Hans Kamp

Two Theories about Adjectives

A solids-agitating insert for double-ended, invertible tanks including flexible X-members the ends of which are flexed together for insertion through one end-aperture of the tank and retained in the tank when the ends are allowed to spring outwardly within the tank.

Events, Instants and Temporal Reference

The truth of my claim: ‘It is raining’ depends on the time at which I made it. It was true if and only if it was indeed raining (in my vicinity) at that time. Similarly my assertion ‘it has been raining’, made at time t, is true if there was a time t′ preceding t such that it rained at t′.

The speaking brain: a tutorial introduction to fMRI experiments in the production of speech, prosody and syntax

Abstract In this study we will give an overview of the experimental work on the neuroanatomical correlates of language and speech production that we have done in recent years. First we will introduce the methodology of event-related functional magnetic neuro-imaging and the experimental paradigm that we employed. Then we will present and discuss the results of our experiments on (1) speech motor control, (2) articulatory complexity, (3) the neuroanatomical correlates of prosody, and (4) the neurocognitive substrates of syntactic processing. Experiments (1) and (2) show that the expected large motor speech network consisting of SMA, motor cortex and cerebellum is only active in planning and execution of simple articulatory movements. Increased articulatory complexity leads to more focused activation. Furthermore, we can show that only the execution of speech movements recruits the left anterior insula, while articulatory planning does not. The results of experiment (3) indicate that it is not the function of prosody (linguistic vs affective) that controls lateralization of prosodic processing, but that more general characteristics of the processing units like the size of the prosodic frame are responsible for the activation of different cortical regions. Finally, in experiment (4) we present first results on syntactic processing in speech production. Besides the expected activation of Brocas area we found activations in Wernickes area and in the cerebellum. We have also found evidence for activations in other cortical areas, which are less often implicated in clinical studies on brain language correlations. The cognitive relevance of these areas and networks is still to be elucidated.

Prolegomena to a Structural Account of Belief and Other Attitudes

Theories that analyze belief as a relation between the believer and a set of possible worlds are unacceptable in just this way. In a context where beliefs are attributed for the sake of explaining overt behavior their intentional character would thus appear to be of paramount importance. What is needed therefore is a theory of belief which does justice both to (i) the intentionality of beliefs and (ii) to the fact that their identity conditions are stricter than those of the corresponding sets of worlds. The general strategy is to see an attitude reporting sentence, in the spirit of discourse representation theory (DRT), as a set of instructions to the recipient for constructing a representation of the reported attitude. Keywords:attitudes; belief; DRT; sentences; structural account

DRS-construction and lexically driven inference

In this paper we investigate the role of lexical information, as outlined and exemplified in the first paper of this volume, in inferencing from semantic representations (DRSs) of miniature texts. Besides lexical entries for certain verbs we also study the inferential role of the word wieder (again). Since the semantic contributions made by wieder are presuppositional in nature, a large part of the paper is concerned with presupposition. Special attention will be given to the subtle connections between presupposition verification and presupposition accommodation.

Semantics Versus Pragmatics

Consider the sentences (1) You may take an apple, (2) You may take a pear, and (3) You may take an apple or take a pear.

