Harry G. Barkema

Foreign entry, cultural barriers and learning

This paper examines the longevity of foreign entries. Hypotheses are developed on the mode (start-ups vs. acquisitions) and ownership structure (wholly owned vs. joint ventures) in relation to cultural distance. The hypotheses are tested within a framework of organizational learning, using data on 225 entries that 13 Dutch firms carried out from 1966 onwards. Results show that the presence of cultural barriers punctuates an organizations learning. Cultural distance is a prominent factor in foreign entry whenever this involves another firm, requiring the firm to engage in ‘double layered acculturation.’ We also identify locational ‘paths of learning.’ The longevity of acquisitions is positively influenced by prior entries of the firm in the same country. Similarly, the longevity of foreign entries, in which the firm has a majority stake, improves whenever the expanding firm engaged in prior entries in the same country and in other countries in the same cultural block.

International Expansion Through Start-Up or Acquisition: A Learning Perspective

This study brings a fresh approach—a learning perspective—to the literature examining whether firms expand internationally through start-ups or acquisitions. Hypotheses concern how this strategic c...

Learning Through Acquisitions

Research on acquisitions has typically focused on acquisitions per se, examining issues such as performance and implementation problems. This study moves beyond that perspective and studies the inf...

Working Abroad, Working with Others: How Firms Learn to Operate International Joint Ventures

Successful international joint ventures entail both learning to operate across national boundaries and learning to cooperate. Hypotheses grounded in organizational learning theory were tested with event-history analysis and data on 1,493 expansions of 25 large Dutch firms between 1966 and 1994. Experience with domestic joint ventures and with international wholly owned subsidiaries contributed to the longevity of international joint ventures, but prior experience with international joint ventures did not.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND DIVERSIFICATION

Employing concepts of lateral and longitudinal learning, we examined the dissolution of 462 expansions of Dutch firms, both acquisitions and new ventures. We interpreted the endurance of an expansi...

Management Challenges in A New Time

As the year 2000 approached, so too did the years 5760, 2544, and 1420, according to the Jewish, Buddhist, and Moslem dating systems, respectively. Still, the coming of the year 2000 held meaning for most Western societies, serving as an opportunity for broader speculation about the new millennium and the 21st century. In the field of management, cycles of boom and bust in Asia had called into question new ways of organizing hailed in the 1980s, and questions and concerns mounted about inadequacies of 20th century views of business firms. Opinions were astonishingly diverse and often contradictory, but the central theme was change--dramatic change--and the idea that, to cope with it, managers ought to strategize anew and shape and reshape their firms.

Adoption of a service innovation in the business market: An empirical test of supply-side variables

The objective of this article is to assess the influence of variables over which suppliers have control (supply-side variables) on the adoption of innovations in addition to adopter-side variables. The empirical study focused on the adoption of electronic banking in the Dutch business market. A quantitative study was conducted to test hypotheses. The results show that the extent to which a supplier has pursued a strategy aimed at positioning the innovation in the marketplace or has focused on reducing the risk of adoption has a positive and significant effect on the probability of innovation adoption. The evidence corroborates that not only adopter-side variables significantly influence innovation, but supply-side variables as well.

Top Management Pay: Impact of Overt and Covert Power

This paper examines variations in executive pay as a function of CEO power. We assume that CEOs optimize their pay conditional upon their ability to shape decisions that favour their interests. Power is inferred from overt manifestations such as share holdings, but also from covert sources such as a CEOs social capital. Two components of compensation are considered: base pay and bonus. While financial performance, firm size, and other factors are held constant, the results show overt power as measured by CEO, and CEO-family equity holdings, to have a curvilinear relationship with executive compensation. Proxies of covert power include tenure, being (one of) the founder(s), and firm diversification. These variables magnify or moderate the effect of equity holdings on compensation. The power effects are most pronounced for the size of CEO bonus.