Henry N. Pontell

“Heads I Win, Tails You Lose”: Deregulation, Crime, and Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry

This study examines fraud in the savings and loan industry as a case study of white-collar crime. Drawing from extensive government reports, Congressional hearings, and media accounts, the study categorizes three types of savings and loan crime and traces them to the competitive pressures unleashed by deregulation in the early 1980s, within the context of a federally protected, insured industry. In addition, the study delineates the limitations of the enforcement process, focusing on the ideological, political, and structural forces constraining regulators. Although savings and loan crime is in many respects similar to corporate crime in the manufacturing sector, a relatively new form of white-collar crime, referred to as “collective embezzlement,” permeates the thrift industry. The study links the proliferation of collective embezzlement and other forms of thrift crime, as well as the structural dilemmas that constrain the enforcement process, to the distinctive qualities of finance capitalism.

Seriousness of crimes: A survey of the nation's chiefs of police

The views of 105 police chiefs throughout the United States were obtained in regard to their ranking of the seriousness of 60 criminal offenses. Responses indicated that the chiefs see most crimes very much in the same light as do citizens surveyed by Rossi et al. (1974) in Baltimore a decade ago. There also is considerable consensus among chiefs throughout the country in their views about seriousness. Variations between the present findings and those of similar studies of other populations are also set forth.

“Other's People's Money” Revisited: Collective Embezzlement in the Savings and Loan and Insurance Industries

This paper compares what is called here “collective embezzlement” in the savings and loan and insurance industries, tracing this embezzlement by top management in these two industries to structures of opportunity and risk that are specific to their location in finance capitalism. Using data from government reports, congressional hearings, and media accounts of particular cases, we argue that the deregulation of the 1980s combined with protective insurance and guaranty funds set the stage for this white-collar crime, but that its prevalence is more fundamentally related to a number of other structural factors. Specifically, the primary function of these industries as trustees of other peoples money, within the context of a “casino” economy where profits are made from speculative investment, not production, simultaneously expands the opportunities for embezzlement and other abuses of trust and sets in place structural contradictions that stymy policymakers and regulators and limit the risks of detection and prosecution. Future research should build on the rich literature on white-collar crime, which has traditionally focused on the production processes and market structures of industrial capitalism, to examine the implications of the shift in the late 20th century to an economy increasingly centered on the management and manipulation of money itself.

Medical criminals: Physicians and white-collar offenses

Lawbreaking by professionals remains an understudied area in the field of white-collar crime. This article presents a review of crime in the practice of medicine, focusing on the misdeeds of physicians. The role of physician power in producing such acts is analyzed from both historical and theoretical perspectives, and a brief inventory of forms of medical wrongdoing is presented. The article also considers the ways in which formal medical training can influence later wrongdoing, and discusses issues related to the control of medical crime.

Risky Business Revisited: White-Collar Crime and the Orange County Bankruptcy:

Orange Countys bankruptcy is the largest governmental bankruptcy in U.S. history. Initial reports blamed the countys financial difficulties on the county treasurers gambling with taxpayer dollars in the high-risk derivative market. This article forwards the argument that it was not simply “risky business” that caused the bankruptcy; rather, fraud and other forms of white-collar crime played a significant role in the

White-Collar Crime in the Savings and Loan Scandal

2 billion debacle. Using concepts and theories from the literature on white-collar crime and drawing comparisons with other financial scandals, most notably the savings and loan crisis, the authors argue that the financial downfall of Orange County was due to a “criminogenic environment” that allowed for concerted ignorance among officials who were motivated by a fear of falling from their positions of power.

Jail overcrowding: An analysis of policy makers' perceptions

This article elaborates on the nature and scale of white-collar crime in the savings and loan crisis. It provides an overview of the thrift industry and the impact of deregulation on opportunities for fraud. Violations are then discussed under the general headings of “unlawful risk taking,”“collective embezzlement,” and “covering up,” and similarities are noted between criminal activities of thrift operators and those of persons associated with traditional organized crime. Government enforcement issues are discussed, focusing on both statutory changes and the law in action. Finally, the article argues that future policymaking, when considering changes in regulatory structure, must take into account the criminogenic environment produced by earlier legislation.

A Demographic Portrait of Physicians Sanctioned by the Federal Government for Fraud and Abuse Against Medicare and Medicaid

This paper examines how public policies are formulated and are applied to the jail overcrowding problem. Strategies of blame avoidance and subscription to myths were found to exert a strong influence on problem definition and policy design. Using an elite interview methodology, we examined the perceptions of 64 key criminal justice policy makers at local and state levels of government. We used statistical data from the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics to supplement the analysis. Policy makers identified eight major themes related to overcrowding: 1) conservative public attitudes, 2) decreased county revenues, 3) resistance to alternatives to incarceration, 4) problems in siting new jails, 5) increased crime, 6) population growth, 7) problems in interagency communication, and 8) general social malaise. Implications for policy design, outcome, and analysis are discussed.

Criminalizing white-collar misconduct

? From the Public Policy Research Organization, University of California, Irvine, California. Supported by a grant from the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice (82-1J-CX-0035). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Meetings of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Chicago, IL, March 28, 1984. Address correspondence to: Henry N. Pontell, PhD, Program in Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717.

Incarceration as a Deviant Form of Social Control: Jail Overcrowding in California

In this article we examine three explanations for the differential treatment of white-collar offenders by the legal system: (1) an organizational advantage argument in which offenders in “organizationally shielded” positions receive more lenient treatment, (2) an alternative sanctions argument in which civil sanctions replace criminal sanctions in the response to white-collar crime, and (3) a system capacity argument in which the legal response to white-collar crime is driven primarily by resources and caseload pressures. These three theoretical arguments are tested through an analysis of data on individuals suspected of having committed serious crimes against savings and loan institutions in the 1980s. We seek to determine the factors that influenced prosecutors to file criminal charges against some of these suspects and not others. We conclude that all three models may be limited in their ability to explain low rates of prosecution in cases involving white-collar crimes of the sort examined here, and suggest that these limitations may have to do with the circumscribed levels of analysis at which these explanations have been pitched.