Haig Khatchadourian

Artistic Freedom and Social Control

Prima facie, societys coercive control of art, e.g., censorship or even the punishment of dissident artists, seems to be justified if one accepts (1) an instrumentalist e.g., moralistic or political theory of art, and (2) the view that societys essential function is furthering the general good. For with regard to (2) it may be said, following Plato, for example, that the function of society is to provide the conditions that foster the creation, growth, and conservation of all possible values; and since good art is a great positive value, furnishing the artist with optimum conditions for artistic creativity is one of societys basic responsibilities. Likewise it may be thought that society has the responsibility to discourage the creation of poor art, which is as undesirable as good art is desirable. Now suppose we agree for the sake of argument (and indeed, I firmly believe this to be true) that society has the responsibility to furnish optimum conditions for the flourishing of good art (proposi-

God, Happiness and Evil

In a recent article, George Schlesinger adds his thoughts to the quite extensive literature on the Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering. What is noteworthy about this article is the fact that the author, after briefly discussing a number of familiar arguments for and against the traditional theistic conception of God as both omnipotent and perfectly good, attempts to dissolve the problem itself as a pseudo-problem. In the present paper I wish (1) to try to show that Schlesingers attempt fails, whether or not he is right in his conclusion that the problem of evil is not a genuine problem; and (2) to raise, in the course of my criticism, certain fundamental questions that must be answered if the controversy between theists and their critics is to become logically capable of resolution. Further, in relation to (1) and (2), I shall (3) offer a very preliminary sketch of some of the fundamental terms or concepts involved in the discussion of the problem of evil and related issues of philosophical theology. I shall begin by saying a few things about Schlesingers discussion of some of the familiar attempts of theists to resolve the problem, and the equally familiar attacks of the sceptics. I shall then pass to a criticism of Schlesingers main thesis.

Philosophical Analysis: A General Discussion

The terms ‘analysis’ and ‘analyse’ are used in all sorts of ways in ordinary discourse and in technical, specialized contexts. Thus we speak of analysis of the news, analysis of the present situation in this or that troubled area of the world, analysis of the ideas or views of an Albert Schweitzer, and of the story of the latest movie in town. In more specialized or technical discourse we speak of chemical analysis, mathematical analysis,1 a critic’s analysis of a poem or a painting, a student’s grammatical analysis of a sentence, and a philosopher’s analysis of a given proposition, concept or phenomenon.

Deductive Inference and Analysis

In the preceding chapter we saw how a philosopher can utilize the results of exhibition analysis and other forms of semantic analysis that we have discussed, in the attempt to answer particular philosophical questions and to resolve — or dissolve — philosophical “puzzles.” We saw that one major way in which the latter may be achieved consists in the construction of deductive arguments logically grounded on the results of accomplished analyses. There is, however, a second, more direct use of deductive arguments in relation to semantic analysis, with which we shall concern ourselves in the present chapter. Certain deductive arguments themselves can, in some cases, reveal or uncover some aspects of the logical grammar (or what Gilbert Ryle calls the logical powers) of one or more of the propositions constituting the premises of such arguments. Since the logical grammar of a proposition is logically a product of the logical powers of the concepts that compose it, as logically related in the particular propositions — or better, the logical grammar of concepts consists in the logical grammar of the propositions into which they enter as logical constituents 1 — the deductive arguments we have in mind reveal the logical grammar of the concepts which form the propositions serving as their premises

Semantic Analysis II

In the preceding chapter I discussed in some detail one form of philosophical analysis — the analysis of concepts — which I had earlier classified under “Semantic Analysis.” In the present chapter I shall discuss a second, related form of “Semantic Analysis.” This form of analysis, it will be remembered, we have referred to as “exhibition analysis,” borrowing a convenient phrase from Stephan Korner. Some, perhaps many, of the method’s salient features, as set out and advocated by me here, are derived from or inspired by the pronouncements and especially the practice of the so-called later Wittgensteinians or Oxford (or Linguistic) Analysts. I am not, however, concerned with an exposition or analysis of the methods associated with these philosophers; nor do I claim that these thinkers would agree with the views here set out any more than the present writer accepts their own methods in their entirety. Similarly, my employment of the phrase ‘exhibition analysis’ is not intended to imply complete agreement on my part with Korner’s understanding of what he calls “exhibition analysis.”

