Hansjörg Herr

Capital Controls and Economic Development in China

The People’s Republic of China is one of most successful developing countries in recent decades.1 However, it is not a showcase for policies recommended by mainstream neoclassical thinking and international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China did not follow the policies of the so-called Washington Consensus.2 Showcases for such policies, from Argentina to Mongolia, did not perform very well. Often China is considered as a very special case not transferable to other countries. This is not true; other developing countries can learn from China.

Elements of a Monetary Theory of Production

Money, Distribution and Economic Policy takes issue with the inappropriate treatment of money, effective demand and distribution issues in modern mainstream macroeconomics. It presents contributions which are critical of modern orthodoxy and which explore alternative approaches to macroeconomics and economic policy analysis. The contributors explore the following areas: • the development of heterodox theory • the role of money in macroeconomics • the relationship between distribution and aggregate demand • macroeconomic policy issues from a broader heterodox perspective.

Insufficient Economic Convergence in the World Economy: How Do Economists Explain Why Too Many Countries Do Not Catch-up?

This essay reviews different economic perspectives on the development of productivity and living standards in developing countries. It shows that neoclassical approaches to the problem of economic convergence fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of why economic convergence does not take place. In doing so, it reviews seven heterodox arguments on why developing countries do not converge. The article argues that the lack of economic convergence is a result of market forces which lead to the reproduction of underdevelopment. Therefore, comprehensive state interventions are needed to overcome underdevelopment. The article discusses different alternative policies which are needed to trigger development, thus countering the perspectives of neoliberal economists and the Washington Consensus.

The Growth of Finance and Its Role Since the 1980s—A Quantitative Overview

The value of financial assets in the German economy grew rapidly in the 1990s, both in absolute terms as well as relative to GDP. The activity of banks, as measured by the ratio of deposits, bank loans and securities held by banks to GDP, also grew strongly in the later period. At the same time the size and activity of financial markets has grown, although to a lesser extent. Despite the growth of financial markets, however, they are still rather underdeveloped by international comparison. More significant changes can be observed in the non-financial corporate sector. Non-financial corporations have increased the share of their investments assigned to financial assets; a larger part of their profits has been generated from financial sources; and the share of their earnings distributed to financial investors has increased. There were important changes in ownership and control of the German corporations, which coincided with those trends. In the early 1990s, the most important shareholders in companies were non-financial corporations, but such cross-holdings subsequently declined quite strongly. The second most important shareholders were households, although their holdings also declined subsequently, partly due to a shift towards indirect holdings through institutional investors. The most striking increase in share-holdings has been that by foreign investors. Institutional investors grew rapidly in the decade from 1990 to 2000. However, their size is still small by international comparison. Over all, the data and comparisons suggest that the growth of finance is a quite recent and still relatively modest phenomenon in Germany.

Privatisation and Nationalisation Policies and the Financial Sector

The structure of the German banking system, involving private, public and cooperative banks, has not changed significantly in recent years, despite some pressure for liberalisation and privatisation. In other sectors of the economy, however, privatisation has had an impact. In quantitative terms, the post-unification wave of privatisations in East Germany was the most important. It was organised by the federal agency Treuhandanstalt, whose aims were to save as much as possible of East German industry. Whether planned or not, in practice, the Treuhandanstalt’s activity resulted largely in the takeover of East German enterprises by West German companies. Because of the Treuhandanstalt’s extensive role, that of financial institutions was quite limited. Another important field for privatisation concerned public utilities. This was in part motivated by a desire to either raise revenue or to sell off loss-making units, and in part a response to European Commission directives. Privatisation has affected former state monopolies such as the postal, telecommunications and, to some extent, transport sectors. The healthcare sector was never a state monopoly, but public hospitals have been increasingly privatised since the early 1990s and private hospitals are now a dominant form of healthcare provision. In the course of the crisis several privately-owned financial institutions were either partly (Commerzbank) or completely (Hypo Real Estate Holding AG) nationalised. On the other hand, the German Industriebank, IKB—up until the crisis in majority ownership of the government—was privatised after German government had taken over all of its debts.

Regulation of the German Financial System

The regulatory regime in Germany from the 1930s up to the 1990s could be characterised as a stakeholder-oriented and bank-based model. Regulations stabilised the widespread system of house-banks and the extensive cross-holdings of shares between big financial and industrial companies. Formally, a universal banking system existed, but investment banking was in practice unimportant. This started to change in the 1990s, gained speed following the election in 1998, and triggered a transition to a regime where shareholders’ interests began to gain importance in regulations. From 1995, Germany initiated changes that aimed to move the financial system in the direction of a more Anglo-Saxon type system. Regulatory changes aimed at strengthening the power of shareholders, and at limiting the influence of banks. This has led to a threefold decline in banks’ direct involvement in corporate governance: in the number of bank representatives on company supervisory boards; in banks’ majority ownership in large firms; and in banks’ role in proxy voting. The regulatory changes were promoted by German governments in an attempt to strengthen the position of Germany as a host for international financial markets, and by the European Commission, which pushed for financial market harmonisation in Europe as part of a neo-liberal agenda. However, the German financial system has not changed substantially. Although Germany has clearly been moving away from a purely bank-based model, it has not adopted a market-based one.

