Henk W. de Regt

A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding

Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.

Terra Incognita: Explanation and Reduction in Earth Science

The present paper presents a philosophical analysis of earth science, a discipline that has received relatively little attention from philosophers of science. We focus on the question of whether earth science can be reduced to allegedly more fundamental sciences, such as chemistry or physics. In order to answer this question, we investigate the aims and methods of earth science, the laws and theories used by earth scientists, and the nature of earth‐scientific explanation. Our analysis leads to the tentative conclusion that there are emergent phenomena in earth science but that these may be reducible to physics. However, earth science does not have irreducible laws, and the theories of earth science are typically hypotheses about unobservable (past) events or generalised—but not universally valid—descriptions of contingent processes. Unlike more fundamental sciences, earth science is characterised by explanatory pluralism: earth scientists employ various forms of narrative explanations in combination with causal explanations. The main reason is that earth‐scientific explanations are typically hampered by local underdetermination by the data to such an extent that complete causal explanations are impossible in practice, if not in principle.

Discussion note: Making sense of understanding

J.D. Trout (2002) presents a challenge to all theorists of scientific explanation who appeal to the notion of understanding. Trout denounces understanding as irrelevant, if not dangerous, from an epistemic perspective and he endorses a radically objectivist view of explanation instead. In this note I accept Trouts challenge. I criticize his argument and defend a non‐objectivist, pragmatic conception of understanding that is epistemically relevant.J.D. Trout (2002) presents a challenge to all theorists of scientific explanation who appeal to the notion of understanding. Trout denounces understanding as irrelevant, if not dangerous, from an epistemic perspective and he endorses a radically objectivist view of explanation instead. In this note I accept Trouts challenge. I criticize his argument and defend a non‐objectivist, pragmatic conception of understanding that is epistemically relevant.

The Epistemic Value of Understanding

This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of scientific understanding based on this notion.This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of scientific understanding based on this notion.

Scientific understanding: truth or dare?

It is often claimed—especially by scientific realists—that science provides understanding of the world only if its theories are (at least approximately) true descriptions of reality, in its observable as well as unobservable aspects. This paper critically examines this ‘realist thesis’ concerning understanding. A crucial problem for the realist thesis is that (as study of the history and practice of science reveals) understanding is frequently obtained via theories and models that appear to be highly unrealistic or even completely fictional. So we face the dilemma of either giving up the realist thesis that understanding requires truth, or allowing for the possibility that in many if not all practical cases we do not have scientific understanding. I will argue that the first horn is preferable: the link between understanding and truth can be severed. This becomes a live option if we abandon the traditional view that scientific understanding is a special type of knowledge. While this view implies that understanding must be factive, I avoid this implication by identifying understanding with a skill rather than with knowledge. I will develop the idea that understanding phenomena consists in the ability to use a theory to generate predictions of the target system’s behavior. This implies that the crucial condition for understanding is not truth but intelligibility of the theory, where intelligibility is defined as the value that scientists attribute to the theoretical virtues that facilitate the construction of models of the phenomena. I will show, first, that my account accords with the way practicing scientists conceive of understanding, and second, that it allows for the use of idealized or fictional models and theories in achieving understanding.

Visualization as a Tool for Understanding

This paper examines the relation between visualization and understanding. Its main thesis is that visualization is an effective tool for achieving scientific understanding, but, contrary to what some scientists and philosophers have suggested, it is not a necessary condition for understanding. The thesis is embedded in a more general analysis of what scientific understanding consists in, and how it can be obtained. It is supported by a case study of the role of visualization in twentieth-century theoretical physics, especially in the genesis of quantum mechanics in the 1920s and in the development of quantum field theory in the years since World War II.

