Hiroki P. Kotabe

On Integrating the Components of Self-Control

As the science of self-control matures, the organization and integration of its key concepts becomes increasingly important. In response, we identified seven major components or “nodes” in current theories and research bearing on self-control: desire, higher order goal, desire–goal conflict, control motivation, control capacity, control effort, and enactment constraints. To unify these diverse and interdisciplinary areas of research, we formulated the interplay of these components in an integrative model of self-control. In this model, desire and an at least partly incompatible higher order goal generate desire–goal conflict, which activates control motivation. Control motivation and control capacity interactively determine potential control effort. The actual control effort invested is determined by several moderators, including desire strength, perceived skill, and competing goals. Actual control effort and desire strength compete to determine a prevailing force, which ultimately determines behavior, provided that enactment constraints do not impede it. The proposed theoretical framework is useful for highlighting several new directions for research on self-control and for classifying self-control failures and self-control interventions.

Culture, threat, and mental illness stigma: identifying culture-specific threat among Chinese-American groups.

We incorporate anthropological insights into a stigma framework to elucidate the role of culture in threat perception and stigma among Chinese groups. Prior work suggests that genetic contamination that jeopardizes the extension of ones family lineage may comprise a culture-specific threat among Chinese groups. In Study 1, a national survey conducted from 2002 to 2003 assessed cultural differences in mental illness stigma and perceptions of threat in 56 Chinese-Americans and 589 European-Americans. Study 2 sought to empirically test this culture-specific threat of genetic contamination to lineage via a memory paradigm. Conducted from June to August 2010, 48 Chinese-American and 37 European-American university students in New York City read vignettes containing content referring to lineage or non-lineage concerns. Half the participants in each ethnic group were assigned to a condition in which the illness was likely to be inherited (genetic condition) and the rest read that the illness was unlikely to be inherited (non-genetic condition). Findings from Study 1 and 2 were convergent. In Study 1, culture-specific threat to lineage predicted cultural variation in stigma independently and after accounting for other forms of threat. In Study 2, Chinese-Americans in the genetic condition were more likely to accurately recall and recognize lineage content than the Chinese-Americans in the non-genetic condition, but that memorial pattern was not found for non-lineage content. The identification of this culture-specific threat among Chinese groups has direct implications for culturally-tailored anti-stigma interventions. Further, this framework might be implemented across other conditions and cultural groups to reduce stigma across cultures.

The nature-disorder paradox: A perceptual study on how nature is disorderly yet aesthetically preferred.

Natural environments have powerful aesthetic appeal linked to their capacity for psychological restoration. In contrast, disorderly environments are aesthetically aversive, and have various detrimental psychological effects. But in our research, we have repeatedly found that natural environments are perceptually disorderly. What could explain this paradox? We present 3 competing hypotheses: the aesthetic preference for naturalness is more powerful than the aesthetic aversion to disorder (the nature-trumps-disorder hypothesis); disorder is trivial to aesthetic preference in natural contexts (the harmless-disorder hypothesis); and disorder is aesthetically preferred in natural contexts (the beneficial-disorder hypothesis). Utilizing novel methods of perceptual study and diverse stimuli, we rule in the nature-trumps-disorder hypothesis and rule out the harmless-disorder and beneficial-disorder hypotheses. In examining perceptual mechanisms, we find evidence that high-level scene semantics are both necessary and sufficient for the nature-trumps-disorder effect. Necessity is evidenced by the effect disappearing in experiments utilizing only low-level visual stimuli (i.e., where scene semantics have been removed) and experiments utilizing a rapid-scene-presentation procedure that obscures scene semantics. Sufficiency is evidenced by the effect reappearing in experiments utilizing noun stimuli which remove low-level visual features. Furthermore, we present evidence that the interaction of scene semantics with low-level visual features amplifies the nature-trumps-disorder effect—the effect is weaker both when statistically adjusting for quantified low-level visual features and when using noun stimuli which remove low-level visual features. These results have implications for psychological theories bearing on the joint influence of low- and high-level perceptual inputs on affect and cognition, as well as for aesthetic design.

