Hiroshi Yama

Matching versus optimal data selection in the Wason selection task

It has been reported as a robust effect that people are likely to select a matching case in the Wason selection task. For example, they usually select the 5 case, in the Wason selection task with the conditional “if an E, then a not-5”. This was explained by the matching bias account that people are likely to regard a matching case as relevant to the truth of the conditional (Evans, 1998). However, because a positive concept usually constructs a smaller set than its negative one does (a rarity assumption), it is more effective to get information on the truth of the conditional in a positive set than in a negative set. Thus the optimal data selection account can also explain the effect. The set size of Q and matching by introducing negation were manipulated independently in four experiments. From the results it was inferred that the so-called matching bias was an amalgam of two different cognitive components—relevance judgement by matching and optimal data selection.

The benefits of argumentation are cross-culturally robust: The case of Japan

Abstract Thanks to the exchange of arguments, groups outperform individuals on some tasks, such as solving logical problems. However, these results stem from experiments conducted among Westerners and they could be due to cultural particularities such as tolerance of contradiction and approval of public debate. Other cultures, collectivistic cultures in particular, are said to frown on argumentation. Moreover, some influential intellectual movements, such as Confucianism, disapprove of argumentation. In two experiments, the hypothesis that Easterners might not share the benefits of argumentation was tested. In Experiment 1, Japanese participants had to solve a standard logical problem individually and then in groups. They performed significantly better in groups. In Experiment 2, Japanese participants had to estimate the weight of various animals. They did so individually, then after learning of another participants estimates, then after discussing these estimates with the other participant, and then individually again. While the Japanese participants also benefitted from the discussion, these benefits were only visible when participants provided a final individual estimate. This delay is interpreted as reflecting the pressure to preserve social harmony that would have constrained Japanese participants to yield to their partner even when knowing that this did not improve the accuracy of their answer.

The difference between implicit and explicit associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm

The effects of implicit and explicit associative processes for false recognition were examined by manipulating exposure duration of studied items; 20 ms or 2000 ms. Participants studied lists of words that were high associates to a nonpresented word (critical lure) in either condition. After learning each list, they took a recognition test and remember/know judgements immediately (Experiment 1) or 1 minute later (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, know responses for critical lures were more in the 20 ms than in the 2000 ms conditions, while remember responses for them were more in the 2000 ms condition. Implicit associative processes create familiarity of critical lures, and explicit associative processes create details of false memories. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2, remember responses for critical lures were increased with the prolonged time only in the 20 ms condition. Characteristics of false memory made by implicit associative processes could be changed by prolonged time.

A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and conditional probabilistic reasoning

Hindsight bias is a mistaken belief that one could have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. Choi and Nisbett (2000) reported that Koreans showed stronger hindsight bias than Americans, and explained the results using the distinction between analytic cognition (Westerners) and holistic cognition (Easterners). The purpose of the present study was to see whether hindsight bias is stronger among Easterners than among Westerners using a probability judgement task, and to test an “explicit–implicit” hypothesis and a “rule-dialectics” hypothesis. We predicted that the implicit process is more active among Easterners to generate hindsight bias, and that Easterners are more dialectical thinkers, whereas Westerners are more rule-based thinkers. French, British, Japanese, and Korean participants were asked to make probabilistic judgements in a Good Samaritan scenario (Experiment 1) and in a scenario including conditional probabilistic judgement (Experiment 2). In both Experiments, we presume that the implicit revision of causal models is made just by being given unexpected outcome information, and that explicit revision is made by being asked to point out possible factors for an unexpected outcome. In the results Easterners showed greater hindsight bias generally and it was greater in the Good Samaritan scenario. We conclude that the reason why hindsight bias was lower among Westerners is primarily that they tried to follow a rule to suppress the bias.

Dialectical thinking: A cross-cultural study of Japanese, Chinese, and British students

Peng and Nisbett found that Chinese people are more apt to engage in dialectical thinking (DT) than Americans. We gave the Dialectical Self Scale questionnaire and 10 pairs of opposing opinions to high school and university students of Japanese, Chinese, and British nationality. We asked them to fill in the questionnaire, to rate how strongly they agreed with each opinion, and to rate how wise it is to think dialectically. The scores on the questionnaire were higher among Easterners than among Westerners and higher among university students than among high school students. But the results of opinion agreement indicated that the dialectical tendency was stronger among the Chinese and British than among the Japanese. Furthermore, however, Japanese participants judged DT as wiser than Chinese and British did, and Chinese university students believed it was wiser than Chinese high school students did. We propose that this effect is attributed to Marxist education in China.

