Hanspeter Neuhold

Permanent Neutrality and Non-Alignment: Similarities and Differences:

HE forthcoming sixth “Summit” Conference of the non-aligned T states to be held at Havana this fall provides an appropriate opportunity for comparing the legal status of permanent neutrality and the political doctrine of non-alignment. Not only the general public but cven experts on foreign affairs in permanently neutral states are rather ill-informed about the characteristics of the non-aligned movement. Similarly, the status of permanent neutrality is often not corrzctly perceived in the nonaligned camp. The first part of this article will consist of brief sumniaries of the main features of pernianent neutrality and non-alignment; a comparison of their most striking similarities will then be made. This paper is based on relevant legal and diplomatic documents, “traditionalist” scholarly literature and a recent empirical study.’ One important finding of the following comparative analysis should be stated a t the outset: both the aspccts which the permanently neutral and the non-aligned states obviously appear to have in common and those which clearly separate them at first sight will have to be qualified against the background of the actual behaviour of thc countries concerned, so that the final picture which will emerge as a result of this article is going to be more complex than might be expected.

The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes

The obligation of the subjects of international law to settle their disputes by peaceful means is the logical corollary of the prohibitions of the threat or use of force and the interdiction of intervention.663 These principles may be seen as the inscriptions on the two sides of the same coin. States resorted to coercion in order to prevail over their adversaries in conflicts. The gradual ban on force and other forms of pressure has not, however, eliminated international disputes caused mainly by the scarcity of goods or contradictory values. Therefore, conflicting parties must be obligated to seek a non-violent solution to their controversies. The terms ‘settlement’ or ‘solution’ are usually employed interchangeably. Their meaning is usually taken for granted without further discussion. However, two definitions that vary in scope seem possible. They can either refer to the elimination of the root causes of a dispute; or they may at least signify the agreement of the parties not to pursue their claims anymore, even if their differences of opinion have not completely disappeared. The slow development of the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes followed the above logic and went in parallel with that of the non-use of force. Thus Article 1 of the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907 set out: ‘With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States, the

The Law of International Conflict

The Law of International Conflict deals with three key principles of international law from a policy-oriented perspective that includes insights from various social sciences.

Common Security: The Litmus Test of International Solidarity

Solidarity is one of the most frequently used and at the same time most elusive terms that is mentioned in everyday conversation as well as invoked in political speeches and official documents. Although there is general agreement on its hard core, definitions of solidarity vary and are often not stringent.

Legitimacy: A Problem in International Law and for International Lawyers?

As was almost to be expected, the papers presented and the discussions that followed at our symposium have not reduced, but rather added to, the confusion which characterises the debate on the place and relevance of legitimacy in international law. Some participants rejected the concept out of hand and insisted that the only notion which counted was that of legality; or that they were at best willing to accept that problems could arise if the rules of international law conflicted with the dictates of justice. Alain Pellet preferred the term “fairness” and eventually equated legitimacy with opinio juris, the elusive psychological element necessary for the emergence of customary international law.1 Other words which are used in the debate or come to one’s mind in order to designate the controversial concept are “authority”,2 “rectitude”3 or “acceptance”.4

Die neutralen Staaten auf dem Weg vom alten in ein neues Europa

Auch die (dauernd) neutralen Staaten Europas (die Schweiz, Schweden, Finnland und Osterreich) mussen ihre Stellung in einem neuen Europa bestimmen. Mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges haben sie ihren Hauptbezugskonflikt und ihre wichtigste spezifische Funktion verloren. Zwar kommt in den begrenzten Konflikten in Europa und auf anderen Kontinenten Neutralitat weiterhin in Betracht. Fur die europaischen Neutralen stellt sich jedoch unter Umstanden die Frage, ob die Aufrechterhaltung ihres Status den Preis der weitgehenden Nichtteilnahme an der (west)europaischen Integration lohnt und Neutralitat weiterhin eine taugliche Strategie zur Wahrung von Unabhangigkeit und Sicherheit darstellt. Noch ist ungeklart, ob eine »Neudefinition«, d. h. eine Einengung der traditionellen Neutralitatskonzeption, einen Ausweg aus diesem und dem Dilemma der Mitgliedschaft neutraler Staaten im System kollektiver Sicherheit der Vereinten Nationen liefern kann.

The M(B)FR Negotiations, the Military Balance and Détente in Europe

It is stating the obvious to point out that a more stable balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe will in all probability raise the nuclear threshold. It is also a truism that an equilibrium at the conventional level will enhance deterrence: The use by the victim of a conventional aggression of its non-nuclear potential against the attacker appears more likely than the decision to resort to nuclear weapons first, no matter how emphatically the threat to do so is proclaimed. A would-be aggressor may in fact speculate that the other side will not cross the nuclear threshold for fear of triggering mutually destructive escalation which it will be unable to control.