Henry E. Allison

Causality and Causal Laws in Kant: A Critique of Michael Friedman

The questions of just what the Second Analogy purports to show and its role in both Kant’s overall theory of experience and his philosophy of science remain matters of some controversy. At the heart of the controversy is the problem of the connection between the transcendental principle of causality and particular causal laws known through experience. Although Kant consistently denies that ordinary empirical laws can be derived from the transcendental principles alone, he is less clear on the precise relationship between them. On the one hand, he characterizes empirical laws as “special determinations of still higher laws,” the highest of which stem from the understanding itself (Al26).1 This suggests a relatively straightforward picture according to which the principles or transcendental laws of themselves guarantee the empirical lawfulness of nature. Experience is required to arrive at particular laws, but the general principle of the empirical lawfulness of nature is sufficiently guaranteed by the transcendental principles. On the other hand, in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the first Critique and the two versions of the Introduction to the third Critique Kant seems to suggest a more complex story. According to this story, not only the unifiability of particular laws into theories, but also the nomological status of particular uniformities

Where Have all the Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse?s Reading of Kant?s Transcendental Deduction

This paper contains a critical analysis of the interpretation of Kant?s second edition version of the Transcendental Deduction offered by Be ´atrice Longuenesse in her recent book: Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Though agreeing with much of Longuenesse?s analysis of the logical function of judgment, I question the way in which she tends to assign them the objectifying role traditionally given to the categories. More particularly, by way of defending my own interpretation of the Deduction against some of her criticisms, I argue that Longuenesse fails to show how either part of the two-part proof may be plausibly thought to have established the necessity of the categories (as opposed to the logical functions). Finally, I question certain aspects of her ?radical? interpretation of the famous footnote at B160-1, where Kant distinguishes between ?form of intuition? and ?formal intuition?.

Kant on freedom: A reply to my critics

The first two sections of this paper are devoted respectively to the criticisms of my views raised by Stephen Engstrom and Andrews Reath at a symposium on Kants Theory of Freedom held in Washington D.C. on 28 December 1992 under the auspices of the North American Kant Society. The third section contains my response to the remarks of Marcia Baron at a second symposium in Chicago on 24 April 1993 at the APA Western Division meetings. The fourth section deals with some general criticisms of my treatment of Kants theory of freedom and its connection with transcendental idealism that have been raised by Karl Ameriks, who was also a participant in the second symposium, in an earlier piece published in Inquiry and by Paul Guyer in a review. The paper as a whole is thus an attempt to reformulate and clarify some of the central claims of my book in light of the initial critical reaction.

Empirical and Intelligible Character in the Critique of Pure Reason

Kant’s conception of free agency has been much criticized and little understood. Since one of the basic criticisms is that it is incoherent, this combination is quite understandable. At the heart of the problem lies the connection between free agency and some of the more problematic and mysterious aspects of transcendental idealism. This connection leads to a familiar dilemma from which there seems to be no escape: either freedom is located in some timeless noumenal realm, in which case it is perhaps conceivable but also irrelevant to the understanding of human agency, or, alternatively, the exercise of free agency is thought to make a difference in the spatio-temporal world in which we live and act, in which case it comes into an irreconcilable conflict with the “causality of nature.”1

Gurwitsch’s Interpretation of Kant: Reflections of a Former Student

In Kants Theorie des Verstandes, we finally have the long awaited, definitive expression of Aron Gurwitsch’s interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.1 The broad outlines of this interpretation were presented in many seminars and lecture courses at the New School for Social Research, and important aspects of it are contained in his seminal study of Leibniz, as well as in the various versions of his article comparing the conceptions of consciousness of Kant and Husserl.2 But prior to the publication of this monograph, it was not available in toto and in detail. Thus, although the work contains few surprises for those of us fortunate enough to have been students of Professor Gurwitsch, its publication is none the less welcome, since it should facilitate the dissemination of this highly original and provocative reading of Kant to a wider philosophical public, including the world of Kant scholarship. It is as both a former student and a member of this latter world that I shall attempt to provide an account of this reading, assess its significance, and, as is only proper, offer some criticisms.

Kant's Theory of Freedom.

Acknowledgments Note on sources and key to abbreviations and translations Introduction Part I. Freedom and Rational Agency in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1. The third antinomy 2. Empirical and intelligible character 3. Practical and transcendental freedom 4. Two alternative interpretatuions Part II. Moral Agency and Moral Phycology: 5. Rational and agency and autonomy 6. Duty, inclination, and respect 7. Wille, Wilkur, and Gesinnung 8. Radical evil 9. Virtue and holiness 10. The classical objections Part III. The Justification of Morality and Freedom: 11. The reciprocity thesis 12. The deduction in Groundwork III 13. The fact of reason and the deduction of freedom Notes Bibliography Index.

Spinoza and the philosophy of immanence: Reflections on Yovel's The Adventures of Immanence

This essay examines the main line of argument of Yirmiyahu Yovels The Adventures of Immanence. Expressing general agreement with Yovels central thesis that Spinozas ‘immanent revolution’ marked an important tuming‐point in the history of modernity and profoundly influenced subsequent thought, I none the less take issue with some of the details of the story. In particular, I question his omission of Lessing, his account of the relationship between Spinoza and Kant, and his treatment of Marx. In a final section I present some objections to Yovels guiding conception of a philosophy of immanence.