Experts and Laymen Grossly Underestimate the Benefits of Argumentation for Reasoning

Many fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem—the Wason selection task—and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and psychologists of reasoning. Every sample underestimated the improvement yielded by group discussion. They did so even after they had been explained the correct answer, or after they had had to solve the problem in groups. These mistaken intuitions could prevent individuals from making the best of institutions that rely on group discussion, from collaborative learning and work teams to deliberative assemblies.

Is the Use of Averaging in Advice Taking Modulated by Culture

Many recent experiments have explored the way people take advice into account. It has been observed that in so doing participants often rely on one of the two following strategies: averaging between the different opinions or choosing one of the opinions, as opposed to using more complex weighting strategies. While several factors that affect strategy choice have been investigated, no attention has been paid to potential cultural variations. Among the many relevant cross-cultural differences, results have show that Easterners tend to favor compromise more than Westerners, a difference that could translate into a greater preference for averaging in Eastern population. In Experiment 1, we confronted Japanese and French participants to two pieces of advice and asked them to form an aggregate answer. In Experiments 2, participants had to aggregate their own opinion and a piece of advice. In neither of the experiments were the Japanese more likely to use averaging than the French. Explanations for this robust absence of difference are suggested. The only difference that emerged was that the Japanese were more likely to choose the advice and less likely to choose their own answer than the French. Different interpretations of this result are discussed, including the possibility that it is an artifact of a theoretically irrelevant difference between the populations under study.

Dealing with contradiction in a communicative context: A cross-cultural study

Abstract In this paper, we investigate the impact of two factors on the way people address conflicting information. One relates to culture and the other to the communicative context in which contradiction occurs. We compared two theoretical approaches, one that focuses on the former factor—the culturalist approach—and one that focuses on the latter factor—the evolutionary approach. According to the culturalist approach, the way we deal with contradiction can be markedly affected by culture, so that people from cultural environments with different social practices are more or less inclined to accept contradictions. In particular, this approach predicts that Easterners are more likely to search for a compromise between two conflicting view-points than Westerners, who tend to follow a logical principle of non-contradiction. In contrast, the evolutionary approach considers that when contradiction occurs in a communicative context, universal mechanisms designed to deal with the problem of managing deceptive information go into effect and lead to the tendency of giving more weight to ones own belief than to the others conflicting view. We tested these two approaches with Japanese and French participants. Our data supports the evolutionary approach, since both groups showed the same bias of favoring ones own position when it was challenged by anothers.

Understanding Conditionals in the East: A Replication Study of Politzer et al. (2010) With Easterners

The new probabilistic approaches to the natural language conditional imply that there is a parallel relation between indicative conditionals (ICs) “if s then b” and conditional bets (CBs) “I bet

Two Methods to Measure the Level of Trust of Americans and Japanese

1 that if s then b” in two aspects. First, the probability of an IC and the probability of winning a CB are both the conditional probability, P(s|b). Second, both an IC and a CB have a third value “void” (neither true nor false, neither wins nor loses) when the antecedent is false (¬s). These aspects of the parallel relation have been found in Western participants. In the present study, we investigated whether this parallel is also present in Eastern participants. We replicated the study of Politzer et al. (2010) with Chinese and Japanese participants and made two predictions. First, Eastern participants will tend to engage in more holistic cognition and take all possible cases, including ¬s, into account when they judge the probability of conditional: Easterners may assess the probability of antecedent s out of all possible cases, P(s), and then may focus on consequent b out of s, P(b|s). Consequently, Easterners may judge the probability of the conditional, and of winning the bet, to be P(s) ∗ P(b|s) = P(s & b), and false/losing the bet as P(s) ∗ P(¬b|s) = P(s & ¬b). Second, Eastern participants will tend to be strongly affected by context, and they may not show parallel relationships between ICs and CBs. The results indicate no cultural differences in judging the false antecedent cases: Eastern participants judged false antecedent cases as not making the IC true nor false and as not being winning or losing outcomes. However, there were cultural differences when asked about the probability of a conditional. Consistent with our hypothesis, Eastern participants had a greater tendency to take all possible cases into account, especially in CBs. We discuss whether these results can be explained by a hypothesized tendency for Eastern people to think in more holistic and context-dependent terms than Western people.