Hal Brands

Crime, Irregular Warfare, and Institutional Failure in Latin America: Guatemala as a Case Study

This article examines the current crisis in Guatemala as a case study in the phenomenon of “criminal insurgency” in Latin America. Since the close of Guatemalas civil war in 1996, crime—especially violent crime—has increased dramatically, to the point that drug traffickers, organized crime syndicates, and youth gangs are effectively waging a form of irregular warfare against the state. The police, the judiciary, and entire local and departmental governments are rife with criminal infiltrators; murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in recent years; criminal operatives assassinate government officials and troublesome members of the political class; and chunks of territory are now effectively under the control of criminal groups. All this has led to growing civic disillusion and eroded the authority and legitimacy of the government. Rampant crime is causing a crisis of the democratic state.

Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?

Efforts to understand Saddam Husseins strategic thought have long been hampered by the opacity and secrecy of the Baathist regime. Newly available, high-level Iraqi archival documentation demonstrates that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Saddam viewed nuclear weapons through a fundamentally coercive, revisionist lens. He had long hoped to wage a grinding war of attrition against the Israeli state, and he believed that Iraqi acquisition of the bomb would neutralize Israeli nuclear threats, force the Jewish state to fight at the conventional level, and thereby allow Iraq and its Arab allies (with their larger economic and population base) to prosecute a prolonged war that would displace Israel from the territories occupied in 1967. These findings have implications for the existing theoretical literature on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, as well as for the growing body of work on “nuclear alarmism.” The Iraqi case undermines the thesis that states proliferate primarily because of defensive concerns. Saddam certainly viewed possession of the bomb as a means of enhancing Iraqs security, but his attraction to nuclear weapons revolved around offensive objectives. Saddam hoped to exploit the deterrent balance with Israel to initiate a bloody conventional war that would have likely been immensely destructive and destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. In other words, though Saddam never obtained nuclear weapons, his views on their potential utility give good cause for both pessimism and alarm.

Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT

During the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union contended both with one another and with the members of their respective alliances in attempting to deal with the issues raised by nuclear proliferation. These negotiations, which covered a number of matters but centred on the conflict between a non-proliferation agreement and NATO plans for nuclear sharing, illustrate in microcosm some of the most important geopolitical trends of the middle Cold War. This episode was in certain diplomatic and conceptual respects an important precursor to détente. It also illuminated the declining ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to manage their respective European alliances, as well as the degree to which Russo-American cooperation further strained these partnerships. Finally, the negotiations and their aftermath showed that, in geostrategic terms, Moscow and Washington had much in common during the 1960s.

Barack Obama and the Dilemmas of American Grand Strategy

Did the Obama administration have a grand strategy? If so, was it effective? Before Obama’s presidency even ended, these questions were unleashing fusillades of contradictory commentary. Sympathetic observers credited Obama with a wise, well-integrated grand strategy that enhanced American power for “the long-game.” Detractors, by contrast, argued that Obama’s strategy of “overarching American retrenchment and accommodation” had been pernicious— even devastating—to national security. Still other prominent observers rejected the very idea of an Obama grand strategy, charging that his policies lacked any coherent design. Finally, and further muddying the waters, Obama himself was sometimes dismissive of grand strategy, once remarking that “I don’t really even need George Kennan right now.” As the president’s tenure ends, it is useful to revisit these issues and come to grips with grand strategy under Obama. In fact, the Obama administration did have a fairly clear and consistent grand strategy—if one defines grand strategy realistically, as a set of basic principles that guide policy. And that grand strategy reflected a mixture of continuity and change vis-a-vis the foreign policy tradition Obama inherited. In many ways, Obama’s grand strategy fit squarely within the broad contours of American statecraft during the post-war and post-Cold War eras, as its broadest objective was maintaining U.S. primacy and a liberal international order. Yet Obama simultaneously sought to define his grand strategy in opposition to the purported mistakes of George W. Bush, and therefore emphasized altering the more recent arc of U.S.

