Harald von Riekhoff

Asymmetrical Dyads and Foreign Policy

An analysis of Canadas foreign policy toward the United States from 1963 to 1972 is used in a test of a theory of foreign policies of subordinate states in asymmetrical dyads. In this theory the interaction of two conditions—the state of a nations economy and the extent of concentration in its linkages with a superordinate power, along with a set of conditioning environmental factors—are used to explain the foreign policy actions of the subordinate state. The findings confirm the importance of the two main exogenous factors and the environmental variables, but the interactive effect of economic performance and linkage concentration is not corroborated. In particular the statistical effects of the economic performance variable on the foreign policy indicators are positive where a negative sign was predicted.

Integration and Autonomy in Canada-United States Relations, 1963-1972

Theories of integration and dependence approach the phenomenon of international interdependence from opposite sides of the spectrum of relations between nations. Integration emphasizes voluntarism in the study of relations characterized by more or less symmetric interdependence, joint participation, and mutual benefits. Dependence, on the other hand, is concerned with asymmetric interdependence and the nonreciprocal reliance this engenders, with emphasis on coercion. These two streams of theorizing share a predilection for a unidirectional focus as they analyze the process by which integration or domination is achieved and maintained. The unidirectional focus in integration theory has been, in part, a reflection of the initial optimism and commitment toward integration in West Europe. Moreover, it was sustained by the concept of spillover, the core of functionalist integration thinking, which attributed a high degree of automaticity to the process of integration once underway. If it was optimism that gave integration theory its unidirectional, quasi-automatic orientation, it was the inherent pessimism of dependency analysts concerning the ability of peripheral countries to overcome the domestic dislocations stemming from integration into the global capitalist system which has given dependency theory its highly deterministic outlook. It cannot adequately explain periodic efforts by peripheral states to change the nature of their ties with metropole countries. To be sure, not all works on integration and dependence have adopted a unidirectional, highly deterministic framework. Pioneering

Canada and the United Nations Security Council, 1999–2000 – a reassessment

During its recent 1999–2000 term on the UN Security Council, Canada performed as a major power and made a distinct impact both on procedural and substantive issues. Canadas activities on the Council stressed three principal themes, which had been articulated during the campaign for a Council seat: improving the Councils transparency and accountability; restoring the Councils leadership and credibility in international security operations; and promoting human security. Concerning transparency, Canada was able to get the Council to schedule more open meetings and to hold broader thematic debates, as well as expand consultations with non‐members and NGOs. Regarding leadership and credibility, under Canadas energetic leadership of the Angolan sanctions committee, sanctions against the Angolan rebels were significantly tightened, thereby helping to bring the long Angolan civil war to an end and improving UN sanctions regimes at large. With respect to human security, by scheduling frequent thematic debates,...During its recent 1999–2000 term on the UN Security Council, Canada performed as a major power and made a distinct impact both on procedural and substantive issues. Canadas activities on the Council stressed three principal themes, which had been articulated during the campaign for a Council seat: improving the Councils transparency and accountability; restoring the Councils leadership and credibility in international security operations; and promoting human security. Concerning transparency, Canada was able to get the Council to schedule more open meetings and to hold broader thematic debates, as well as expand consultations with non‐members and NGOs. Regarding leadership and credibility, under Canadas energetic leadership of the Angolan sanctions committee, sanctions against the Angolan rebels were significantly tightened, thereby helping to bring the long Angolan civil war to an end and improving UN sanctions regimes at large. With respect to human security, by scheduling frequent thematic debates, Canada managed to establish the concept as part of the prevailing discourse of the Security Council and to incorporate specific Chapter VII language for the protection of civilians into new peacekeeping mandates. Not all Canadian initiatives succeeded, e.g., attempts to get the civil wars in Chechnya and Sudan on the Council agenda failed to get the necessary support from other members. The challenge now facing Canada as non‐member of the Council is to maintain some of the momentum that was achieved during its two‐year term.

Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads

An analysis of the foreign policies of black African states toward industrialized nations in the middle 1960s is employed in a partial test of a theory of the foreign policies of subordinate states in asymmetrical dyads. In this theory, the interaction of two conditions-the state of a nations economy and the extent of concentration in its linkages with a superordinate power-is used to explain the foreign policy actions of the subordinate state toward the superordinate country. Directed dyads are divided into asymmetrical and nonasymmetrical sets, and the hypotheses are tested over both sets via regression analysis. The findings confirm the importance of structural asymmetry as a scope condition on the theory but offer only limited support for the use of the economic strength and linkage concentration variables in the explanation of foreign policy. The results also reveal that the influence of these two variables on foreign policy is not precisely as stipulated by the theory. For the more developed African states, relative economic strength in combination with highly concentrated linkages is associated, contrary to the theory, with a foreign policy of expanded relations with superordinate partners. For the less-developed states, this combination produces a foreign policy designed to restrict relations within the asymmetrical dyad as predicted by the theory.

The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Foreign Policy

When assessing the impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Canadian foreign policy, we must remind ourselves that the subject of international relations has been something of a sideline to both his intellectual and his political activities. His earlier student travels, which took him off the ordinary academic cavaliers tour path of that period, certainly attest to an unorthodox disposition and an intellectual curiosity, but his interests were cultural and anthropological rather than political in nature. Nor was international relations the focus of analysis in his writings as a political theorist. Trudeaus output as a journalist for CitW Libre was directed toward other subjects, although occasionally he took issue with current Canadian foreign policy, notably with respect to the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China and the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadas forces. In both of these cases his stand was strongly critical of the policies of the Pearson government. His brief political career as parliamentary secretary to Prime Minister Pearson and as justice minister engaged him in his own area of specialization and offered a minimum of direct exposure to foreign policy. Because his tenure of office as prime minister coincides with the most serious challenge that has ever confronted the Canadian federal system, his domestic preoccupations tend to be reinforced, whatever his personal predilection. In assessing Trudeaus impact on Canadian foreign policy, we are therefore dealing with a residual function of his over-all political activity and hardly the one which will ultimately determine his place in Canadian history.

