures of managerial market timing are not.

Firm Age and Fluctuations in Idiosyncratic Risk

This paper presents empirical evidence that fluctuations in idiosyncratic risk are largely driven by the age characteristics of the firms composing the market. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the age of the typical firm at its IPO date has fallen dramatically from nearly 40 years old in the early 1960s to less than 5 years old by the late 1990s. Since younger firms tend to be riskier, this systematic decline in the average age of the typical public firm, combined with the increasing number of firms going public over the last 30 years, has caused the increase in idiosyncratic risk over the last four decades. We show that after controlling for the proportion of young firms in the market, this time period exhibits no trend in the time series of idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, we find some evidence of a negative trend in idiosyncratic risk after controlling for other measures of firm maturity.

Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated

There has been a systematic decline in the number of publicly-traded firms over the last two decades, and half of the U.S. industries have lost over 50% of their publicly traded peers. The decline has increased industry concentration, as the void left by public firms has not been filled by an increase in the number of private businesses or by greater presence of foreign firms. Furthermore, this phenomenon has significantly changed the nature of public firms. Firms in industries with the largest decline in the number of public firms have generated higher profit margins and abnormal stock returns, and enjoyed better investment opportunities through M&A deals. Overall, our findings suggest that the nature of US product markets has undergone a structural shift that has potentially weakened competition.There has been a systematic decline in the number of publicly-traded firms over the last two decades. Half of the U.S. industries lost over 50% of their publicly traded peers. The decline has increased industry concentration, as the void left by public firms has not been filled by an increase in the number of private businesses or by greater presence of foreign firms. Firms in industries with the largest decline in the number of firms have generated higher profit margins and abnormal stock returns, and enjoyed better investment opportunities through M&A deals. Overall, our findings suggest that the nature of US product markets has undergone a structural shift that has potentially weakened competition.

The Effects of Short-Selling Threats on Incentive Contracts: Evidence from an Experiment

This paper examines the effects of a shock to the stock-price formation process on the design of executive incentive contracts. We find that an exogenous removal of short-selling constraints causes firms to convexify compensation payoffs by granting relatively more stock options to their managers. We also find that treated firms adopt new antitakeover provisions. These results suggest that when firms face the threat of bear raids, they incentivize managers to take actions that mitigate the adverse effects of unrestrained short selling. Overall, this paper provides causal evidence that financial markets affect incentive contract design.

Comovement and Investment Banking Networks

We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.