Hiroki Ozono
Kagoshima University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Hiroki Ozono.
Scientific Reports | 2016
Hiroki Ozono; Nobuhito Jin; Motoki Watabe; Kazumi Shimizu
Punishment of non-cooperators—free riders—can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a “leader support system,” in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group; a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader; and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader’s punishment. The results show that punishment occurs more frequently in the support-present condition than the no-support condition. Within the former, both higher cooperation and higher support for a leader are achieved under linkage-type leaders—who punish both non-cooperators and non-supporters. In addition, linkage-type leaders themselves earn higher profits than other leader types because they withdraw more support. This means that leaders who effectively punish followers could increase their own benefits and the second-order free rider problem would be solved.
PLOS ONE | 2016
Hiroki Ozono; Yoshio Kamijo; Kazumi Shimizu
Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and one of the important paths for its emergence and maintenance is reciprocity. In prisoner’s dilemma (PD) experiments, reciprocal strategies are often effective at attaining and maintaining high cooperation. In many public goods (PG) games or n-person PD experiments, however, reciprocal strategies are not successful at engendering cooperation. In the present paper, we attribute this difficulty to a coordination problem against free riding among reciprocators: Because it is difficult for the reciprocators to coordinate their behaviors against free riders, this may lead to inequality among players, which will demotivate them from cooperating in future rounds. We propose a new mechanism, institutionalized reciprocity (IR), which refers to embedding the reciprocal strategy as an institution (i.e., institutionalizing the reciprocal strategy). We experimentally demonstrate that IR can prevent groups of reciprocators from falling into coordination failure and achieve high cooperation in PG games. In conclusion, we argue that a natural extension of the present study will be to investigate the possibility of IR to serve as a collective punishment system.
Scientific Reports | 2017
Hiroki Ozono; Yoshio Kamijo; Kazumi Shimizu
Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation, it is critical to have a pool punishment system with second-order punishment, which gathers resources from group members and punishes second-order free riders as well as first-order free riders. In this study, we focus on the priority of punishment. We hypothesize that the pool punishment system that prioritizes second-order punishment is more likely to achieve cooperation than the system that prioritizes first-order punishment, because the former is more likely to obtain sufficient punishment resources. In the experiments, we compare four pool punishment systems: 1To2 (first-order punishment to second-order punishment), 2To1 (second-order punishment to first-order punishment), 1ONLY (first-order punishment only), and 2ONLY (second-order punishment only). We find that the 2To1 and 2ONLY systems can receive more support than the 1To2 and 1ONLY systems and only the 2To1 system can achieve high cooperation. However, the effect of priority of second-order punishment is observed only when the punishment ratio (PR) is low (Experiment 1), not high (Experiment 2), in which the punishment resource is relatively abundant.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | 2010
Nicholas O. Rule; Nalini Ambady; Reginald B. Adams; Hiroki Ozono; Satoshi F. Nakashima; Sakiko Yoshikawa; Motoki Watabe
Evolution and Human Behavior | 2011
Max M. Krasnow; Danielle Truxaw; Steven J. C. Gaulin; Joshua New; Hiroki Ozono; Shota Uono; Taiji Ueno; Kazusa Minemoto
Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science | 2010
Hiroki Ozono; Motoki Watabe; Sakiko Yoshikawa; Satoshi F. Nakashima; Nicholas O. Rule; Nalini Ambady; Reginald B. Adams
Experimental Economics | 2016
Yoshio Kamijo; Hiroki Ozono; Kazumi Shimizu
Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science | 2012
Hiroki Ozono; Motoki Watabe
Archive | 2014
Hiroki Ozono; Yoshio Kamijo; Kazumi Shimizu
Japanese Journal of Social Psychology ( Before 1996, Research in Social Psychology ) | 2010
Hiroki Ozono; Yuko Morimoto; Satoshi F. Nakashima; Asuka Komiya; Motoki Watabe; Sakiko Yoshikawa