Helen De Cruz

An Extended Mind Perspective on Natural Number Representation

Experimental studies indicate that nonhuman animals and infants represent numerosities above three or four approximately and that their mental number line is logarithmic rather than linear. In contrast, human children from most cultures gradually acquire the capacity to denote exact cardinal values. To explain this difference, I take an extended mind perspective, arguing that the distinctly human ability to use external representations as a complement for internal cognitive operations enables us to represent natural numbers. Reviewing neuroscientific, developmental, and anthropological evidence, I argue that the use of external media that represent natural numbers (like number words, body parts, tokens or numerals) influences the functional architecture of the brain, which suggests a two-way traffic between the brain and cultural public representations.Experimental studies indicate that nonhuman animals and infants represent numerosities above three or four approximately and that their mental number line is logarithmic rather than linear. In contrast, human children from most cultures gradually acquire the capacity to denote exact cardinal values. To explain this difference, I take an extended mind perspective, arguing that the distinctly human ability to use external representations as a complement for internal cognitive operations enables us to represent natural numbers. Reviewing neuroscientific, developmental, and anthropological evidence, I argue that the use of external media that represent natural numbers (like number words, body parts, tokens or numerals) influences the functional architecture of the brain, which suggests a two-way traffic between the brain and cultural public representations.

Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions

Recent experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience indicates that humans are equipped with unlearned elementary mathematical skills. However, formal mathematics has properties that cannot be reduced to these elementary cognitive capacities. The question then arises how human beings cognitively deal with more advanced mathematical ideas. This paper draws on the extended mind thesis to suggest that mathematical symbols enable us to delegate some mathematical operations to the external environment. In this view, mathematical symbols are not only used to express mathematical concepts—they are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols are epistemic actions, because they enable us to represent concepts that are literally unthinkable with our bare brains. Using case-studies from the history of mathematics and from educational psychology, we argue for an intimate relationship between mathematical symbols and mathematical cognition.Recent experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience indicates that humans are equipped with unlearned elementary mathematical skills. However, formal mathematics has properties that cannot be reduced to these elementary cognitive capacities. The question then arises how human beings cognitively deal with more advanced mathematical ideas. This paper draws on the extended mind thesis to suggest that mathematical symbols enable us to delegate some mathematical operations to the external environment. In this view, mathematical symbols are not only used to express mathematical concepts—they are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols are epistemic actions, because they enable us to represent concepts that are literally unthinkable with our bare brains. Using case-studies from the history of mathematics and from educational psychology, we argue for an intimate relationship between mathematical symbols and mathematical cognition.

Dealing with creationist challenges. What European biology teachers might expect in the classroom

Creationists are becoming more active in Europe. We expect that European biology teachers will be more frequently challenged by students who introduce creationist misconceptions of evolutionary theory into the classroom. Moreover, research suggests that not all teachers are equally prepared to deal with them. To make biology teachers aware of what they might be confronted with, we discuss three kinds of misconceptions that are common in creationist literature: misconstruing scientific methodology, making a straw man out of evolutionary theory, and demanding unreasonable evidence. We offer some suggestions as to how to deal with them, but we also note the importance of embedding this approach in a more comprehensive educational programme in which students learn to think critically and in which their moral concerns and worldview are taken into account. In addition, we invite biology teachers to reflect on their own knowledge and, if necessary, to refresh it by consulting accessible yet scientifically informed literature. Although our main concern lies with teachers in Europe, our approach might be valuable to biology teachers worldwide.

Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From

Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise.Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise.

The role of material culture in human time representation: Calendrical systems as extensions of mental time travel

Humans have cognitive mechanisms that allow them to keep track of time, represent past events, and simulate the future, but these capacities have intrinsic constraints. Here, we explore the role of material culture as an extension of internal time representations through anthropological and archeological case studies, focusing on Upper Paleolithic material culture. We argue that calendars complement and extend internal time representations, because they enable humans to project past events into the future more accurately than is possible with episodic memory alone, making them one of the factors that significantly improved foraging success during the Upper Paleolithic. We discuss the implications of the epistemic use of material culture for our understanding of the causes of shifts in human behavior during the Upper Paleolithic.Humans have cognitive mechanisms that allow them to keep track of time, represent past events, and simulate the future, but these capacities have intrinsic constraints. Here, we explore the role of material culture as an extension of internal time representations through anthropological and archeological case studies, focusing on Upper Paleolithic material culture. We argue that calendars complement and extend internal time representations, because they enable humans to project past events into the future more accurately than is possible with episodic memory alone, making them one of the factors that significantly improved foraging success during the Upper Paleolithic. We discuss the implications of the epistemic use of material culture for our understanding of the causes of shifts in human behavior during the Upper Paleolithic.

