Halvard Leira

Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II From a Local to a Global Perspective

This article details the changes in Norwegian strategic culture, comprising grand strategy and practice, following the end of the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War, Norwegian security and defence policy was characterized by broad, non-politicized consensus. Basic elements of this grand strategic perspective were the smallness of Norway, the people defence and allegiance to the UN. Doctrines focused on survival, with the army as the lead service. Close ties were maintained between the military and societal elites, and the military was seen just as much in societal terms, namely as an employer in scarcely populated areas, as it was in defensive terms. The changes in strategic culture over the past 10–15 years have been uneven, partly driven by internal and external changes in discourse, but over recent years probably as much by changes in practice. The first post-Cold War years witnessed the emergence of an alternative grand strategic representation, focusing on international operations rather than on invasion defence. Mindful of the impact on local communities of a reduced military presence, politicians long resisted any change, but after years of resistance the alternative grand strategy was embraced by the armed forces, leading to the creation of a rapid reaction force and increased emphasis on special task forces. International experience is now considered positive, even necessary, for a military career. Furthermore, whereas general conscription was gradually undermined because of the way in which it is practised, new civil–military ties were forged through the practice of providing military personnel training that was interchangeable with regular education. It now seems that military practice, as well as the specialized military discourse, has outpaced the broader Norwegian discourse on the use of military means. Nevertheless, the tension between global and local concerns remains unresolved.

Justus Lipsius, political humanism and the disciplining of 17th century statecraft

Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) was among the most influential thinkers of the late 16th/early 17th centuries. His guides for action were highly influential in the establishment of moderate absolutism and what has been called the fiscal-military state across Europe. In this article I explore Lipsian thought in an International Relations context. Special attention is paid to his ideals of discipline, which were meant to order both the ruler and those that he ruled. Dignity, self-restraint and discipline were the recipes for the foreign policy of the prince, while the individual was subordinated to the purposes of the state, and taught to control his own life by mastering his emotions. If not a seminal thinker in his own right, it is necessary to understand Lipsius’ thought and influence to be able to fully understand the 17th century theoretical approaches to peace and prosperity and the relative discipline of early-modern statecraft.

Consular representation in an emerging state : the case of Norway

The consular institution has regularly been viewed by academics and practitioners alike as the poor sibling of diplomacy: as a career sidetrack or tour of duty for aspiring ambassadors; and as an example devoid of all the intrigue and politics by historians and theoreticians of diplomacy. Through a detailed case study of the emergence and development of consular representation in Norway, this article demonstrates that any comprehensive history of diplomacy must include a history of the consular institution; that the history of the consular institution is nevertheless not reducible to a history of diplomacy; and that studying the consular institution offers up fresh perspectives on the social practices of representation and state formation.

Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking

We develop scholarship on status in international politics by focusing on the social dimension of small and middle power status politics. This vantage opens a new window on the widely-discussed strategies social actors may use to maintain and enhance their status, showing how social creativity, mobility, and competition can all be system-supporting under some conditions. We extract lessons for other thorny issues in status research, notably questions concerning when, if ever, status is a good in itself; whether it must be a positional good; and how states measure it.

Political change and historical analogies

In November 2016, Donald J. Trump surprised the world, himself included, by being elected to the US presidency. His completely unorthodox campaign seemingly overturned common wisdom about how to get elected, and the way he outperformed polling in key swing states left most prognosticators with egg on their faces. The shocks continued through a disjointed transition-period and the first, combative and tumultuous months of the Trump presidency. Trying to make sense of the developments, scholars, policy analysts and activists alike have turned to history for analogies and ideas for action, some in opposition to Trump, and others in support. The turn to history is not restricted to how observers are trying to make sense of the Trump presidency; on the contrary, there seems to have been a steady uptick in the use of historical analogies in both scholarly and political work over the last decades. This is not surprising. History has long been considered the provider of “lessons” – informing those who perceive them correctly, misleading those who misperceive them, and damning those who ignore them. And such lessons are more sought after in times of perceived upheaval and change, than in quieter periods. If today is much like yesterday, and tomorrow can be expected to bring more of the same, there is no perceived need to look for guidance and understanding beyond one’s own experience. On the other hand, when seemingly novel phenomena disrupt the daily rhythm, the incentive to look beyond becomes stronger and the need to establish meaning and possibilities for action more acute. Understanding the present in terms of the past is one of the commonplace ways in which humans situate themselves and make decisions about action. Not being able to read the future, and unable to hang on to the present, many would say it is our only source of lessons. If all things appear equal, choosing the course which has been successful at a previous historical situation makes good sense; turning to historical analogies offers what Jervis (1976, p. 220) refers to as a useful “shortcut to rationality”. This holds for great political decisions as well as the everyday practices of life. Mythologized great events provide cognitive metaphors which reduce uncertainty for most of us, including decision-makers; the alleged lessons of Munich, Vietnam and Srebrenica have, for instance, been invoked in international relations at critical junctions over the last seven decades. This mode of decision-making and political reasoning has been the object of much

Caring and Carers: Diplomatic Personnel and the Duty of Care

This article deals with the duty of care that states hold in relation to their citizens abroad — more specifically, the double role of diplomatic personnel, as both providers and recipients of care. The focus of discussion is states’ duty of care for diplomatic personnel, raising questions of how this care can be balanced with the duty of care for citizens and how far this duty stretches. The article first emphasizes the threats, before focusing on the means of protection: evacuation; physical structures; and psychological care. A tension remains, for as states fulfil their duty of care towards personnel through increasing security, they might at the same time reduce their personnel’s capacity to provide care for citizens. One solution for this tension — outsourcing and local personnel — tests the limits of care.