Henk van den Belt

Debating the Precautionary Principle: “Guilty until Proven Innocent” or “Innocent until Proven Guilty”?

On May 20, 1999, Nature published a brief report on an experiment performed by researchers at Cornell University that indicated that pollen from genetically modified (GM) Bt corn (Zea mays) could kill the larvae of monarch butterflies (Danaus plexippus). In laboratory tests, caterpillars fed milkweed (Asclepias curassavica) leaves dusted with pollen from a Bt corn hybrid showed retarded growth and increased mortality. “These results,” the authors stated, “have potentially profound implications for the conservation of monarch butterflies” (Losey et al., 1999). In a press release announcing the publication in Nature, the principal investigator on the Cornell study, John Losey, had expressed due caution: “Pollen from Btcorn could represent a serious risk to populations of monarchs and other butterflies, but we can’t predict how serious the risk is until we have a lot more data. And we can’t forget that Bt-corn and other transgenic crops have a huge potential for reducing pesticide use and increasing yields. This study is just the first step, we need to do more research and then objectively weigh the risks versus the benefits of this new technology” (Cornell News, 1999). Such caution was wasted on Greenpeace International. The day the findings of the Cornell study were published it already demanded that authorities in the United States, Argentina, Canada, and the European Union take immediate action and prohibit the growing of genetically engineered maize crops. The environmentalist nongovernmental organization (NGO) reiterated its earlier call for a ban on all releases of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Less than a month later, in a media-oriented action, members of Greenpeace dressed up as butterflies confronted a meeting of European Union environment ministers held in Luxembourg, carrying banners demanding “Give butterflies a chance.” In Europe, their campaign apparently found resonance among the authorities: The European Commission decided to freeze the approval process for new Bt maize varieties. The Cornell study did not show that monarch butterfly populations in the wild were actually endangered by Bt corn. However, when Monsanto and Novartis, the companies that sold Bt corn at that time, correctly pointed out that the detrimental effects had so far only been shown in the laboratory, Greenpeace branded them as irresponsible. A spokesperson declared: “Such reactions are the precise opposite to precaution and follow the same pattern of denial these companies have employed for decades, when health and environmental effects of their chemical pesticides were exposed. However, in the case of these GMOs we are talking about living toxins that can reproduce in nature and transmit their dangerous traits to wild species. We cannot consider GMOs harmless until harmful effects are fully proven (sic)” (Greenpeace, 1999a). (The last sentence is obviously a—Freudian?—slip of the tongue and should be read: “We cannot consider GMOs harmless until the absence of harmful effects is fully proven.”) For Greenpeace, not just monarchs were supposed to be endangered. The NGO drew up a list of over 100 species of butterflies that it believed could be harmed by GM maize. It accused biotech companies and regulatory authorities of fully ignoring these risks (Greenpeace, 1999b). More recent field research performed in the American Midwest, however, seems to indicate that monarch butterfly populations are hardly affected, if at all, by the large-scale cultivation of Bt maize in this region (Ortman et al., 2001). The monarch butterfly case is only one among many occasions in which the so-called Precautionary Principle (PP) has been invoked to advocate preventative action to forestall possible harm even before the likelihood or the possible extent of the latter has been scientifically well established. This principle is highly contested. With many other environmentalist NGOs, Greenpeace champions its adoption as a central principle of international law against tenacious opposition from the United States, Canada, and Australia (Greenpeace, 2002). The principle is also at issue in recent World Trade Organization trade disputes between the United States and the European Union. But why does the PP play such a central role?

Playing God in Frankenstein's Footsteps: Synthetic Biology and the Meaning of Life

The emergent new science of synthetic biology is challenging entrenched distinctions between, amongst others, life and non-life, the natural and the artificial, the evolved and the designed, and even the material and the informational. Whenever such culturally sanctioned boundaries are breached, researchers are inevitably accused of playing God or treading in Frankenstein’s footsteps. Bioethicists, theologians and editors of scientific journals feel obliged to provide an authoritative answer to the ambiguous question of the ‘meaning’ of life, both as a scientific definition and as an explication with wider existential connotations. This article analyses the arguments mooted in the emerging societal debates on synthetic biology and the way its practitioners respond to criticism, mostly by assuming a defiant posture or professing humility. It explores the relationship between the ‘playing God’ theme and the Frankenstein motif and examines the doctrinal status of the ‘playing God’ argument. One particularly interesting finding is that liberal theologians generally deny the religious character of the ‘playing God’ argument—a response which fits in with the curious fact that this argument is used mainly by secular organizations. Synthetic biology, it is therefore maintained, does not offend so much the God of the Bible as a deified Nature. While syntheses of artificial life forms cause some vague uneasiness that life may lose its special meaning, most concerns turn out to be narrowly anthropocentric. As long as synthetic biology creates only new microbial life and does not directly affect human life, it will in all likelihood be considered acceptable.