Religious Concepts as Structured Imagination

What cognitive processes underlie the generation of religious concepts? This study investigates the creative processes involved in religious concept formation from the perspective of structured imagination. It examines whether the generation of novel religious entities is structured by universal features of human cognition that are hypothesized in the cognitive science of religion literature, in particular regarding the degree to which religious beings are anthropomorphic, their level of counterintuitiveness, and their moral character. In this study, participants freely imagined and described aliens and alien religious beings. Results suggest that spontaneously imagined religious beings are perceived as less anthropomorphic than aliens, that aliens are conveyed in more counterintuitive terms than religious beings, and that religious beings are described more frequently in terms of moral properties than aliens.What cognitive processes underlie the generation of religious concepts? This study investigates the creative processes involved in religious concept formation from the perspective of structured imagination. It examines whether the generation of novel religious entities is structured by universal features of human cognition that are hypothesized in the cognitive science of religion literature, in particular regarding the degree to which religious beings are anthropomorphic, their level of counterintuitiveness, and their moral character. In this study, participants freely imagined and described aliens and alien religious beings. Results suggest that spontaneously imagined religious beings are perceived as less anthropomorphic than aliens, that aliens are conveyed in more counterintuitive terms than religious beings, and that religious beings are described more frequently in terms of moral properties than aliens.

Toward an Integrative Approach of Cognitive Neuroscientific and Evolutionary Psychological Studies of Art

This paper examines explanations for human artistic behavior in two reductionist research programs, cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Despite their different methodological outlooks, both approaches converge on an explanation of art production and appreciation as byproducts of normal perceptual and motivational cognitive skills that evolved in response to problems originally not related to art, such as the discrimination of salient visual stimuli and speech sounds. The explanatory power of this reductionist framework does not obviate the need for higher-level accounts of art from the humanities, such as aesthetics, art history or anthropology of art.This paper examines explanations for human artistic behavior in two reductionist research programs, cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Despite their different methodological outlooks, both approaches converge on an explanation of art production and appreciation as byproducts of normal perceptual and motivational cognitive skills that evolved in response to problems originally not related to art, such as the discrimination of salient visual stimuli and speech sounds. The explanatory power of this reductionist framework does not obviate the need for higher-level accounts of art from the humanities, such as aesthetics, art history or anthropology of art.

Human Artistic Behaviour: Adaptation, Byproduct, or Cultural Group Selection?

Evolutionary accounts of art fall naturally into two categories: those that propose that art is an adaptation, and those that propose it is a byproduct of adaptations which evolved for different purposes. Although each of these positions can be supported by a wide range of empirical evidence, we will argue that there are shortcomings in each type of explanation. We will propose the alternative that the earliest art arose as a product of cultural group selection, drawing on theoretical models of altruism, anthropological observations of the use of art in extant small-scale societies and archaeological findings from Upper Palaeolithic Europe, in particular the Magdalenian cultural complex.

Reformed and evolutionary epistemology and the noetic effects of sin

Despite their divergent metaphysical assumptions, Reformed and evolutionary epistemologists have converged on the notion of proper basicality. Where Reformed epistemologists appeal to God, who has designed the mind in such a way that it successfully aims at the truth, evolutionary epistemologists appeal to natural selection as a mechanism that favors truth-preserving cognitive capacities. This paper investigates whether Reformed and evolutionary epistemological accounts of theistic belief are compatible. We will argue that their chief incompatibility lies in the noetic effects of sin and what may be termed the noetic effects of evolution, systematic tendencies wherein human cognitive faculties go awry. We propose a reconceptualization of the noetic effects of sin to mitigate this tension.

The cognitive appeal of the cosmological argument

e cosmological argument has enjoyed and still enjoys substantial popularity in various tradi- tions of natural theology. We propose that its enduring appeal is due at least in part to its concur- rence with human cognitive predispositions, in particular intuitions about causality and agency. !ese intuitions seem to be a stable part of human cognition. We will consider implications for the justification of the cosmological argument from externalist and internalist perspectives.