Henry Bienen

The political economy of privatization in developing countries

Abstract Privatization in LDCs refers here to the sale or leasing of assets in which the state has a majority interest, and the contracting out of publicly provided services. Privatization is in part a response to the need for fiscal austerity. Its pace and scope will be determined importantly by the way in which the public sector was built. Privatization is easier to implement than has been supposed because its austerity and equity costs are relatively small compared to those of broader structural adjustment processes in which it is commonly situated. However, the payoffs from privatization are relatively small too. There is high opportunity cost in time and management for the complicated task of preparing public assets for sale. Capital market thinness characterizes LDCs, and “popular capitalism” does not appear to be a realistic option. In LDCs, privatization is likely to be entangled in regional and ethnic conflicts. These may be as consequential for formulating and implementing programs as are the critical coalitions that form between economic sectors such as capital and labor or importers and exporters. We believe that privatization is not a linear or ineluctable process. Indeed, many privatizations may be implemented in the absence of a commitment to market forces, but where the state seeks to redefine the instruments and scope of its interventionism.

Time and Power in Africa

Both rapid leadership turnover and remarkably durable leaders can be found side by side in African systems of personal rule. In order to explain differences in time in power among African leaders we employ life tables analysis and hazard models, a multivariate technique. We find that the risk of losing power is a decreasing function of time that is little affected by country or leader particularities. The best predictor of whether a leader will lose power in any given period is the length of rule up to that point.

Economic stabilization, conditionality, and political stability

IMF conditionality is seldom so important that it dominates all other considerations for political stability. IMF stabilization programs often shift benefits from one group to another. They expose elites to charges of selling the sovereignty of their countries. The imposition of IMF conditions, particularly subsidy cuts, may lead to sharp outbreaks of civil disorder. Nonetheless, the IMF provides resources that make adjustment easier and thus may lessen the chances of political instability for a country. IMF programs are seldom implemented fully as negotiated, and the penalties for partial compliance are not great. Debtor countries have more flexibility in imposing austerity measures, and the economic constraints are less binding than often assumed. The very availability of alternatives to IMF programs results in internal divisions because some favor debt repudiation and others oppose it. Groups now contend over solutions to the debt problems of their countries.

Decentralization in Nepal

Abstract Nepal provides a striking context for examining decentralization programs because the country is highly centralized politically yet has poor communications and transportation. Its development performance has also lagged. Decentralization has been promulgated by the ruling elite in order to increase participation, defang opposition, and improve efficiency. This study shows the difficulties involved in setting priorities, planning, and implementing programs at district and subdistrict levels. It also shows that there are dangers from the capture of local progrmas by local elites. Moreover, decentralization appears to have further burdened the system of informational flows between the center and the peripheral areas without any notable improvement in efficiency.

Urbanization and third world stability

Abstract This essay reviews images of urbanization that have been held by academics and activists, including revolutionary leaders. It examines the methodology and findings of case studies in Nigeria, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Kenya, Turkey, Malaysia and other countries with the aim of determining how well suited are our data and theories for assessing the relationship between urbanization and political stability. The review examines the following topics: migration; political participation and the urban poor; radical parties and urban violence; the ‘over-urbanization’ thesis; class and ethnicity. It especially evaluates the role of so-called ‘urban marginals’ in urban political life and concludes that the evidence is overwhelming that there is no widespread ‘culture of poverty’ or ‘culture of apathy’ among the urban poor indeveloping countries.

Religion, Legitimacy, and Conflict in Nigeria

Nigeria has not evolved political formulas that explicitly allow religion or religious authorities to define legitimacy. There have, however, been struggles carried out in religious terms over constitutional mechanisms for adjudicating conflict. Religion also has been an element in the conflict between ethnic-language groups. Finally, religion provides a language, a set of values, and institutions through which groups struggle and over which groups contend, both within and between religious communities. It has been necessary for northern leaders to stress Islam in order to maintain northern unity. However, Islam itself has worked to intensify fissures opened up by social and economic change in Nigeria. Islam in Nigeria continues to be contentious in both domestic and foreign policy.

What Does Political Development Mean in Africa

There is disagreement among analysts about political development in Africa. Debate over the meaning of political development is not confined to those concerned with Africa, of course. Once the question, What does political development mean? is reformulated as, What do we mean by political development? there is no dearth of people willing to provide definitions and to free us from value-laden concepts.1 The lack of consensus on definitions is neither more nor less profound among those who study African politics than among those who concentrate their inquiry elsewhere, and the major ingredients of dispute are present in both groups in approximately the same mixture.

Youth Lash and the 1970 Congressional Elections

1970, campus unrest had been put first by the Gallup sample-ahead of the war in Vietnam, race relations, inflation, and unemployment.’ 1 The conjunction of the salience of campus unrest as an issue and the possibility that large numbers of students would, after the Cambodian invasion, work for peace candidates in the congressional elections, raised the specter of a backlash to young political workers or &dquo;youthlash.&dquo; The possibility of a youthlash was raised by the press, by certain politicians, notably Vice President Agnew and Attorney General Mitchell, and by fearful dove candidates themselves who had pollsters gauging their constituents’ reaction to youth. We argue that there has been a misunderstanding of the backlash phenomenon as applied to youth in politics. This