Harvey Siegel

The rationality of science, critical thinking, and science education

This paper considers two philosophical problems and their relation to science education. The first involves the rationality of science; it is argued here that the traditional view, according to which science is rational because of its adherence to (a non-standard conception of) scientific method, successfully answers one central question concerning sciences rationality. The second involves the aims of education; here it is argued that a fundamental educational aim is the fostering of rationality, or its educational cognate, critical thinking. The ramifications of these two philosophical theses for science education are then considered, and a science education which takes reasons in science as its fundamental feature is sketched.

Foundational Issues in Evolution Education.

There is a great need for effective evolution education. This paper reviews some of the evidence that demonstrates that need and analyzes some of the foundational semantic, epistemological, and philosophical issues involved. This analysis is used to provide a functional understanding of the distinction between science and non-science. Special emphasis is placed the scientific meaning of the terms theory, hypothesis, fact, proof, evidence, and truth, focusing on the difference between religious belief and acceptance of a scientific theory. Science is viewed as theologically neutral and as not mutually exclusive from religion. Finally, a number of practical recommendations to the classroom biology teacher are presented.

Epistemological Diversity and Education Research: Much Ado About Nothing Much?:

Research in education and the training of education researchers are often said to require attention to epistemological diversity: Researchers ought to be familiar with different ways of knowing and diverse epistemological perspectives. But the notion is unclear. What is “epistemological diversity”? What exactly is epistemological about it? Why is it important for education researchers to be knowledgeable about it? In addressing these questions, I will argue that the call for epistemological diversity is not, where justified, as radical or significant as it is often taken to be; and that, where it is radical or significant, it is not justified.

Science Education: Multicultural and Universal

In this paper, I first explore the reasons for embracing multiculturalism, arguing that multiculturalism is best conceived and defended in universalistic moral, rather than epistemic, terms. I then criticize the common view that multiculturalism is incompatible with a universalistic conception of science, and argue that multiculturalism is compatible with a suitably characterized epistemic universalism. Finally, I consider whether or not that sort of universalism is itself morally objectionable, and argue that it is not. The upshot is that science educators ought to embrace both a universalistic conception of multiculturalism (on moral grounds), and a universalistic conception of science (on epistemic grounds).

Multiculturalism and the Possibility of Transcultural Educational and Philosophical Ideals

How should we think about the interrelationships that obtain among Philosophy, Education, and Culture? In this paper I explore the contours of one such interrelationship: namely, the way in which educational and (other) philosophical ideals transcend individual cultures . I do so by considering the contemporary educational and philosophical commitment to multiculturalism . Consideration of multiculturalism, I argue, reveals important aspects of the character of both educational and philosophical ideals. Specifically, I advance the following claims: i) We are obliged to embrace the moral and political directives of multiculturalism. ii) This obligation is a moral one: that is, multiculturalism is justified on moral grounds. iii) Far from entailing any philosophically problematic form of cultural relativism, multiculturalism is itself a ‘universal’ or ‘transcultural’ ideal. iv) Moreover, the advocacy of multiculturalism presupposes another kind of universality, dubbed below ‘transcultural normative reach.’ v) Consequently, multiculturalism should not be understood as entailing the demise of ‘universalistic’ dimensions of either philosophy or education.

OBJECTIVITY, RATIONALITY, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND MORE

Few readers of this journal will need to be reminded of the provocative view of science provided by Thomas S. Kuhn. Since the publication of his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhns work has generated an enormous amount of discussion and controversy. Perhaps the most vehement discussion has focused on Kuhns conception of cross-paradigm debate, for this conception, it is argued, portrays the process of theory choice as irrational and subjective, and so threatens the philosophical ideals of rationality and objectivity. In his book The Essential Tension Kuhn attempts, among other things, to extend and clarify his position xns-d-vis the interrelated issues of objectivity, rationality, incommensurability, and relativism. While only a small number of the papers appearing in The Essential Tension speak directly to these issues, because of their importance for contemporary debate in philosophy of science I shall focus the bulk of this essay on them. I shall attempt to fit Kuhns discussion of these issues into the rest of the relevant literature, including other recent papers by Kuhn not included in the volume under review. The effect will be to make the present essay not only a review of that volume, but in addition a general account of the progress and status of the discussion Kuhns work has spawned. First, however, a general review of Kuhns book is in order.

Laudan's normative naturalism

Abstract Unlike more standard non-normative naturalizations of epistemology and philosophy of science, Larry Laudans naturalized philosophy of science explicitly maintains a normative dimension. This paper critically assesses Laudans normative naturalism. After summarizing Laudans position, the paper examines: (1) Laudans construal of methodological rules as ‘instrumentalities’ connecting methodological means and cognitive ends; (2) Laudans instrumental conception of scientific rationality; (3) Laudans naturalistic account of the axiology of science; and (4) the extent to which a normative philosophy of science can be naturalized. It is concluded that Laudans normative naturalism is as problematic as its non-normative naturalist cousins.

Argument quality and cultural difference

Central to argumentation theory is a concern with normativity. Argumentation theorists are concerned, among other things, with explaining why some arguments are good (or at least better than others) in the sense that a given argument provides reasons for embracing its conclusion which are such that a fair- minded appraisal of the argument yields the judgment that the conclusion ought to be accepted -- is worthy of acceptance -- by all who so appraise it.This conception of argument quality presupposes that the goodness of arguments is characterizable in terms of features of ‘the argument itself.’ It makes no reference either to the attributes of the persons appraising the argument and judging its normative force, or to the context in which that appraisal is carried out. But recent work by a wide range of philosophers, argumentation theorists, and social theorists rejects such an abstract, impersonal notion of argument goodness. Instead, these theorists insist upon taking seriously, in the evaluation of arguments, the features of the evaluators themselves. In particular, such theorists emphasize the importance of cultural difference in argument appraisal. Often locating themselves under the banner of multiculturalism, they argue that the quality of an argument depends upon culturally-specific beliefs, values, and presuppositions; that an argument may be of high quality in one cultural context but of low quality in another. Consequently, they contend, no abstract, impersonal characterization of argument quality can succeed.In this paper I consider this multiculturalist approach to argument quality. I argue that while there is much merit in the general multiculturalist perspective, the multiculturalist argument against impersonal conceptions of argument quality fails. It fails for several reasons detailed below; most fundamentally, it fails because it itself presupposes just the kind of impersonal account of argument quality it seeks to reject. I call this presupposition that of transcultural normative reach. I identify this presupposition in the multiculturalist argument, and show how it undercuts the multiculturalist challenge to abstract, impersonal, transcultural conceptions of argument quality. I conclude with an evaluation of the strengths, and weaknesses, of the multiculturalist challenge to such conceptions of argument quality.

Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies

In Biro and Siegel (1992) we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.

High stakes testing, educational aims and ideals, and responsible assessment

School and government officials, system administrators and other policymakers offer a variety of reasons for engaging in high stakes testing: to monitor student performance, to measure teacher and/or school effectiveness, to ensure accountability, etc. Some of these reasons are good; others not. But the best reason - one that is never offered, because it is not true - is that such testing furthers our efforts to realize our considered educational aims and ideals. I argue that while some testing is perfectly legitimate, current high stakes testing practice is largely inimical to the achievement of our most defensible educational ends.