Haruto Takagishi

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity

The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response in the ultimatum game provides evidence of the assumption held by strong reciprocity theorists that negative reciprocity observed in the ultimatum game is inseparably related to positive reciprocity as the two sides of a preference for fairness. The prediction of an inseparable relationship between positive and negative reciprocity was rejected on the basis of the results of a series of experiments that we conducted using the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game, and the prisoner’s dilemma game. We did not find any correlation between the participants’ tendencies to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum game and their tendencies to exhibit various prosocial behaviors in the other games, including their inclinations to positively reciprocate in the trust game. The participants’ responses to postexperimental questions add support to the view that the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is a tacit strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior status.

In Search of Homo economicus

Homo economicus, a model for humans in neoclassical economics, is a rational maximizer of self-interest. However, many social scientists regard such a person as a mere imaginary creature. We found that 31 of 446 residents of relatively wealthy Tokyo suburbs met the behavioral definition of Homo economicus. In several rounds of economic games, participants whose behavior was consistent with this model always apportioned the money endowed by the experimenter to themselves, leaving no share for their partners. These participants had high IQs and a deliberative decision style. An additional 39 participants showed a similar disregard for other people’s welfare, although they were slightly more altruistic than those in the Homo economicus group. The psychological composition of these quasi–Homo economicus participants was distinct from that of participants in the Homo economicus group. Although participants in the latter group behaved selfishly on the basis of rational calculations, those in the former group made selfish choices impulsively. The implications of these findings concerning the two types of extreme noncooperators are discussed.

The Relationship between Child Maltreatment and Emotion Recognition

Child abuse and neglect affect the development of social cognition in children and inhibit social adjustment. The purpose of this study was to compare the ability to identify the emotional states of others between abused and non-abused children. The participants, 129 children (44 abused and 85 non-abused children), completed a children’s version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). Results showed that the mean accuracy rate on the RMET for abused children was significantly lower than the rate of the non-abused children. In addition, the accuracy rates for positive emotion items (e.g., hoping, interested, happy) were significantly lower for the abused children, but negative emotion and neutral items were not different across the groups. This study found a negative relationship between child abuse and the ability to understand others’ emotions, especially positive emotions.

Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games

Significance Is human prosociality a consequence of cognitive control of selfish impulses? Alternatively, is it a default option that most people use unless they are cognitively persuaded that a given situation does not require them to behave prosocially? Our results support the latter argument. Participants with weaker cognitive control fairly shared a reward with another participant even when there was no chance of punishing unfair behavior, whereas those more capable of cognitive control behaved selfishly in the same situation. These findings demonstrate that participants’ intuitive choices in economic games are prosocial. Human prosociality has been traditionally explained in the social sciences in terms of internalized social norms. Recent neuroscientific studies extended this traditional view of human prosociality by providing evidence that prosocial choices in economic games require cognitive control of the impulsive pursuit of self-interest. However, this view is challenged by an intuitive prosociality view emphasizing the spontaneous and heuristic basis of prosocial choices in economic games. We assessed the brain structure of 411 players of an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) and measured the strategic reasoning ability of 386. According to the reflective norm-enforcement view of prosociality, only those capable of strategically controlling their selfish impulses give a fair share in the UG, but cognitive control capability should not affect behavior in the DG. Conversely, we support the intuitive prosociality view by showing for the first time, to our knowledge, that strategic reasoning and cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not related to giving in the UG but were negatively related to giving in the DG. This implies that the uncontrolled choice in the DG is prosocial rather than selfish, and those who have a thicker dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and are capable of strategic reasoning (goal-directed use of the theory of mind) control this intuitive drive for prosociality as a means to maximize reward when there are no future implications of choices.

The Role of Cognitive and Emotional Perspective Taking in Economic Decision Making in the Ultimatum Game

We conducted a simple resource allocation game known as the ultimatum game (UG) with preschoolers to examine the role of cognitive and emotional perspective-taking ability on allocation and rejection behavior. A total of 146 preschoolers played the UG and completed a false belief task and an emotional perspective-taking test. Results showed that cognitive perspective taking ability had a significant positive effect on the proposer’s offer and a negative effect on the responder’s rejection behavior, whereas emotional perspective taking ability did not impact either the proposer’s or responder’s behavior. These results imply that the ability to anticipate the responder’s beliefs, but not their emotional state, plays an important role in the proposer’s choice of a fair allocation in an UG, and that children who have not acquired theory of mind still reject unfair offers.

Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals

Significance Prosocial and proself predispositions dictate economic game players’ fast decisions but exert limited influence when game players take a longer time in making decisions. Prosocially predisposed individuals use the extended time to contemplate the risk of being exploited. Selfishly predisposed individuals are suggested to behave according to the immediate incentives of the games when they make decisions quickly and become behaviorally less selfish as they spend more time assessing the long-term strategic implications of always behaving according to immediate incentives. Different strategies are needed to promote prosocial behavior and to design institutions depending on the constitution of the population. Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants’ overall prosocial behavior in four economic games. Participants’ predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs’ prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.

The development of the effect of peer monitoring on generosity differs among elementary school-age boys and girls

The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of peer monitoring on generosity in boys and girls aged 6–12 years. A total of 120 elementary school students played a one-shot dictator game (DG) with and without peer monitoring by classmates. Children decided how to divide 10 chocolates between themselves and a classmate either in a condition in which their allocations were visible to their peers, or in private. While the effect of peer monitoring on the allocation amount in the DG was clearly present in boys, it was not observed in girls. Furthermore, the effect of peer monitoring in boys appeared at the age of 9 years. These results suggest that the motivation to draw peers’ attention plays a stronger role for older boys than for girls or younger boys. The potential roles of higher-order theory of mind, social roles, and emergence of secondary sex characteristics on the influence of peer monitoring on generosity shown by boys are discussed.

The Development of Theory of Mind and Positive and Negative Reciprocity in Preschool Children

This study examined the relation between the acquisition of false-beliefs theory of mind (ToM) and reciprocity in preschoolers. Preschool-aged children completed a task assessing the understanding of false beliefs, and played an Ultimatum Game (UG) with another child in a face-to-face setting. Negative reciprocity was assessed by examining the rejection of unfair offers made by another child in the UG, while positive reciprocity was assessed by examining allocations made by participants in a Dictator Game (DG) following the UG. The results indicated that children who had passed a task assessing first-order false beliefs were more likely to make generous offers in a DG following a fair offer made by their partner in a proceeding UG, but that false beliefs ToM was unrelated to the rejection of unfair offers in the UG.

Association of the oxytocin receptor gene with attitudinal trust: role of amygdala volume

Abstract Previous studies have shown that genetic variations in rs53576, a common variant of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) resulting from a single nucleotide polymorphism involving an adenine (A)/guanine (G) transition, are associated with attitudinal trust in men. However, the pathway from gene to behaviour has not been elucidated. We conducted the present study to determine whether amygdala volume mediates the association between OXTR rs53576 genotypes and attitudinal trust. Our results revealed that the left amygdala volume was significantly smaller in GG men than in AA and AG men, whereas it was significantly smaller in AA and AG women than in GG women. In addition, the left amygdala volume was negatively associated with attitudinal trust in men, whereas there was no such association in women. We also found a significant mediation effect of the left amygdala volume on the association between OXTR rs53576 genotypes and attitudinal trust in men. The results of our study suggest that the left amygdala volume plays a pivotal role in the association between OXTR rs53576 genotypes and attitudinal trust in men.

Behavioural Differences and Neural Substrates of Altruistic and Spiteful Punishment

Altruistic punishment following social norm violations promotes human cooperation. However, experimental evidence indicates that some forms of punishment are spiteful rather than altruistic. Using two types of punishment games and seven non-strategic games, we identified strong behavioural differences between altruistic and spiteful punishers. Altruistic punishers who rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game and punished norm violators in the third-party punishment game behaved pro-socially in various non-strategic games. Spiteful punishers who rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game but did not punish norm violators in the third-party punishment game behaved selfishly in non-strategic games. In addition, the left caudate nucleus was larger in spiteful punishers than in altruistic punishers. These findings are in contrast to the previous assumption that altruistic punishers derive pleasure from enforcement of fairness norms, and suggest that spiteful punishers derive pleasure from seeing the target experience negative consequences.