H. L. A. Hart

Are There Any Natural Rights

I SHALL advance the thesis that if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free. By saying that there is this right, I mean that in the absence of certain special conditions which are consistent with the right being an equal right, any adult human being capable of choice (i) has the right to forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or restraint against him save to hinder coercion or restraint and (2) is at liberty to do (i.e., is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons.2 I have two reasons for describing the equal right of all men to be free as a natural right; both of them were always emphasized by the classical theorists of natural rights. (i) This right is one which all men have if they are capable of choice; they have it qua men and not only if they are members of some society or stand in some special relation to each other. (2) This right is not created or conferred by mens voluntary action;

Essays on Bentham : studies in jurisprudence and political theory

In his introduction to these closely linked essays Professor Hart offers both an exposition and a critical assesment of some central issues in jurisprudence and political theory. Some of the essays touch on themes to which little attention has been paid, such as Benthams identification of the forms of mistification protecting the law from criticism; his relation to Beccaria; and his conversion to democratic radicalism and a passionate admiration for the United States.

Between Utility and Rights

I do not think than anyone familiar with what has been published in the last ten years, in England and the United States, on the philosophy of government can doubt that this subject, which is the meeting point of moral, political and legal philosophy, is undergoing a major change. We are currently witnessing, I think, the progress of a transition from a once widely accepted old faith that some form of utilitarianism, if only we could discover the right form, must capture the essence of political morality. The new faith is that the truth must lie not with a doctrine that takes the maximisation of aggregate or average general welfare for its goal, but with a doctrine of basic human rights, protecting specific basic liberties and interests of individuals, if only we could find some sufficiently firm foundation for such rights to meet some long familiar objections. Whereas not so long ago great energy and much ingenuity of many philosophers were devoted to making some form of utilitarianism work, latterly such energies and ingenuity have been devoted to the articulation of theories of basic rights. As often with such changes of faith or redirection of philosophical energies and attention, the new insights which are currently offered us seem to dazzle at least as much as they illuminate. Certainly, as I shall try to show by reference to the work of two now influential contemporary writers, the new faith has been presented in forms which are, in spite of much brillance, in the end unconvincing. My two examples, both American, are taken respectively from the Conservative Right and the Liberal Left of the political spectrum; and while the former, the Conservative, builds a theory of rights on the moral importance of the separateness or distinctness of human persons which utilitarianism is said to ignore, the latter, the Liberal Left, seeks to erect such a theory on their moral title to equal concern and respect which, it is said, unreconstructed utilitarianism implicitly denies. So while the first theory is dominated by the duty of governments to respect the separateness of persons, the second is dominated by the duty of governments to treat their subjects as equals, with equal concern and respect.

Issues in contemporary legal philosophy : the influence of H.L.A. Hart

The essays presented in this text, based on a conference held in Jerusalem in March 1984, may all be described as being generated or affected by H.L.A.Harts pioneering work in legal philosophy. Papers on legal theory, responsibility and enforcement of morals are presented by some of the most prominent scholars influenced by Harts theories. The book pays tribute to Hart by reflecting the variety of his interests, the breadth of his contribution and the efforts of his work and personality. Thus the book aims to show how indispensable Harts work on legal philosophy has become, and how on many points his vision is still unsurpassed.

Law, Liberty, and Morality.

In this book Professor Hart examines the use of criminal law to enforce morality, in particular sexual morality. He considers the views of experts from J. S. Mill to Lord Devlin, and argues that their challenges fail to recognise distinctions of vital importance for legal and political theory.

The Concept of Law.

The Concept of Law is the most important and original work of legal philosophy written this century. First published in 1961, it is considered the masterpiece of H.L.A. Harts enormous contribution to the study of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. Its elegant language and balanced arguments have sparked wide debate and unprecedented growth in the quantity and quality of scholarship in this area--much of it devoted to attacking or defending Harts theories. Principal among Harts critics is renowned lawyer and political philosopher Ronald Dworkin who in the 1970s and 80s mounted a series of challenges to Harts Concept of Law. It seemed that Hart let these challenges go unanswered until, after his death in 1992, his answer to Dworkins criticism was discovered among his papers. In this valuable and long-awaited new edition Hart presents an Epilogue in which he answers Dworkin and some of his other most influential critics including Fuller and Finnis. Written with the same clarity and candor for which the first edition is famous, the Epilogue offers a sharper interpretation of Harts own views, rebuffs the arguments of critics like Dworkin, and powerfully asserts that they have based their criticisms on a faulty understanding of Harts work. Hart demonstrates that Dworkins views are in fact strikingly similar to his own. In a final analysis, Harts response leaves Dworkins criticisms considerably weakened and his positions largely in question. Containing Harts final and powerful response to Dworkin in addition to the revised text of the original Concept of Law, this thought-provoking and persuasively argued volume is essential reading for lawyers and philosophers throughout the world.