Semantic Analysis I

In the first part of the present work we considered some important topics by way of preparing the ground for a critical study of philosophical analysis. With that we pass to a detailed consideration of the major types and forms of philosophical analysis themselves, as we have outlined them in chapter one. The type of analysis to be considered first is “semantic analysis”; and we shall begin with that form of it which we have labelled “Semantic Analysis I.” The other forms of “semantic analysis,” as well as the major forms of “extra-linguistic analysis,” will be taken up in turn in succeeding chapters.

Language and Truth

In earlier chapters we spoke about some of the major ways in which a close study and analysis of ordinary language can be philosophically fruitful. There is one major philosophical use of ordinary language, however, which we left out of our discussion; though what we said there is related to it and to some extent implies it. I am referring to what seems to me to be the fact that ordinary language provides us with a criterion of truth: that it enables us to discover the truth or falsity of certain classes of statements that are, or may be, philosophically important. The discussion and analysis of this use of ordinary language — in particular the discovery of the kinds of statements whose truth or falsity it enables us to know, and the exact manner in which it can do so — constitutes the subject-matter of the present chapter.

Extra-Linguistic Analysis

In chapters five, six and nine we have discussed, it will be remembered, three major forms of semantic analysis. In the present chapter we pass to the second type of philosophical analysis we distinguished in chapter one: to what I have called “extra-linguistic analysis.” This type of analysis, it will perhaps be recalled, consists in the philosopher’s conceptual analysis of (I) certain actual objects, occurrences or states of affairs, and/or (2) certain empirical facts — hence true propositions — about actual objects, occurrences or states of affairs arrived at through scientific investigation. In both cases — and this is absolutely essential in our present conception of philosophical extra-linguistic analysis — the philosopher’s appeal to the nature of, or actual facts about, various existing things is, or must be, designed to help answer some philosophical question, or to throw light on some philosophical concept. In the latter case, the empirical facts which are utilized and interpreted may sometimes show the usefulness or desirability of reconstructing the concept in question, in view of the philosophical purpose or purposes it is intended to serve. In the light of our description of this method, it is seen that ‘empirical analysis’ would have been a better name for it than the one I have actually used, except for the following two reasons: First, that semantic analysis too is empirical in one sense — in being an analysis of actual languages or parts of actual languages; and second, that our present type of analysis, like semantic analysis, is conceptual in nature; as opposed to the kind of analysis which the chemist (say) practises in his laboratory.

Semantic Analysis III Analysis and Reconstruction

In chapters five and six I attempted a somewhat detailed exposition and analysis of two forms of semantic analysis. It was assumed there that in the case of neither form of analysis, the concepts, meanings or other kinds of uses analysed are in any way affected by the process of analysis itself. The first question we want to ask in the present chapter is whether this assumption or presumption is as a matter of fact true; or whether our two forms of semantic analysis — particularly “exhibition analysis,” on which, in a certain respect, the other form of analysis itself rests — necessarily involve a modification of the analysandum.

Meanings, Concepts, and the Uses of Verbal Expressions

In chapter two I frequently used such expressions as ‘the meaning of an expression,’ ‘the concept of so-and-so,’ ‘the uses of an expression,’ ‘the expression X has the same meaning as the expression Y.’ And we shall continue to meet these expressions in succeeding chapters. Although I did say something about “uses” in relation to the nature of “ordinary language(s)” (chapter two), I said little about concepts or synonymity. Nor have I hitherto attempted to deal with these in a separate section, at some length. In the present chapter we shall attempt to arrive at a clear understanding of the major differences and the relations between “meaning,” “use,” and “concept.” The notion of synonymity will be clarified in chapter four. I shall not attempt to say what “meaning,” “concept,” “use” are,in the sense of providing definitions of the corresponding terms, in any usual sense of ‘definition.’ But some direct, explicit, as well as implicit, analysis — whether or not capable of terminating in a definition of some sort — of the concepts meaning, concept and use will of necessity be made in the course of the discussion.