Henrik Wenander

Myndighetsföreskrifter : Demokratisk anknytning, politisk styrning och rättssäkerhet

Artikeln behandlar utrymmet for forvaltningsorgan under regeringsnivanatt pa egen hand anta bindande regler enligt svensk ratt. Grundlagsregleringenger stort utrymme for delegation till forvaltningen, somenligt den svenska konstitutionella strukturen har en betydande sjalvstandighet.Det finns dock principiella invandningar mot att forvaltningen ska kunna anta foreskrifter med samma bindande verkan som lagar. Nar det galler demokratisk anknytning ar tjanstemannen inte folkvalda och har darmed inte nagot politiskt ansvar. Darutover finns det risk att den politiska styrningen av forvaltningsmyndigheterna brister. Samtidigt kan delegation av normgivningsmakt till forvaltningen motiveras med effektivitet och forvaltningens sakkunskap. Den svenska regleringen innebar en avvagning mellan dessa intressen. Undersokningen identifierar rattsliga strukturer och utmaningar i denna avvagning. Med tanke pa den bristande demokratiska anknytningen ar det viktigt att beslut fattade med stod av myndighetsforeskrifter kan overklagas och da genomga en noggrann overprovning. En overgripande slutsats ar att den svenska ordningen bygger pa att det demokratiska systemet fungerar, sa att riksdag och regering reglerar utrymmet for myndighetsforeskrifter pa ett valavvagt satt. (Less)

The Recognition of Foreign Administrative Decisions in Sweden

This contribution describes some basic features of the procedure relating to the recognition of foreign administrative decisions under Swedish law. After some comments on the general legal and theoretical framework relating to administrative decisions in Swedish law, the article discusses the preconditions for service of documents, including international aspects. The subsequent section discusses matters of validity, efficacy, and enforcement in relation to foreign administrative decisions. Thereafter, special attention is given the impact of EU law and international conventions. In the subsequent section, the development of doctrinal treatment of matters relating to recognition of foreign administrative decisions is described. Some general comments conclude the article.

Regulatory Trust in EU Free Movement Law – Adopting the Level of Protection of the Other?

The principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition are well established features of EU law. On a technical level, it is clear that the principles may require adoption of foreign levels of protection in individual cases as well as in legislation. At a closer look, however, the principles through “the rule of reason” also may imply quite the opposite: the imposing of domestic requirements on foreign goods, services etc. The CJEU case law following the Cassis judgement may be seen as striking a balance between cooperation and Member State self-determination, or between trust and distrust, in different fields. This contribution aims at looking into the regulatory function of the legal principle of trust in EU law. Taking this wider regulatory perspective, the mutual recognition regimes of EU must be seen from a holistic perspective. Rather than dwelling upon harmonized and non-harmonized fields separately, we will approach mutual trust as one, albeit multi-faceted, concept, where harmonization, proportionality assessments and Member State actions in various fields of law form part of the same wider picture. In this regulatory perspective, the law on mutual trust and mutual recognition may be seen as a balancing between the regulatory interests of the EU (promoting free movement and cooperation) and the various Member States (promoting their interests of – alleged – protection of safety of various kinds). Through this perspective, we will be able to address the tension between regulation and deregulation, between integration and disintegration, and between unity and diversity present in EU law on a very general level. The first section of this contribution will look at the constitutional life of mutual trust within the CJEU case law: looking at its origins and main logic. The second section will attempt to clarify why the principle of mutual trust is mostly invisible in the free movement jurisprudence. This section also argues for understanding mutual recognition in terms of Regulatory Trust. The last section focuses on the thorny issue of the levels of protection and attempts to understand which are the key factors used by the CJEU in reviewing the (host) States measures that restrict free movement law and thus may constitute a break to the application of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition.