H. Sebastian Heese

Supply Chain Conflict Due to Store Brands: The Value of Wholesale Price Commitment in a Retail Supply Chain*

Store brands are of increasing importance in retail supply chains, often causing channel conflict, as the retailers product directly competes with the manufacturers national brand. Extant research on the resulting channel interactions either assumes the national brand manufacturer can credibly commit to maintaining a wholesale price or that he lacks such ability. However, these two scenarios imply very different supply chain interactions, as only a national brand manufacturer with commitment ability can strategically adjust a national brand wholesale price to prevent a store brand introduction by the retailer. We specifically analyze the impact of this assumption on the manufacturer, the retailer, and the customers. We determine when long-term contracts that provide the manufacturer with such commitment ability can improve supply chain profitability.

Retail Strategies for Extended Warranty Sales and Impact on Manufacturer Base Warranties

Consider two competing manufacturers selling their products through the same retailer. If this retailer derives profits from extended warranty sales, the manufacturers face a dilemma in setting their base warranties. Although they have incentive to increase their warranties to make their products attractive to consumers, the retailer might prefer selling lower-warranty products to enhance extended warranties sales. We develop a stylized model to determine and analyze optimal manufacturer and retailer strategies in this setting. Consistent with the ongoing decline in warranties for products that are sold through independent retailers, we show that these interactions exert downward pressure on manufacturer warranties. Rather than pitching the extended warranty at the checkout after customers have selected a certain product, we find that retailers can often benefit from inducing simultaneous consideration of product and extended warranty characteristics, for example by posting extended warranty information right on the product shelf.

Don't ask, don't tell: Sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer

When different supply chain parties have private information, some form of information sharing is required to improve supply chain performance. However, it might be difficult to ensure truthful information transfer when firms can benefit from distorting their private information. To investigate the impact of dishonest information transfer, we consider a single-supplier single-retailer supply chain that operates under a contract with a revenue sharing clause, providing the retailer incentive to underreport sales revenues. In practice, suppliers utilize audits based on statistical tools that, for example, compare the retailers’ sales reports and order quantities to limit, but not necessarily eliminate, cheating. We investigate the impact of such limited cheating on the different supply chain constituents. We show that when the retailer can exert sales effort, a supplier might benefit from the retailers dishonesty. Our findings also suggest that if the retailers negotiation power is high or if retailer effort is effective, the supplier should reduce the retailers revenue share and absorb some of the demand risk to increase retailer participation. When facing a less powerful or less capable retailer, the supplier might be better off extracting profitability upfront through a higher wholesale price.

Inventory and sales effort management under unobservable lost sales

A retailer needs to make decisions regarding how much to order and how much sales effort to exert in an environment with uncertain demand. One intrinsic complexity in a typical retail environment is caused by the fact that the retailer can obtain information about demand only based on sales, as demand itself is unobservable. Taking a Bayesian approach, Lariviere and Porteus (1999) show that in such a setting a retailer should stock more to increase the probability of an exact demand observation. In this article, we extend their work by allowing the retailer to control both the stocking quantity and sales effort, which can be used to affect demand. We show that their insights with respect to information stalking carry over to this setting. In addition, our model allows gaining a better understanding of optimal sales effort strategies. We find that demand management has a dual role in supporting information gathering: while at the beginning of a product life cycle it is optimal to support learning effects by sharply reducing sales effort, at later stages of the product life cycle an aggressive strategy of increased promotional activities can be used to harvest the information gathered in earlier periods.

Controlling a supplier’s subcontracting decisions through contractual enforcement or economic incentives

Suppliers often subcontract part of their workload to other suppliers, and manufacturers might suffer severe consequences if they do not anticipate their suppliers’ incentives to subcontract. In this paper, we study the case where a manufacturer outsources two tasks to a top-tier supplier. The manufacturer must decide whether it should design a contract that enforces that the different tasks are completed by the appropriate suppliers, and when it is preferable to use economic incentives to manipulate the top-tier supplier’s subcontracting behaviour. We find that when the cost difference between suppliers of different tiers is small and the correlation between the risks associated with the two tasks is minimal, the manufacturer can benefit from designing a contract that ensures the preferred subcontracting behaviour, if the cost of enforcing such a contract is not too high. However, when such enforcement cost is substantial, the manufacturer might be better off manipulating the top-tier supplier’s economic incentives.

Outsourcing to suppliers with unknown capabilities

We investigate the make-buy decision of a manufacturer who does not know its potential suppliers’ capabilities. In order to mitigate the consequences of this limited knowledge, the manufacturer can either perform in-house or audit suppliers. An audit reveals the audited supplier’s capability such that the manufacturer can base the make-buy decision on the audit outcome; the manufacturer might also learn from the audit and update its beliefs about the capabilities of the unaudited suppliers. Interestingly, using a very general model we find that the manufacturer’s decision can be independent of both the number of available suppliers and of the mechanism it uses to update its beliefs after an audit. We illustrate our general model by considering a possible application, where a manufacturer is making the outsource-audit decisions when the suppliers are more cost effective. However, when outsourcing to supplier, the manufacturer would face the uncertainty of whether or not the delivered task can integrate well with the other parts of the project.

Optimal single machine scheduling of products with components and changeover cost

We consider the problem of scheduling products with components on a single machine, where changeovers incur fixed costs. The objective is to minimize the weighted sum of total flow time and changeover cost. We provide properties of optimal solutions and develop an explicit characterization of optimal sequences, while showing that this characterization has recurrent properties. Our structural results have interesting implications for practitioners, primarily that the structure of optimal sequences is robust to changes in demand.

Product variety and distribution channel structure

We consider how a manufacturer’s product variety decision is affected by its distribution strategy. While offering product variety will generally lead to higher demand, it also has negative implications on production costs and demand uncertainty. We investigate how the manufacturer’s optimal product variety decision differs when selling directly to customers (centralised scenario) as compared to selling through a retailer (decentralised scenario). We find that the retailer’s power and the impact of product variety on demand significantly affect the attractiveness of product variety and determine under which distribution strategy the manufacturer should provide a higher level of variety.