Image Feature Types and Their Predictions of Aesthetic Preference and Naturalness

Previous research has investigated ways to quantify visual information of a scene in terms of a visual processing hierarchy, i.e., making sense of visual environment by segmentation and integration of elementary sensory input. Guided by this research, studies have developed categories for low-level visual features (e.g., edges, colors), high-level visual features (scene-level entities that convey semantic information such as objects), and how models of those features predict aesthetic preference and naturalness. For example, in Kardan et al. (2015a), 52 participants provided aesthetic preference and naturalness ratings, which are used in the current study, for 307 images of mixed natural and urban content. Kardan et al. (2015a) then developed a model using low-level features to predict aesthetic preference and naturalness and could do so with high accuracy. What has yet to be explored is the ability of higher-level visual features (e.g., horizon line position relative to viewer, geometry of building distribution relative to visual access) to predict aesthetic preference and naturalness of scenes, and whether higher-level features mediate some of the association between the low-level features and aesthetic preference or naturalness. In this study we investigated these relationships and found that low- and high- level features explain 68.4% of the variance in aesthetic preference ratings and 88.7% of the variance in naturalness ratings. Additionally, several high-level features mediated the relationship between the low-level visual features and aaesthetic preference. In a multiple mediation analysis, the high-level feature mediators accounted for over 50% of the variance in predicting aesthetic preference. These results show that high-level visual features play a prominent role predicting aesthetic preference, but do not completely eliminate the predictive power of the low-level visual features. These strong predictors provide powerful insights for future research relating to landscape and urban design with the aim of maximizing subjective well-being, which could lead to improved health outcomes on a larger scale.

The world is random: a cognitive perspective on perceived disorder

Research on the consequences of perceiving disorder is largely sociological and concerns broken windows theory, which states that signs of social disorder cause further social disorder. The predominant psychological explanations for this phenomenon are primarily social. In contrast, I propose a parsimonious cognitive model (“world-is-random” model; WIR) that may partly account for these effects. Basically, WIR proposes that perceiving disorder primes randomness-related concepts, which results in a reduction to one’s sense of personal control, which has diverse affective, judgmental, and behavioral consequences. I review recent developments on the psychological consequences of perceiving disorder and argue that WIR can explain all of these findings. I also cover select correlational findings from the sociological literature and explain how WIR can at least partly explain them. In a general discussion, I consider possible alternative psychological models and argue that they do not adequately explain the most recent psychological research on disorder. I then propose future directions which include determining whether perceiving disorder causes a “unique psychology” and delimiting boundary conditions.

On treating effort as a dynamically varying cost input

Kurzban et al.s framework may be extended in fruitful ways by treating effort also as a cost input that affects the utility computation of a given option (rather than only as the output of a utility comparison between options). The weight people assign to effort as a cost may vary dynamically as a function of situational and dispositional factors.

To search or to like: Mapping fixations to differentiate two forms of incidental scene memory

We employed eye-tracking to investigate how performing different tasks on scenes (e.g., intentionally memorizing them, searching for an object, evaluating aesthetic preference) can affect eye movements during encoding and subsequent scene memory. We found that scene memorability decreased after visual search (one incidental encoding task) compared to intentional memorization, and that preference evaluation (another incidental encoding task) produced better memory, similar to the incidental memory boost previously observed for words and faces. By analyzing fixation maps, we found that although fixation map similarity could explain how eye movements during visual search impairs incidental scene memory, it could not explain the incidental memory boost from aesthetic preference evaluation, implying that implicit mechanisms were at play. We conclude that not all incidental encoding tasks should be taken to be similar, as different mechanisms (e.g., explicit or implicit) lead to memory enhancements or decrements for different incidental encoding tasks.