Hanna Lierse

The Global Emergence of Social Protection

Comparative welfare state research is directed mainly toward the development of welfare states in advanced democracies, although the majority of people live outside the OECD and often face graver social risks arising from poverty and starvation. To secure a minimum standard of living, nearly all countries have introduced social programs to protect their citizens. Yet the timing of when governments take on the responsibility of providing social protection varies decisively across the world. Using data for 177 territories and independent states over the period from 1820 to 2013, we illustrate how social security legislation has emerged throughout the world. Although we find that the patterns and pathways vary strongly between different regions, the evidence shows that the proliferation of social protection is a transnational event: regional diffusion and membership in the International Labour Organization matter irrespective of the regional and temporal context.

European taxation during the crisis: does politics matter?

With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, European governments extensively intervened to avert a severe economic recession. Taxation is a crucial instrument to achieve such economic objectives, but it also represents a redistributive tool in democratic societies. Generally, left-wing parties are more supportive of progressive taxes and redistribution than right-wing governments. As a crisis response, one could assume that European governments, especially social-democratic ones, reinforced a redistributive stance to compensate for the substantial amounts of public money used to bail out financial institutions. Based on the tax reforms introduced between 2008 and 2010, the paper explores the tax strategies adopted by European governments. The findings do not reveal a direct effect of party politics on taxation but rather show that pressures from the capital markets significantly restrained governments’ policy capacities to act.

Dictators Don't Compete: Autocracy, Democracy and Tax Competition

ABSTRACT It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011.

Trade liberalization and the global expansion of modern taxes

ABSTRACT For a long time, governments relied heavily on trade taxes as the main source of public finance, and for some countries, mainly less developed ones, they still account for a large share of revenue. Yet, with trade liberalization, governments have been forced to abandon these easy-to-collect taxes and to adopt modern hard-to-collect taxes, mainly internal income and consumption taxes. Surprisingly, we know little about how governments across the world have addressed this common challenge. In this paper, we analyze the rise of the most important present taxes: the personal and corporate income tax, the general sales tax and the value-added tax. Based on a self-coded dataset, we provide a historical-descriptive outline of the expansion of modern taxes since 1842 and test the effect of trade liberalization on the probability to adopt hard(er)-to-collect taxes. While trade is an important determinant for the legislation of modern taxes, we find that its influence is not universal but depends on the tax type. Only the personal income tax and the value-added tax have served as a revenue substitution to trade taxes, while the general sales tax and the corporate income tax were rather fueled by other factors such as spending pressures.

Room to Manoeuvre? International Financial Markets and the National Tax State

Globalisation has triggered a downwards trend in direct taxation as governments compete for internationally mobile capital. This popular postulation has blurred the attention to potential upward constraints on tax policy-making emanating from globalised capital markets. In this paper, we illustrate when and how capital markets exert an upward pressure on taxes. While the increasing access to international capital allowed governments in developed democracies to indulge their voters with deficit-financed spending, the most recent crisis has shown that this is no panacea. When international loans become costly, governments have to revert to raising revenue domestically. Using comparative time-series data since the 1980s, we investigate how rising bond yields affect the number and the direction of tax reforms, as well as the tax mix in the OECD. The empirical analysis provides some evidence that international capital markets place an upward pressure on taxes, recently above all on consumption taxes. Yet, governments have also retained room to manoeuvre as a number of tax decisions are more dependent on domestic political factors than on pressure from the capital markets.