Hans Degryse

Bank Relationships and Firm Profitability

This paper examines how bank relationships affect firm performance. An empirical implication of recent theoretical models is that firms maintaining multiple bank relationships are less profitable than their single-bank peers. We investigate this empirical implication using a data set containing virtually all Norwegian publicly listed firms for the period 1979-1995. We find that profitability is substantially higher if firms maintain only a single bank relationship. We also find that firms replacing a single bank relationship are on average smaller and younger than firms not replacing a single bank relationship.

On the interaction between vertical and horizontal product differentiation: An application to banking

The author studies the conditions under which banks offer remote access. Note there exists interaction between location and taste for remote access. Offering remote access is an instrument to (partially) segment depositors according to their taste for that technology. The interaction between location and taste for remote access enhances this effect. Different equilibria emerge as the result of two effects. First, introducing remote access steals depositors from the opponent as the product specification becomes more appealing. Second, deposit rate competition is affected as remote access determines the substitutability of banks. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets

In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lenders own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbents profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry.

When arm's length is too far. Relationship banking over the business cycle

Using a novel way to identify relationship and transaction banks, we study how banks’ lending techniques affect funding to SMEs over the business cycle. For 21 countries we link the lending techniques that banks use in the direct vicinity of firms to these firms’ credit constraints at two contrasting points of the business cycle. We show that relationship lending alleviates credit constraints during a cyclical downturn but not during a boom period. The positive impact of relationship lending in an economic downturn is strongest for smaller and more opaque firms and in regions where the downturn is more severe.

Foreign Bank Entry and Credit Allocation in Emerging Markets

We employ a unique data set containing bank-specific information to explore how foreign bank entry determines credit allocation in emerging markets. We investigate the impact of the mode of foreign entry (greenfield or takeover) on banks’ portfolio allocation to borrowers with different degrees of informational transparency, as well as by maturities and currencies. The impact of foreign entry on credit allocation may stem from the superior performance of foreign entrants (“performance hypothesis�?), or reflect borrower informational capture (“portfolio composition hypothesis�?). Our results are broadly in line with the portfolio composition hypothesis, showing that borrower informational capture determines bank credit allocation.

The Impact of Firm and Industry Characteristics on Small Firms' Capital Structure: Evidence from Dutch Panel Data

We investigate small firms’ capital structure, employing a proprietary database containing financial statements of Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2005. We find that the capital structure decision of Dutch SMEs is consistent with the pecking order theory: SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level, and growing firms increase their debt position since they need more funds. Furthermore, we document that profits reduce in particular short term debt, whereas growth increases long term debt. This implies that when internal funds are depleted, long term debt is next in the pecking order. We also find evidence for the maturity matching principle in SME capital structure: long term assets are financed with long term debt, while short term assets are financed with short tem debt. This implies that the maturity structure of debt is an instrument for lenders to deal with problems of asymmetric information. Finally, we find that SME capital structure varies across industries but firm characteristics are more important than industry characteristics.

On the Non-Exclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

Credit contracts are non-exclusive. A string of theoretical papers shows that nonexclusivity generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how the contractual externality stemming from the non-exclusivity of credit contracts affects credit supply. In particular, using internal information on a creditor’s willingness to lend, we find that a creditor reduces its loan supply when a borrower initiates a loan at another creditor. Consistent with the theoretical literature on contractual externalities, the effect is more pronounced the larger the loans from the other creditor. We also find that the initial creditor’s willingness to lend does not change if its existing and future loans retain seniority over the other creditors’ loans and are secured with assets whose value is high and stable over time.

Distance, Bank Organizational Structure, and Credit

A time of arrival detector for an analog pulse signal digitizes the pulse, digitally delays the digitized signal in one path and converts the delayed signal back to a delayed analog version of the input signal. In a second path an undelayed analog version of the input signal is provided. A scaling offset is established to scale the delayed signal larger than the undelayed signal, and the delayed and undelayed signals are then compared to establish a time of arrival for the input pulse. A delta modulator is preferably used to provide the digitized signal, and also to provide the undelayed analog version of the input signal as the smoothed output of an integrator within the delta modulator. The undelayed modulator output is preferably attenuated by -3 dB, with the pulses time of arrival obtained from the time at which the delayed analog signal rises above the undelayed but attenuated signal. The time of arrival of the pulses trailing edge is obtained in a similar manner by scaling the undelayed signal larger than the delayed signal, and comparing the two resulting signals to detect when the undelayed signal falls below the delayed signal. The pulse width can then be determined by subtracting the pulses time of arrival from its time of termination.

Informal or Formal Financing? Or Both? First Evidence on the Co-Funding of Chinese Firms

The recent financial crisis has reopened the debate on the impact of informal and formal finance on firm growth in developing countries. Using unique survey data, we find that informal finance is associated with higher sales growth for small firms and lower sales growth for large firms. We identify a complementary effect between informal and formal finance for the sales growth of small firms, but not for large firms. Informal finance offers informational and monitoring advantages, while formal finance offers relatively inexpensive funds. Co-funding, i.e. the simultaneous use of formal and informal finance, is the optimal choice for small firms.

Information Sharing and Credit Rationing : Evidence from the Introduction of a Public Credit Registry

We provide the first evidence on how the introduction of information sharing via a public credit registry affects banks’ lending decisions. We employ a unique dataset containing detailed information on credit card applications and decisions from one of the leading banks in China. While we do not find that information sharing decreases credit rationing on average, the distribution of granted credit among borrowers with shared information has a unique pattern. In particular, compared to those with information reported only by this bank, borrowers with extra information shared by other banks receive higher credit card lines. While positive information shared by other banks augments lending of this bank, the effect of negative information shared by other banks is not significant. In addition, the availability of shared information through the Public Registry has mixed effects on how the bank utilizes internally produced information. Last, information sharing alleviates informational barriers in China’s credit card market, but not completely.