Inside the Iraqi State Records: Saddam Hussein, ‘Irangate’, and the United States

Abstract This article uses captured Iraqi state records to examine Saddam Husseins reaction to US arms to sales to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War (the Iran/Contra scandal). These records show that ‘Irangate’ marked a decisive departure in Saddams relations with the United States. Irangate reinforced Saddams preexisting suspicions of US policy, convincing him that Washington was a strategic enemy that could not be trusted. Saddam concealed his anger to preserve a working relationship with the Reagan administration, but this episode nevertheless cemented his negative views of the United States and forged a legacy of hostility and mistrust that would inform his strategic calculus for years to come.

Inside the cold war : Loy Henderson and the rise of the American empire, 1918-1961

This is a biography of the American diplomat Loy Henderson, a key foreign service officer whose career spanned the period 1920 to 1960. Hendersons involvement in many critical decisions of his time presents insight into the course of the development of American foreign policy over four decades. As the USA started to become enmeshed in world affairs between the 1930s and 1960s, so Hendersons career developed. He was part of the first American diplomatic mission to Moscow in 1934, and watched the unfolding of Stalins totalitarian design. He refused to temper his opinions to suit the White House and consequently often found himself in far corners of the world. Henderson served as the American representative to the Baghdad Alliance when a 1953 coup in Iran carried the USA into the Middle East in an unprecedented way. By the time he retired in 1961, he enjoyed a reputation unmatched in his profession. In telling the story of Hendersons service, this text shows how he reflects so many of the major themes of 20th century American foreign policy. The author also makes use of Hendersons career to explore major themes of American policy, particularly in the post-1945 Cold War period.

Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable

The most fateful American choice in the rise of ISIS was also the oldest one: the 2003 decision to invade Iraq, followed by the mismanagement of the occupation.

Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing

Should the United States adopt a fundamentally more modest and restrained grand strategy? Should it dramatically reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the network of security commitments and overseas force deployments that have been the linchpin of its global posture since World War II? In recent years, a growing chorus of scholars and strategic thinkers has answered this question ‘yes.’ They have argued that Washington’s longstanding global posture has now become unnecessary and counterproductive—unnecessary because it is no longer required to maintain a favorable international environment, and counterproductive because it squanders limited resources while creating more problems than it solves. The solution, these scholars contend, is to embrace a minimalist strategy of “offshore balancing.” In its simplest form, offshore balancing envisions slashing U.S. force posture and alliance commitments overseas, and undertaking a marked retrenchment in U.S. policy more broadly. Its guiding premise is that such retrenchment can lead to greater security at lesser cost—that less, in other words, can really be more. At present, this seems to be a beguiling proposition. Offshore balancing has long been the grand strategy of choice among leading international-relations “realists” like John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Christopher Layne, and Barry Posen. In the post-Iraq War and post-financial crisis context, retrenchment’s appeal has grown stronger still. Interest in offshore balancing has “jumped from

Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was there a green light?

Since the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, numerous observers and scholars have alleged that the United States ‘green-lighted’ Saddam Husseins decision to go to war. This article scrutinises the green light thesis by examining US and Iraqi documents that have recently become available to scholars. These records reveal that the green light thesis has more basis in myth than in reality. Preoccupied with issues such as the Iran hostage crisis and the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter administration officials neither expected nor welcomed Saddams attack on Iran. The Iraqi dictator, for his part, believed that Washington would oppose rather than support his war.

Evaluating Brazilian Grand Strategy under Lula

This article analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. During Lulas eight years in office, he pursued a multitiered grand strategy aimed at hastening the transition from U.S. and Western hegemony to a multipolar order more favorable to Brazilian interests. Lula did so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing, coalition building, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America. During Lulas time in office, this strategy successfully raised Brazils profile and increased its diplomatic flexibility, but the country still faces several potent strategic dilemmas that could complicate or undermine its geopolitical ascent.