Synthetic biology, patenting, health and global justice

The legal and moral issues that synthetic biology (SB) and its medical applications are likely to raise with regard to intellectual property (IP) and patenting are best approached through the lens of a theoretical framework highlighting the “co-construction” or “co-evolution” of patent law and technology. The current situation is characterized by a major contest between the so-called IP frame and the access-to-knowledge frame. In SB this contest is found in the contrasting approaches of Craig Venter’s chassis school and the BioBricks school. The stakes in this contest are high as issues of global health and global justice are implied. Patents are not simply to be seen as neutral incentives, but must also be judged on their effects for access to essential medicines, a more balanced pattern of innovation and the widest possible social participation in innovative activity. We need moral imagination to design new institutional systems and new ways of practising SB that meet the new demands of global justice.The legal and moral issues that synthetic biology (SB) and its medical applications are likely to raise with regard to intellectual property (IP) and patenting are best approached through the lens of a theoretical framework highlighting the “co-construction” or “co-evolution” of patent law and technology. The current situation is characterized by a major contest between the so-called IP frame and the access-to-knowledge frame. In SB this contest is found in the contrasting approaches of Craig Venter’s chassis school and the BioBricks school. The stakes in this contest are high as issues of global health and global justice are implied. Patents are not simply to be seen as neutral incentives, but must also be judged on their effects for access to essential medicines, a more balanced pattern of innovation and the widest possible social participation in innovative activity. We need moral imagination to design new institutional systems and new ways of practising SB that meet the new demands of global justice.

How To Engage With Experimental Practices? Moderate Versus Radical Constructivism

A central question in constructivist studies of science is how the analyst should deal with the material objects handled by scientific practitioners in laboratories. Representatives of ‘radical constructivism’ such as Knorr-Cetina and Latour have gone furthest in exploring the role of these ‘non-humans’ but have also maneuvered themselves in untenable positions due to a fatal conflation of different meanings of the term ‘construction’. The epistemological and ontological commitments of ‘moderate constructivism’ especially of the Strong Program defended by Barnes and Bloor, are more suitable for dealing with the task at hand. While radical constructivists treat the domains of nature and human society as largely coterminous, an alternative ontology stresses that natural reality is never fully absorbed into the world of culture but only interacts with the latter at localizable interfaces such as practices and artifacts. This perspective promises a more relaxed relationship with current forms of scientific realism.

DIY-Bio – economic, epistemological and ethical implications and ambivalences

Since 2008, we witness the emergence of the Do-It-Yourself Biology movement, a global movement spreading the use of biotechnology beyond traditional academic and industrial institutions and into the lay public. Practitioners include a broad mix of amateurs, enthusiasts, students, and trained scientists. At this moment, the movement counts nearly 50 local groups, mostly in America and Europe, but also increasingly in Asia. Do-It-Yourself Bio represents a direct translation of hacking culture and practicesfrom the realm of computers and software into the realm of genes and cells. Although the movement is still in its infancy, and it is even unclear whether it will ever reach maturity, the contours of a new paradigm of knowledge production are already becoming visible. We will subsequently sketch the economic, the epistemological and the ethical profile of Do-It-Yourself Bio, and discuss its implications and also its ambivalences.

Ludwik Fleck and the causative agent of syphilis: sociology or pathology of science? A rejoinder to Jean Lindenmann

Abstract In 1905 two different microbes were proposed to fill the vacant role of etiologic agent for syphilis, one, the Cytorrhyctes luis, by John Siegel, the other, Spirochaeta pallida, by Fritz Schaudinn. After gathering and reviewing the evidence the majority of medical scientists decided in favor of Schaudinn’s candidate. In a previous issue Jean Lindenmann challenged Ludwik Fleck’s suggestion that under suitable social conditions Siegel’s candidate could just as well have won acceptance by the scientific community ( Lindenmann, 2001 ). To refute this counterfactual thesis, Lindenmann presented an asymmetric account of the dispute over the etiology of syphilis. He adopted the view of the proponents that Schaudinn’s spirochete had already been there in syphilitic lesions for centuries, only awaiting the discovery of an appropriate staining technique to be revealed. Here a more symmetric analysis of the episode will be attempted, paying serious attention to the arguments put forward by the spirochete’s opponents, who expatiated on the many possibilities of inadvertently creating artifacts through microscopic preparation and staining. The symmetric account that is presented in this rejoinder thus aims to trace the simultaneous construction of facts and artifacts. It will not, however, resurrect Fleck’s counterfactual thesis.

