Helge Blakkisrud

Living with Non-recognition: State- and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-states

Abstract The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the establishment of several non-recognised statelets, three of which—Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh—are located in the South Caucasus. This article sets aside the question of whether these quasi-states ought to be internationally recognised, and focuses on whether they exist as functioning state entities. To what extent are the authorities in these would-be states able to provide the populace with the services expected of contemporary states—like internal and external security, basic infrastructure and welfare? All three insist that they are not only functioning states, but also nation-states that command the allegiance of their population. We thus also discuss their claim to embody real nationhood.

From Secessionist Conflict Toward a Functioning State: Processes of State- and Nation-Building in Transnistria

How have the Transnistrian authorities sought to consolidate de facto statehood in the absence of international recognition? Starting from the idea that the time factor will eventually transform secessionists into state-builders, this article traces how the processes of state- and nation-building promoted by the Transnistrian de facto authorities have evolved since the early 1990s. Drawing on official sources, interviews, journalism, and the political science literature, the domestic dimensions of state- and nation-building in de facto state conflicts are examined. These include fulfillment of basic requirements of state-building, development of economic viability, and nation-building processes that attempt to create a unifying identity.

Medvedev's New Governors

ON 7 MAY 2008, DMITRII MEDVEDEV WAS SWORN IN as the third President of the Russian Federation. Under his two predecessors, the relationship between Moscow and the regions had undergone cataclysmic changes. Boris Yel’tsin’s rule had ushered in a period of unprecedented, albeit unsystematic and ad hoc, decentralisation (Teague 1994; Lapidus & Walker 1996). Moreover, although the 1992 Federal Treaty had prevented further fragmentation of the state, it also laid the groundwork for a fundamentally asymmetric federal structure, later further differentiated through the conclusion of bilateral power-sharing treaties between Moscow and selected regions (Solnick 1995, 2000; Kahn 2002). At the regional level, the governors soon emerged as the focal point of political power, and, somewhat reluctantly, Yel’tsin ceded his prerogative to appoint these leaders in favour of direct elections (Zlotnik 1996; Busygina 1997). By the turn of the millennium, with power transferred from Yel’tsin to Vladimir Putin, virtually all regions had popularly elected leaders. The governors had also become a political force to be reckoned with at the federal level (Solnick 1999; Lussier 2002). Under Vladimir Putin, however, the pendulum swung back. Moscow tightened the reins anew over ‘the executive vertical’ and began to scale back regional autonomy, including the power of the governors (Hyde 2001; Reddaway & Orttung 2004). During his first term, Putin deprived the governors of their federal platform by abolishing ex officio representation in the Federation Council, and established a limit on the number of consecutive terms they could serve (Ross 2003; Blakkisrud 2003). In his second term, Putin also stripped the governors of their independent regional power-base by

History writing and nation building in post-independence Tajikistan

Since the end of the Tajik civil war in 1997, the Tajik authorities have being seeking to instill a new national consciousness. Here the educational system plays a crucial role, not least the way history is taught. Through a state-approved history curriculum, the authorities offer a common understanding of the past that is intended to strengthen the (imagined) community of the present. In this article, we examine the set of history textbooks currently used in Tajik schools and compare them with Soviet textbooks, exploring continuities and changes in the understanding of the Tajik nation. We distinguish between changes in the perception of the national “self” and the new “other,” the Uzbeks, and introduce two intermediary categories: the Soviet/Russian heritage as an “external self” and Islam as an “internal other.” The main battle for the further delimitation of the Tajik “self” is likely to take place within the discursive gray zone between the two latter categories, where the authorities will have to find a balance between a continued secular state ideology and the heavy presence of Islam, as well as between a Soviet past and a Tajik present.

Dynamics of de facto statehood: the South Caucasian de facto states between secession and sovereignty

Scattered across the globe there exist a handful of unrecognized statelets. Although some such entities have proven short-lived, others have demonstrated remarkable tenacity. The South Caucasian de facto states – Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh – have existed for almost 20 years now. This article offers a comparative analysis of how these statelets have attempted to consolidate statehood though processes of state- and nation-building. Despite many outward similarities, both ambitions and outcomes have varied greatly. Interestingly, whether the ultimate goal has been independent statehood or status is seen only as a springboard for unification with ethnic kin does not seem to be a decisive point.

Yielding to the sons of the soil: Abkhazian democracy and the marginalization of the Armenian vote

Abstract Among the post-Soviet de facto states, Abkhazia is unique in that the secessionists pursued self-determination in the name of a minority group. Today the ethnic Abkhaz enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Simultaneously, Abkhazia has developed a reasonably democratic political system. How has it been possible for the ethnic Abkhaz to monopolize power within a political system that exhibits most of the trappings of democratic rule? We discuss four alternative theories of ethnic marginalization to explain why the Armenians, the largest minority community in Abkhazia, have abstained from translating numerical strength into political influence. We argue that it is essential to examine sentiments and behaviour not only among the dominant group, but just as much among the marginalized group. Particularly relevant is the pervasive perception that rights in and ‘ownership’ of a territory are linked to ‘rootedness’.

A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North

The aim of this article is to examine what the geopolitics of the Arctic look like as seen from the largest Arctic state. How are narratives about the development of the region received, reworked and produced in a Russian context? We find that Russian policy actors distance themselves from discourses of Arctic conflict and geopolitical competition, and examine how this approach may serve some of Russias key interests in the region. We further argue that the key tension in the Arctic region is not along the conflict/cooperation axis, but rather lies in the tricky process of delineating between international cooperation and national sovereignty in tackling Arctic problems. In attempting to illustrate the various voices, ideas and interests that shape Russias policy understanding of the Arctic and its challenges and opportunities, we draw upon a media analysis and a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the five Arctic states.

Governing the governors: legitimacy vs. control in the reform of the Russian regional executive

In December 2011, President Medvedev unexpectedly announced that the Kremlin was planning to re-introduce gubernatorial elections. Such elections had been discontinued in the aftermath of the 2004 Beslan terrorist attack. This article traces the new reform: the process of adopting the necessary legislative amendments in spring 2012; implementation through the elections in October 2012 – and partial backtracking in April 2013. The process was framed by a conflict between the wish to increase the legitimacy of the governors through popular participation and the Kremlins perceived need for control over the outcome. In the 2012–2013 reform cycle, control eventually trumped legitimacy.

The new Russian nationalism: imperialism, ethnicity and authoritarianism 2000–2015

Three highly qualified readers – Paul Goode, Oxana Shevel, and Igor Zevelev – have presented their assessment of our book The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 20...

Center‐Periphery relations in Russia's European north 1

Abstract Two Norwegian researchers examine the post‐Soviet evolution of decision‐making authority between the regions of Northwest Russia (Arkhangelsk Oblast, Republic of Karelia, Murmansk Oblast, and Nenets Autonomous Okrug) and the Russian Federation government in Moscow, with particular attention to the arena of natural resource use and management. The authors document an ongoing struggle for authority (including the right to allocate quotas for the fish catch) between fisheries management departments of the regional administrations and the State Committee on Fisheries (and its quasi‐subsidiary basinwide management body Sevryba). The analysis highlights the unstable power balance in management of this important northern resource.