A calculus for first order Discourse Representation Structures

This paper presents a sound and complete proof system for the first order fragment of Discourse Representation Theory. Since the inferences that human language users draw from the verbal input they receive for the most transcend the capacities of such a system, it can be no more than a basis on which more powerful systems, which are capable of producing those inferences, may then be built. Nevertheless, even within the general setting of first order logic the structure of the “formulas” of DRS-languages, i.e. of the Discourse Representation Structures suggest for the components of such a system inference rules that differ somewhat from those usually found in proof systems for the first order predicate calculus and which are, we believe, more in keeping with inference patterns that are actually employed in common sense reasoning.This is why we have decided to publish the present exercise, in spite of the fact that it is not one for which a great deal of originality could be claimed. In fact, it could be argued that the problem addressed in this paper was solved when Gödel first established the completeness of the system of Principia Mathematica for first order logic. For the DRS-languages we consider here are straightforwardly intertranslatable with standard formulations of the predicate calculus; in fact the translations are so straightforward that any sound and complete proof system for first order logic can be used as a sound and complete proof system for DRSs: simply translate the DRSs into formulas of predicate logic and then proceed as usual. As a matter of fact, this is how one has chosen to proceed in some implementations of DRT, which involve inferencing as well as semantic representation; an example is the Lex system developed jointly by IBM and the University of Tübingen (see in particular (Guenthner et al. 1986)).In the light of the close and simple connections between DRT and standard predicate logic, publication of what will be presented in this paper can be justified only in terms of the special mash we have tried to achieve between the general form and the particular rules of our proof system on the one hand and on the other the distinctive architecture of DRS-like semantic representation. Some additional justification is necessary, however, as there exist a number of other proof systems for first order DRT, some of which have pursued more or less the same aims that have motivated the system presented here. We are explicitly aware of those developed by (Koons 1988), (Saurer 1990), (Sedogbo and Eytan 1987), (Reinhart 1989), (Gabbay and Reyle 1994); perhaps there are others. (Sedogbo and Eytan 1987) is a tableau system, and (Reinhart 1989) and (Gabbay and Reyle 1994) are resolution based, goal directed. These systems may promise particular advantages when it comes to implementing inference engines operating on DRS-like premises. But they do not aim to conform to certain canons of actual inferencing by human interpreters of natural language; and indeed the proof procedures they propose depart quite drastically from what one could plausibly assume to go in the head of such an interpreter. Only (Koons 1988) and (Saurer 1990) are, like our system, inspired by the methods of natural deduction. But there are some differences in the choice of basic rules. In particular both (Koons 1988) and (Saurer 1990) have among their primitive rules the Rule of Reiteration, which permits the copying of a DRS condition from a DRS to any of its sub-DRSs. In our system this is a derived rule (see Section 4 below).We will develop our system in several stages. The necessary intuitions and the formal background are provided in Sections 1 and 2. (The formal definitions can be found also in the first two chapters of (Kamp and Reyle 1993). The first system we present is for a sublanguage of the one defined in Section 2, which differs from the full language in that it lacks identity and disjunction. The core of the paper consists of Section 3, where the proof system for this sublanguage is presented, and Section 5, which extends the system for the full language, including disjunctions (Section 5.1) and identity (Section 5.2) and then establishes soundness and completeness for the full system. Section 4 deals with certain derived inference principles.

There is no Opposition between Formal and Cognitive Semantics

Abstract 1. Introduction The history of modern semantics is characterised by two research traditions which are based on radically different views concerning both conceptual motivation and the purpose of semantic research. Realistic semantics conceives of semantics as characterising the relationsship between linguistic expressions and reality. In most cases this relationship is explicated by means of modeltheoretic concepts. The following quote from one of the founding fathers of realistic semantics clearly rejects a mentalist stance.

Squiggly issues: alternative sets, complex DPs, and intensionality

In this paper, we investigate a number of long-standing issues in connection with (i) focus interpretation and its interrelation with complex definite descriptions, and (ii) the intensional properties of sentences with focus constituents. We revitalize the use of Rooths (1992) ∼ operator, clarify its definition as an anaphoric operator, discuss the principles that govern its placement in logical forms and show how it can be succesfully employed to replace the notion of Krifkas (2006) focus phrases. Finally, we argue that a proper view of the intensional dimension of retrieving the antecedent sets required by the operator can account for problems relating to the intensionality of sentences with focus sensitive operators that are discussed by Beaver & Clark (2008).

Tense and Aspect

The theory we have developed in the preceding chapters ignores all questions of reference to time. In view of this one might have thought that it cannot possibly by right. For in natural languages such as English reference to time is ubiquitous. Virtually every English sentence involves an element of temporal reference because of the tense of its verb: as a first approximation, a sentence in the past tense locates the episode it describes before the utterance time, sentences in the future tense serve to describe episodes later than the time of utterance and a present tense sentence is typically used to present a condition as holding over some period which surrounds the utterance time. Since our theory paid no heed to any of this, how could it possibly be correct?