The precautionary principle and pesticides

In 1998, Greenpeace, Natuur en Milieu(Nature and Environment), Milieudefensie(Environmental Defense), and the National ConsumersUnion presented a report about the possible risks andhazards associated with pesticide residues on fruitsand vegetables. Although these organizationsexplicitly denied having unassailable evidence on theharmful effects of pesticides, they claimed that bynow there are sufficient indications that pesticidesmay indeed lead to such health hazards. They used anappeal to the so-called precautionary principle tounderpin their claims. The committee officially incharge of deciding on the admission of pesticidesaccused the organizations of scaremongering. Afterdistinguishing three possible versions of theprecautionary principle, we then show that the fourorganizations used in their campaign an improperversion of the precautionary principle to convince thegeneral public.

Frankenstein lives on

It was 200 years ago that Mary Shelleys Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus was published. Over the decades, this gothic tale has captured the popular imagination through the numerous theater productions and films it inspired. The story is commonly taken to imply a dire warning about the dangers of scientific hubris. Just mention the name Frankenstein and laypersons think of scientists “playing God.” In the common view, the inevitable consequence of Frankensteins alleged transgression—bestowing life on inanimate matter—was that he created a monster that would wreak havoc on his family and friends. Frankensteins name is repeatedly invoked in debates about emerging technologies like biotech, nanotech, synthetic biology, and artificial intelligence. However, the view of Shelleys story as a cautionary tale about scientific hubris, although dominant, is only one possible interpretation. Her novel, actually, is a multilayered story full of ambivalences and much subtler than most Hollywood versions. It naturally lends itself to diverse interpretations.It was 200 years ago that Mary Shelleys Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus was published. Over the decades, this gothic tale has captured the popular imagination through the numerous theater productions and films it inspired. The story is commonly taken to imply a dire warning about the dangers of scientific hubris. Just mention the name Frankenstein and laypersons think of scientists “playing God.” In the common view, the inevitable consequence of Frankensteins alleged transgression—bestowing life on inanimate matter—was that he created a monster that would wreak havoc on his family and friends. Frankensteins name is repeatedly invoked in debates about emerging technologies like biotech, nanotech, synthetic biology, and artificial intelligence. However, the view of Shelleys story as a cautionary tale about scientific hubris, although dominant, is only one possible interpretation. Her novel, actually, is a multilayered story full of ambivalences and much subtler than most Hollywood versions. It naturally lends itself to diverse interpretations.

Animal welfare, consumer welfare, and competition law: The Dutch debate on the Chicken of Tomorrow

Business initiatives to create markets for ethical products such as animal-friendly meat products or child labor-free clothing may be restrained by competition law if they involve agreements that reduce consumer choice. In the Netherlands, supermarkets, poultry farmers, and chicken meat processors agreed in 2015 on a chicken meat concept with an enhanced sustainability profile: the ‘Chicken of Tomorrow’. It established private animal welfare standards above the legally required minimum, such as the use of a slower growing breed, more space in the poultry house, natural day and night rhythm, and provision of distraction materials. Chicken of Tomorrow also addresses public health and environmental concerns through less use of antibiotics, “responsible soy” in feed, reduced emissions of ammonia and particulates, and closed mineral cycles. The goal of this agreement was that by 2020 supermarkets would sell fresh chicken meat exclusively from animals that have been produced under these improved conditions. Accordingly, supermarkets would offer higher purchasing prices to meat processors and poultry farmers positioned further up the supply chain. However, the Dutch Consumer and Market Authority (ACM) ruled that these arrangements violated national and European Union (EU) competition rules (ACM, 2015). According to ACM, the benefits in terms of animal welfare and sustainability did not outweigh the disadvantages for consumers from limited choice and a higher product prices. The decision highlighted a conflict between consumer protection and animal welfare goals. Public opinion and the Dutch government expect the private sector to innovate in promoting sustainable animal-sourced products (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2013). This works well when efficiency savings can be made that benefit companies and consumers. However, further progress requires the agro-food sector to also internalize environmental and social externalities, which would lead to higher product prices and the removal of the least sustainable products from the market. Supermarket chains face the dilemma of either advancing alone and risking the loss of price-oriented customers or collaborating with their competitors in potential breach of competition law for conspiring to Implications

Comment: Between Human and Animal

As in the other parts of the book, in this part culturally entrenched boundaries and demarcations are also critically re-examined in light of the arrival of the Anthropocene as a new geological era. Here the focus is on rethinking the received distinction between humans and non-human animals. In a long series of discourses making up our cultural heritage, we humans have persistently tried to define the essence of our own humanity and to distinguish ourselves from other animals by laying claim to supposedly unique capacities and achievements like reason, language, morality, religion, technology, law and politics. By now, however, human exceptionalism in its cruder forms has definitely gone out of fashion. None of the contributors to this part of the book subscribes to such versions, but each has different views on how far the critique of human supremacy should be pursued and where the new boundaries should be redrawn, if at all. The issues raised in these contributions are of central importance for the reorientation of animal ethics and environmental ethics in the Age of the Anthropocene.