NATO without France

While the Atlantic alliance has tried to implement a strategy of graduated deterrence and flexible response, France has worked toward a gradual disentanglement from the military structure of nato. The process of separation, which started in 1959 with Frances withdrawal from the Mediterranean command, came to a rapid climax in 1966 with General de Gaulles irrevocable decision to pull all French forces out of the integrated command structure of the alliance by July 1 of that year. The military effects of this move have been felt more immediately and can be ascertained somewhat more clearly than the longrange political implication. NATO without France1 is a very timely, readable, and highly competent discussion of these military consequences, and, within the somewhat restricted scope which he has set for himself, the author does full justice to this sensitive subject. As the result of the French withdrawal and the expulsion of allied forces and bases from French territory, nato has lost not only the direct territorial link between its central and southern sectors of operation but also a vital portion of its hinterland which had provided allied forces with manoeuvrability, air bases, supply lines, and communication installations. For an alliance which has been plagued by lack of space and which has suffered from a shortage of conventionally armed forces, this presents a rather grim picture. Perhaps there are a few compensating factors. Two French divisions remain in Germany, although under strictly French rather than under nato command. This might facilitate some degree of co-operation with the military apparatus of the alliance. But the primary role of these forces is political rather than military, for their presence places Germany in a position of dependence vis-a-vis France a situation which the integrated defence structure was designed to prevent or ameliorate and creates a semblance of parity with the Soviet Union which maintains its forces in East Germany also under strictly national command. The supply lines and air bases are being relocated to a more forward area, even though this entails considerable costs and makes them more vulnerable to attack. The development of a nato satellite communications system makes the alliance less dependent on French communication lines. More important, France continues to grant overflight privileges to allied aircraft and still participates in natos forward air defence warning system. The latter, to be sure, is dictated less by French concern about allied goodwill than by a very real need to provide her vulnerable force de frappe with advance warning.

Review: International/Strategic: Threat Perception in International CrisisTHREAT PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRISISCohenRaymondMadison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, 229pp, US

the Vci from office in 1947. Those hoping to establish once and for all proof of direct United States intervention will be disappointed. Serfaty presents a balanced and nuanced view, stressing internal factors and in particular de Gasperis search for American aid. However, the argument would have more impact if it had put this important event in the context of similar actions in France and Belgium. More research will be needed before we get the definitive answer on this controversy. One last point should be mentioned in recommending this book as an introductory text. It provides one of the most comprehensive bibliographies of recent, and not so recent, research on the PCI one can hope to find, covering twelve pages, with very pertinent commentaries.

17.50

Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in international crisis. When threat is not perceived, even in the face of objective evidence, there can be no mobilization of defensive resources. Hence the phenomenon of surprise. Conversely, threat may be perceived, and countermeasures taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent. The project described here set out to investigate empirically, on the basis of the comparative analysis of historical case studies, the conditions under which threat is perceived. Six examples were chosen, each involving a different state actor, from the past hundred years. Adequacy of documentation and diversity were two criteria of selection. Examples consisted of:

Threat Perception in International Crisis

who is now Professor of Law and International Organization at Columbia University, is exceptionally qualified to present these international problems with their amalgam of law and economics. In the light of his experience as a deputy assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, he has the advantage of the practitioner in commenting on the politics, both domestic and international, of economic relations. His 1969 introductory comment provides a valuable prospectus for further international initiatives in both the trade and foreignexchange fields. In the trade field we are in the aftermath of the Kennedy Round, and one receives the impression that initiatives toward freer international trade are temporarily exhausted. But a short list of problems in commercial policy-domestic subsidization of agriculture, border taxes, the multi-national corporation indicates that there is much to be done, if the political will is there. In international monetary relations we have moved into quieter waters after a tempestuous decade. The agreement on Special Drawing Rights is approaching completion; German revaluation has removed pressure from other currencies and the gold speculators have become discouraged; and Britains external accounts are, for the moment at least, looking better. But no one, I am sure, would pretend that weakness in the international system has been finally overcome. The present calmer climate is an admirable one in which to seek further fundamental solutions to the liquidity problem.

Book Review: International Politics and Economics: The Arms Trade in International RelationsThe Arms Trade in International Relations. By FrankLewis A.New York: Frederick A. Praeger [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern]. 1969. xx, 266pp.

The present process of critical introspection which has engaged the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has seen no shortage of diagnosis and prognosis on the ailments of the alliance system. It might, therefore, be of some value to examine modern alliance functions in a more general context in order to see whether NATO, far from being an anachronistic bastion of the cold war with a vested interest in the perpetuation of tensions, might not represent a concession to the modern demands of inter-state relations on a regional basis, with the further advantage of being capable of adjustment to assume new political and security functions in connection with the continuation of the present nuclear equilibrium.The present process of critical introspection which has engaged the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has seen no shortage of diagnosis and prognosis on the ailments of the alliance system. It might, therefore, be of some value to examine modern alliance functions in a more general context in order to see whether nato, far from being an anachronistic bastion of the cold war with a vested interest in the perpetuation of tensions, might not represent a concession to the modern demands of inter-state relations on a regional basis, with the further advantage of being capable of adjustment to assume new political and security functions in connection with the continuation of the present nuclear equilibrium.