Helena Matute

Biological significance in forward and backward blocking: resolution of a discrepancy between animal conditioning and human causal judgment.

Similarities between Pavlovian conditioning in nonhumans and causal judgment by humans suggest that similar processes operate in these situations. Notably absent among the similarities is backward blocking (i.e., retrospective devaluation of a signal due to increased valuation of another signal that was present during training), which has been observed in causal judgment by humans but not in Pavlovian responding by animals. The authors used rats to determine if this difference arises from the target cue being biologically significant in the Pavlovian case but not in causal judgment. They used a sensory preconditioning procedure in Experiments 1 and 2, in which the target cue retained low biological significance during the treatment, and obtained backward blocking. The authors found in Experiment 3 that forward blocking also requires the target cue to be of low biological significance. Thus, low biological significance is a necessary condition for a stimulus to be vulnerable to blocking.

Biological Significance as a Determinant of Cue Competition

Many researchers have noted the similarities between causal judgment in humans and Pavlovian conditioning in animals One recently noted discrepancy between these two forms of learning is the absence of backward blocking in animals, in contrast with its occurrence in human causality judgment Here we report two experiments that investigated the role of biological significance in backward blocking as a potential explanation of this discrepancy With rats as subjects, we used sensory preconditioning and second-order conditioning procedures, which allowed the to-be-blocked cue to retain low biological significance during training for some animals, but not for others Backward blocking was observed only when the target cue was of low biological significance during training These results suggest that the apparent discrepancy between human causal judgment and animal Pavlovian conditioning arises not because of a species difference, but because human causality studies ordinarily use stimuli of low biological significance, whereas animal Pavlovian studies ordinarily use stimuli of high biological significance, which are apparently protected against cue competition

Human reactions to uncontrollable outcomes: further evidence for superstitions rather than helplessness

Recent research has shown superstitious behaviour and illusion of control in human subjects exposed to the negative reinforcement conditions that are traditionally assumed to lead to the opposite outcome (i.e. learned helplessness). The experiments reported in this paper test the generality of these effects in two different tasks and under different conditions of percentage (75% vs. 25%) and distribution (random vs. last-trials) of negative reinforcement (escape from uncontrollable noise). All three experiments obtained superstitious behaviour and illusion of control and question the generality of learned helplessness as a consequence of exposing humans to uncontrollable outcomes.

Illusion of Control: Detecting Response-Outcome Independence in Analytic but Not in Naturalistic Conditions

Experiments in which subjects are asked to analytically assess response-outcome relationships have frequently yielded accurate judgments of response-outcome independence, but more naturalistically set experiments in which subjects are instructed to obtain the outcome have frequently yielded illusions of control The present research tested the hypothesis that a differential probability of responding p(R), between these two traditions could be at the basis of these different results Subjects received response-independent outcomes and were instructed either to obtain the outcome (naturalistic condition) or to behave scientifically in order to find out how much control over the outcome was possible (analytic condition) Subjects in the naturalistic condition tended to respond at almost every opportunity and developed a strong illusion of control Subjects in the analytic condition maintained their p(R) at a point close to 5 and made accurate judgments of control The illusion of control observed in the naturalistic condition appears to be a collateral effect of a high tendency to respond in subjects who are trying to obtain an outcome, this tendency to respond prevents them from learning that the outcome would have occurred with the same probability if they had not responded

Stimulus competition in the absence of compound conditioning

Most associative theories have assumed that stimulus competition occurs only between conditioned stimuli (CSs) that are trained in compound. The present research investigated the possibility of competition between two CSs that were individually paired to the same unconditioned stimulus (US). We used human subjects in an anticipatory suppression analogue to Pavlovian conditioning. Experiment 1 showed that X+ training followed by A+ training resulted in impaired responding to X. This did not occur when A+ training preceded X+ training. Experiment 2 replicated the basic effect and showed that it did not occur when the Phase 2 training consisted of A− instead of A+ nor when the A+ pairings occurred in a second context. Experiment 3 showed that A+ pairings occurring in a second context could still produce the effect when X was tested in the context in which the A+ pairings had occurred, but not when X was tested in a context different from that used for A+ training. Collectively, these results suggest that individually trained CSs may compete with each other when one of those CSs is more strongly activated by the test context than the other one.

Flexible Use of Recent Information in Causal and Predictive Judgments

Associative and statistical theories of causal and predictive learning make opposite predictions for situations in which the most recent information contradicts the information provided by older trials (e.g., acquisition followed by extinction). Associative theories predict that people will rely on the most recent information to best adapt their behavior to the changing environment. Statistical theories predict that people will integrate what they have learned in the two phases. The results of this study showed one or the other effect as a function of response mode (trial by trial vs. global), type of question (contiguity, causality, or predictiveness), and postacquisition instructions. That is, participants are able to give either an integrative judgment, or a judgment that relies on recent information as a function of test demands. The authors concluded that any model must allow for flexible use of information once it has been acquired.

Illusion of control: The role of personal involvement

The illusion of control consists of overestimating the influence that our behavior exerts over uncontrollable outcomes. Available evidence suggests that an important factor in development of this illusion is the personal involvement of participants who are trying to obtain the outcome. The dominant view assumes that this is due to social motivations and self-esteem protection. We propose that this may be due to a bias in contingency detection which occurs when the probability of the action (i.e., of the potential cause) is high. Indeed, personal involvement might have been often confounded with the probability of acting, as participants who are more involved tend to act more frequently than those for whom the outcome is irrelevant and therefore become mere observers. We tested these two variables separately. In two experiments, the outcome was always uncontrollable and we used a yoked design in which the participants of one condition were actively involved in obtaining it and the participants in the other condition observed the adventitious cause-effect pairs. The results support the latter approach: Those acting more often to obtain the outcome developed stronger illusions, and so did their yoked counterparts.

Cues trained apart compete for behavioral control in rats : Convergence with the associative interference literature

Contemporary theories of associative learning require cues be trained in compound for cue competition (interference) to occur. That is, Cues A and X should compete for behavioral control only if training consists of AX-outcome (O) trials and not if each cue is separately paired with O (i.e., X-O and A-O). Research with humans challenges this view by showing that A-O trials interpolated between training and testing of a X-O association impair responding to X (i.e., retroactive interference). In six conditioned suppression studies with rats, the authors demonstrate that two cues trained apart can each interfere with the potential of the other to predict the outcome. The authors conclude that this type of interference (a) reflects a failure to retrieve the target association due to priming at test of the interfering association and (b) is attenuated if the outcome is of high biological significance. These findings parallel previous reports in verbal learning research and suggest that a similar associative structure underlies some types of associations in nonverbal subjects.

Illusion of Control in Internet Users and College Students

When people try to obtain a desired event and this outcome occurs independently of their behavior, they often think that they are controlling its occurrence. This is known as the illusion of control, and it is the basis for most superstitions and pseudosciences. However, most experiments demonstrating this effect had been conducted many years ago and almost always in the controlled environment of the psychology laboratory and with psychology students as subjects. Here, we explore the generality of this effect and show that it is still today a robust phenomenon that can be observed even in the context of a very simple computer program that users try to control (and believe that they are controlling) over the Internet. Understanding how robust and general this effect is, is a first step towards eradicating irrational and pseudoscientific thinking.

Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience

Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.