Harold B. Gerard

Attributed intentions and informational selectivity.

Abstract Three experiments tested the hypothesis that ascribing a specific intention to an actor prior to witnessing his behavior leads an observer to preferentially recall action bearing on the intention. In each case, subjects were exposed to an action sequence which mixed elements appropriate to more than one intention. Recall of action was compared among different observers who were led to attribute different intentions to the same actors. Selective remembering favoring intent-relevant action is demonstrated in all three studies. The second experiment offers evidence that selectivity operates during observation of an actor rather than retrospectively. The third experiment suggests that attributions about intentions are more potent determiners of such selectivity than are characteristics of an actor related to his behavior but not bearing on his intention and indicates that observer characteristics interact with attributed intentions to determine recall. Interpretation of the findings suggests that accurate attribution of intentions can facilitate social exchange by attuning partners to the planned aspects of each others behavior, while misapprehension of intentions can preclude coordinated interaction by misdirecting attention to irrelevant action or to responses coerced by the observer.

Post-Decisional Reevaluation of Choice Alternatives

In a free-choice experiment, subjects chose between two pairs of alternatives, each containing a positively and a negatively valued feature. The results confirmed dissonance theory in that the negative feature of the chosen alternatives increased in value from before to after the choice. However, the positive feature of the rejected alternative decreased only slightly. Implications of the findings for the theory are discussed.

The Dynamics of Opinion Formation

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the informational social comparison within a framework of opinion formation in which an opinion is conceived of as a preparatory set for action by the person (P) toward an object or issue(X). When P anticipates transaction with X, an opinion-forming imperative is induced in P to reduce ambivalence he or she may have toward X. There are two major strategies P may use to reduce ambivalence: reduce the opinion-forming imperative and/or generate supportive information. Subsumed under the latter strategy are several avenues classified into two broad categories of information generation, nonsocial and social. The nonsocial type is a subset of avenues that leads to the generation of information directly relating to specific features of X (e.g., pro and con arguments, positive and negative features), whereas the social category of avenues—e.g., social comparison—refers to indirect information relating to X generated via referral to others. The ubiquitous process of social projection, the tendency for P to assume that others (Os) share his or her opinion, is the basis for such informational social comparison. The three-tiered conception presented in the chapter, in which informational social comparison is based on a substructure of individual opinion dynamics overlaid on goal gradient processes, offers a deeper understanding of some of the older literature and enables to derive additional implications, some which have already been tested and others that are in the process of being tested.

Compliance, Justification, and Cognitive Change1

Publisher Summary The chapter presents research and theoretical formulation that grew out of a controversy over the theory of compliance, justification, and cognitive change. The dissonance theory derivation is based on the assumption that the person will experience dissonance if his or her behavior is not sufficiently justified—the lower the extrinsic incentive (for example, money) offered the subject in the experiments, the less justification he or she has for saying something opposed to his or her belief. The chapter attempts to reconcile those studies that obtained support for the dissonance derivation with those studies that did not and provides useful synthesis of the conflicting points of view and of the apparently contradictory sets of findings. It describes a formulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for dissonance effects that is consistent with a post hoc analysis of a number of studies done by others and is also supported by several studies, which grew out of the formulation. But there are already several reformulations of dissonance theory that achieve similar ends. Alternatives to the framework and some implications for future research have been discussed.

Personality, Attitudinal, and Social Correlates of Drug Use

Retrospective data on 106 young people collected 10 years prior to this study as well as contemporaneous data were analyzed to determine predictors of drug use. Results indicate that personality factors fared poorly in distinguishing users from nonusers with the exception of anxiety and IQ for hallucinogen use only. Users tended to have high IQs and low anxiety. Social factors seem to play a major role in the spread of drug use. The initiator of the adolescent into drug use is not a group leader but rather an equal status peer group member. Factors in the spread of drug use follow similar patterns for licit as well as illicit drugs.

Competitive Behavior: A Manifestation of Motivation for Ability Comparison.

Abstract Social comparison theory predicts that when the person is uncertain about the level of his ability, he may seek comparison information through competitive behavior. This derivation, however, has never been directly tested. An experiment is reported in which the level of the subjects uncertainty about his competence was manipulated and subsequent measures of his competitive motivation and behavior were obtained. The data indicate that higher levels of uncertainty do lead to higher levels of motivation and competition, but only under conditions that minimize threat to self-esteem.

Postdecision evaluation of choice alternatives as a function of valence of alternatives, choice, and expected delay of choice consequences

Abstract The effects of valence of alternatives, choice, and expected delay of choice consequences on postdecision evaluations of choice alternatives were studied by either giving subjects a choice between two experimental tasks (both either pleasant or unpleasant) or assigning subjects their initially preferred task. Crosscutting valence and choice, subjects expected either no delay, 10-min delay, or 30-min delay before engaging in the task. All subjects evaluated both tasks immediately after the delay instructions but before experiencing the actual delay. Results confirmed the expected dissonance effect; that is, an upward evaluation of the chosen alternative and a downward evaluation of the rejected alternative, relative to no-choice conditions. Moreover, the relative upward evaluation of the chosen alternative increased as the expected delay decreased. Valence was not found to interact with other variables. The results are discussed in terms of differential salience of choice alternatives.