Hélène Le Cadre

A Pricing Model for a Mobile Network Operator Sharing Limited Resource with a Mobile Virtual Network Operator

Radio spectrum allocation is essential to the provision of mobile communication services. The spectrum is a finite resource and can accomodate a limited number of simultaneous users at one time. Due to this scarcity, allocating traditional mobile licenses to new mobile operators is unrealizable. Hence, new entrants should bargain access to the networks of the incumbents who establish contracts specifying access charge and maximum traffic volume that the MVNO is allowed to send on the MNOs network. In this article a Mobile Network operator (MNO) shares his finite network resource with a Mobile Virtual Network operator (MVNO) lacking the infrastructure. We study the game where the MVNO invests in content/advertising to compensate for the quality of service degradation. Modeling the system as a supply-chain, i.e. a logistics network consisting of the MNO, the MVNO and the consumers, we determine the access charge and the optimal traffic volume that the MVNO should be allowed to send on the MNOs network to coordinate the system.

Modelling MNO and MVNO's dynamic interconnection relations: is cooperative content investment profitable for both providers?

We consider a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) who shares dynamically his limited resource spectrum with a Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) lacking the infrastructure. We start by introducing at each time period a three-level game: in the first step the MNO defines the wholesale access charge that the MVNO pays per traffic unit sent on his network and allocates his scarce resource between his own consumers and the MVNO; in a second step, both operators compete on their retail prices, the MNO discriminating between the market segments while the MVNO invests in contents to target niche markets or add value to her company; finally the consumers choose one of the providers’ offers or none depending on their intrinsic preferences and on the opportunity cost values. The game admits a unique equilibrium. In a second part, a regulatory authority forces both providers to use cooperative content investment i.e., the MNO now shares the MVNO’s content investment cost; in exchange this latter agrees to share her revenue. The equilibrium is still uniquely defined at each time period. Besides, we check numerically that depending on the operators’ power relation, such a contract can increase both operators’ utilities and consumer welfare, and incite the MVNO to invest more in contents.

Optimal pricing strategy with compensation when QoS is not satisfied

Pricing has been recently regarded as a means to control congestion in communication networks and, therefore, satisfy quality-of-service (QoS) requirements. In a network without connection access control, though, available proposals are generally based on average values, and QoS requirements can be unsatisfied for a part of the traffic. We propose here a simple pricing model for which, if delay exceeds a predefined threshold, a compensation is provided. We study this model by investigating first the level of (elastic) demand for fixed parameters, made of price, threshold, and compensation values, and then find the values maximizing the corresponding revenue. We also compare the results with those when no compensation is provided.

Coalition Stability under QoS Based-Market Segmentation

N independent sources choose their provider depending on the perceived costs associated with each provider. The perceived cost is the sum of the price and quality of service proposed by the provider coefficiented by the source sensitivity to the quality of service. The source chooses the smallest cost provider or refuses to subscribe if all the perceived costs are above her maximum admissible opportunity cost. First, we detail the market segmentation between the providers as function of the quality of service sensitivity. Then, we prove that in case where coalitions emerged and under defensive equilibria, the game characteristic function would be submodular meaning that the Shapley value would be a fair and stable way to share the grand coalition revenue.