Sources of Funds for Business Investments: Non-financial Corporate Sector and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs)

The profitability of the non-financial business sector increased considerably from the early 1990s until the Great Recession, but investment in capital stock was weak. There seems to be some evidence that the ‘preference channel’ and the ‘internal means of finance channel’ constrained investment in capital stock under the conditions of financialisation and the increasing shareholder value orientation of management. Increasing received financial profits (interest and dividends) indicate an increasing orientation of the management of non-financial corporate business towards investment in financial assets, as compared to investment in capital stock (‘preference channel’). And increasing dividends paid out to shareholders indicate a decrease in internal means of finance available for fixed investment purposes (‘internal means of finance channel’). As in other countries, internal means of finance have been the most important source of investment finance for German corporations; the contributions of equity issues have historically been negligible and they have been negative since the mid 1990s, indicating share buybacks in this period. Bank credit, as well as corporate bond issues, have not been necessary for real investment finance but have been used for the acquisition of financial assets since the mid-1990s. SMEs and non-corporate firms also finance investment predominantly from internal sources. Periods of high investment are associated with increasing credit and increasing debt-capital ratios. The decline in credit to non-corporate firms since the financial and economic crisis has been mainly caused by a lack of demand for the output of these firms, and not by a lack of access to credit.

Profitability of the Financial Sector and Sub-sectors

The profitability of German banks, measured by the rate of return on equity or on assets, has been low by international comparison since the early 1980. Pre-tax profitability tended to fall from the early 1980s until the recent crisis, although after-tax profitability did not. The pre-tax profitability of the cooperative banking sector has been higher than that of the private banking sector, with the latter being far more volatile. It has also been higher than that of the public savings banks because of the particularly low profitability of the Landesbanken. After-tax profitability has converged and private banks have gained relatively most from government re-distribution. The profit share of the financial corporate sector has shown no pronounced trend since the early 1980s, but has fluctuated quite widely, with major declines during the crisis in the early 2000s and the recent financial and economic crisis. The profit share of the non-financial corporate sector started from a lower level in the early 1980s, but then showed a tendency to rise until the recent crisis with only minor fluctuations. Since the early 2000s, it has exceeded the profit share of the financial corporate sector. The rate of return of the financial corporate sector has shown a falling trend. Although the financial and the non-financial sectors had similar rates of return on equity in the early 1990s, in contrast to the financial sector, the rate of return tended to rise in the non-financial sector until the recent crisis.

Efficiency of the Financial Sector

The evidence regarding the efficiency of the German banking system is mixed. For international comparisons, it is important to note that a large part of the German system consists of savings and cooperative banks that do not aim at maximising profits. Savings banks use part of their surplus to promote community activities and are also obliged to provide financial services to all customers, regardless of the profitability of the business relationship. Additionally, it seems that savings banks lend at rates below those charged by the private and cooperative banks. The primary aim of cooperative banks, in turn, is to benefit their customers and members. Local banks from all groups (private, cooperative and public) seem to be superior to the big nationally active banks in terms of efficiency. Among local banks, public and cooperative banks are found to be more efficient than private banks. There is therefore no evidence that opening up the public sector for private capital would improve the efficiency of the German banking system. Suboptimal size of German banks is not a significant factor either. Furthermore, since the optimal size for banks is not known, and the threshold where risk-return decisions are found to deteriorate is rather low, there is little evidence that a consolidation strategy would improve efficiency. There is also no evidence for the existence of significant economies of scope. This indicates that a separation of investment and commercial banking would not have a negative effect on efficiency.

The Historical Development of the German Financial System

The development of the German financial system has been characterised by two key features, both of which have their origin in the country’s pattern of industrialisation in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first is that Germany is a prime example of a bank-based financial system. Germany required large amounts of capital to industrialise, and this was mobilised primarily by banks. A major role was played by large joint-stock banks which were established in the early 1850s and the early 1870s. The second key feature is that, in addition to profit-oriented commercial banks, the German financial system has also included two other sectors that are not primarily motivated by making a profit, namely the publicly-owned savings banks, and the cooperative banks. By 1913 the German banking system consisted of a private sector, dominated by eight big banks, a large public savings bank sector, and a somewhat smaller cooperative sector. In the 1920s, the big private banks faced major challenges from inflation and competition from foreign banks, and three big banks emerged because of mergers and failures. At the end of the Second World War, the three big private banks were broken up because of their complicity in German war crimes but, following successful lobbying, could re-establish themselves as unified institutions in the 1950s. The big banks played a major role in financing larger firms during Germany’s post-war reconstruction, while savings banks and cooperative banks contributed significantly to the growth of Germany’s very successful small and medium-sized enterprises.