Harry L. Coles

John Gooch. Armies in Europe. Pp. x, 286. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

a profound disbelief in the ability of the establishment to solve pressing problems. This provided the basis for a new national opposition, which claimed superior access to the will of the nation. Political dissidence developed into a populist attack on the government and the old right. This amounted to an important radicalization of the old right, a decisive rupture with past traditions, which Eley calls &dquo;radical nationalism.&dquo; In his search for a thesis, Eley is so deeply concerned with the political structure of nationalist activities that he pays too little attention to deep-rooted intellectual traditions. Political actions do not operate in a vacuum; they have a way of reflecting intellectual trends -would the French Revolution have been possible without the philosophes? Eley speaks in somewhat cavalier fashion of the &dquo;older view&dquo; of Hans Kohn, Fritz Stern, and G. L. Mosse as tending to &dquo;concentrate on intellectual history and the ’German mind.&dquo;’ He would have done far better had he combined the work of these brilliant pioneers with his own analysis. At the core of the &dquo;older view&dquo; is commitment to the notion of continuity between Bismarck and Hitler, which Eley judges to be a &dquo;simple notion of linear continuity.&dquo; These &dquo;simple&dquo; notions include industrial traditions, authoritarianism and anti-democratic structure in state and society, susceptibility to authoritarian politics, and defensive strategies of traditional power-elites. There is really nothing simple or linear here. One must not exaggerate the &dquo;static notion of continuity&dquo; in the Wilhelmine state. There was, indeed,

30.00. With what can scarcely be called felicity of expression, the author describes his purpose as follows:

Under normal circumstances, three flaws in this volume would insure a negative response by this reviewer: the claim that volume size dictated that much research could not be included; the absence of a full bibliography; and the tendency to spend a depressingly large amount of time emphasizing the shortcomings of previous scholars who labored on the same or similar subjects. Yet, despite these shortcomings and my usual aversion to revisionist dogmatism, The Invasion of America is probably the single important volume in the area of Native American studies published in 1975. Fearlessly, this past president of the American Society of Ethnohistory fires arrows at the scholarship and theses of William Hubbard, James M. Mooney, Francis Parkman, Frederick Jackson Turner, and numerous other historians and anthropologists who have relegated Native Americans to the role of simplistic children &dquo;whose only contribution was to stimulate the energy and ingenuity of European dispossessors&dquo; (p. ix). And, more often than not, he clearly hits the target. Jennings’ thesis is that Native Americans were not uncivilized savages (by any defensible definition) when Euramericans invaded their land. They were a numerous, successful, and sophisticated people who had learned to live successfully on the lands they inhabited. The emergence of America as we know

RICHARD H. KOHN. Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802. Pp. xx, 443. New York: The Free Press, 1975.

military policies of the late 1940’s and 1950’s, there is slightly more detail on the early 1960’s, but the main thrust is directed at policies stemming from the McNamara reforms and the Vietnam War. With most of what has been done in the Pentagon in the last five years, the author is in basic disagreement. Donovan shows considerable knowledge and insight in certain areas. For example, his analysis of development of the giant transport, the C-5A, and its relation, or lack of relation, to basic strategic concepts is excellent. Although on this and several other topics the book has much useful information, basically it lacks focus. I suspect that Donovan’s real quarrel is with the substance of policies, and that he has tried, not entirely successfully, to fit his critique into the pattern of the current concern over the military-industrial complex. In his old but still good book on militarism, Alfred Vagts makes a distinction between the military way and militarism. Donovan makes no such distinction, and his book suffers not only from lack of clarity in definition but also lack of a coherent analytical framework. In his preface he describes his purpose as &dquo;an effort to inform readers by explaining the what, hows, and whys of the current mili-

13.95

ministrative powers. Where in earlier years he contended that broadly delegated powers were necessary and beneficial for the needs of an industrial society, Professor Davis now feels that we have gone too far in this direction. He suggests that &dquo;unnecessary&dquo; discretionary power should be eliminated, and warns that boundaries must be drawn for the exercise of discretionary powers or else injustice will become rampant in America. Most of the significant discretionary actions of public officials do not lend themselves to the trial-type procedures of administrative law, and Davis proposes that we find new ways to regulate the exercise of discretionary power. This is a very important book because it exhibits the courage to attack issues which have been buried below the surface of daily controversy. How do we confine the choices of Social Security administrators, policemen, prosecutors, welfare officials, workmen’s compensation administrators and that army of grey bureaucrats who increasingly impinge on our personal destinies? Professor Davis has the subtlety to suggest different approaches for each area of discretionary justice. His answers are highly tentative, and are not detailed. He intends to open these areas up to public discussion and to the informed attiudes of

James A. Donovan. Militarism, U.S.A. Pp. xxi, 265. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970.

a strictly legal point of view, therefore, it would have been possible in 1944 for the Allied armies to invade the countries occupied by the Axis without the consent of the various governments in exile. For a number of good reasons, however, the Allies chose to base the occupation of friendly territory on consent rather than force, and concluded what were known as civil affairs agreements with France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway.’ These civil affairs agreements contained the basic policy guidance for all civil affairs planning and operations in northwest Europe. Their aims were primarily to assist in the winning of the war by securing the maximum cooperation from the inhabitants, and secondly to further long-range national policies. They are of especial interest therefore to students both of military government and of American foreign relations.