Interpreting theories without a spacetime

In this paper we have two aims: first, to draw attention to the close connexion between interpretation and scientific understanding; second, to give a detailed account of how theories without a spacetime can be interpreted, and so of how they can be understood. In order to do so, we of course need an account of what is meant by a theory ‘without a spacetime’: which we also provide in this paper. We describe three tools, used by physicists, aimed at constructing interpretations which are adequate for the goal of understanding. We analyse examples from high-energy physics illustrating how physicists use these tools to construct interpretations and thereby attain understanding. The examples are: the ’t Hooft approximation of gauge theories, random matrix models, causal sets, loop quantum gravity, and group field theory.In this paper we have two aims: first, to draw attention to the close connexion between interpretation and scientific understanding; second, to give a detailed account of how theories without a spacetime can be interpreted, and so of how they can be understood. In order to do so, we of course need an account of what is meant by a theory ‘without a spacetime’: which we also provide in this paper. We describe three tools, used by physicists, aimed at constructing interpretations which are adequate for the goal of understanding. We analyse examples from high-energy physics illustrating how physicists use these tools to construct interpretations and thereby attain understanding. The examples are: the ’t Hooft approximation of gauge theories, random matrix models, causal sets, loop quantum gravity, and group field theory.

A Davidsonian argument against incommensurability

The writings of Kuhn and Feyerabend on incommensurability challenged the idea that science progresses towards the truth. Davidson famously criticized the notion of incommensurability, arguing that it is incoherent. Davidsons argument was in turn criticized by Kuhn and others. This article argues that, although at least some of the objections raised against Davidsons argument are formally correct, they do it very little harm. What remains of the argument once the objections have been taken account of is still quite damaging to the thesis that formerly endorsed scientific theories are incommensurable with those of todays science.

A precipice below which lies absurdity? Theories without a spacetime and scientific understanding

While the relation between visualization and scientific understanding has been a topic of long-standing discussion, recent developments in physics have pushed the boundaries of this debate to new and still unexplored realms. For it is claimed that, in certain theories of quantum gravity, spacetime ‘disappears’: and this suggests that one may have sensible physical theories in which spacetime is completely absent. This makes the philosophical question whether such theories are intelligible, even more pressing. And if such theories are intelligible, the question then is how they manage to do so. In this paper, we adapt the contextual theory of scientific understanding, developed by one of us, to fit the novel challenges posed by physical theories without spacetime. We construe understanding as a matter of skill rather than just knowledge. The appeal is thus to understanding , rather than explanation, because we will be concerned with the tools that scientists have at their disposal for understanding these theories. Our central thesis is that such physical theories can provide scientific understanding, and that such understanding does not require spacetimes of any sort. Our argument consists of four consecutive steps: (a) We argue, from the general theory of scientific understanding, that although visualization is an oft-used tool for understanding, it is not a necessary condition for it; (b) we criticise certain metaphysical preconceptions which can stand in the way of recognising how intelligibility without spacetime can be had; (c) we catalogue tools for rendering theories without a spacetime intelligible; and (d) we give examples of cases in which understanding is attained without a spacetime, and explain what kind of understanding these examples provide.

Thinking about the nerve impulse: A critical analysis of the electricity-centered conception of nerve excitability

Nerve impulse generation and propagation are often thought of as solely electrical events. The prevalence of this view is the result of long and intense study of nerve impulses in electrophysiology culminating in the introduction of the Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential in the 1950s. To this day, this model forms the physiological foundation for a broad area of neuroscientific research. However, the Hodgkin-Huxley model cannot account for non-electrical phenomena that accompany nerve impulse propagation, for which there is nevertheless ample evidence. This raises the question whether the Hodgkin-Huxley model is a complete model of the nerve impulse. Several alternative models have been proposed that do take into account non-electrical aspects of the nerve impulse and emphasize their importance in gaining a more complete understanding of the nature of the nerve impulse. In our opinion, these models deserve more attention in neuroscientific research, since, together with the Hodgkin-Huxley model, they will help in addressing and solving a number of questions in basic and applied neuroscience which thus far have remained outside our grasp. Here we provide a historico-scientific overview of the developments that have led to the current conception of the action potential as an electrical phenomenon, discuss some major objections against this conception, and suggest a number of scientific factors which have likely contributed to the enduring success of the Hodgkin-Huxley model and should be taken into consideration whilst contemplating the formulation of a more extensive and complete conception of the nerve impulse.