Hirotsugu Uchida

The Fishery Performance Indicators: A Management Tool for Triple Bottom Line Outcomes

Pursuit of the triple bottom line of economic, community and ecological sustainability has increased the complexity of fishery management; fisheries assessments require new types of data and analysis to guide science-based policy in addition to traditional biological information and modeling. We introduce the Fishery Performance Indicators (FPIs), a broadly applicable and flexible tool for assessing performance in individual fisheries, and for establishing cross-sectional links between enabling conditions, management strategies and triple bottom line outcomes. Conceptually separating measures of performance, the FPIs use 68 individual outcome metrics—coded on a 1 to 5 scale based on expert assessment to facilitate application to data poor fisheries and sectors—that can be partitioned into sector-based or triple-bottom-line sustainability-based interpretative indicators. Variation among outcomes is explained with 54 similarly structured metrics of inputs, management approaches and enabling conditions. Using 61 initial fishery case studies drawn from industrial and developing countries around the world, we demonstrate the inferential importance of tracking economic and community outcomes, in addition to resource status.

TURFs and ITQs: Collective vs. Individual Decision Making

While most of the attention in the scientific and policy literature on rights-based institutions has been devoted to Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), there are alternatives that involve different configurations of use rights. One such alternative is a space-based option commonly referred to as Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). TURFs have been utilized in island fisheries off Southeast Asia for decades, and they have been well studied, particularly by anthropologists and sociologists. This paper discusses case studies of TURF organizations in Japan and Chile from an economics perspective. We discuss the historical origins of each system, outline the legal and institutional structures of the systems, and then discuss how each system manages nearshore coastal resources. We discuss similarities and differences across the many specific collective management structures adopted by Japanese and Chilean TURF organizations. We then discuss how outcomes differ from what might emerge under ITQs.

The Economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFs

The most recent stage in the evolution of fisheries management institutions has been the adoption of so-called rights-based management schemes that grant secure rights of access to users so they are not forced to compete wastefully under open access conditions. The most common rights-based system is the individual transferable quota that grants fishermen rights to a share of a biologically determined total harvest. Another rights-based system is the harvester cooperative that grants access rights to a group. Unlike these species-based rights systems, territorial use rights fisheries, known as TURFs, are place-based, allocating some or all resources within a designated coastal zone to one or more agents. This article discusses the deficiencies of species-based systems and the advantages of place-based systems and reviews experience with TURFs in Japan and Chile. We argue that the success of TURFs depends not only on their physical design and placement, but also on the governing institutions that make internal resource use decisions. In most applications, TURFs are governed by harvester cooperatives that generate value by mitigating common property incentives and resolving internal coordination problems not otherwise addressed by species-based instruments.

The Economic Effects of Catch Share Management: The Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot Program

Abstract In 2009, Rhode Island implemented a pilot catch share program around summer flounder, or fluke, a state-managed species that is jointly harvested with the Northeast Multispecies groundfish complex. A sector was given a fluke allocation to land when they wished, while the rest of the fleet was managed through sub-seasonal total harvest caps and daily trip limits. Sector members avoided fluke landings during seasonal fluke derbies, instead shifting landings to post-derby closures in the general fishery, when the price was higher. However, they also affected prices of species they targeted instead. We combine predictions of counterfactual 2009 daily landings by sector vessels with a panel model of trip-level ex-vessel prices for 25 products targeted by the groundfish fleet to project what revenues would have been in the absence of the sector program. We find the pilot program increased fleetwide revenues by over

Does Self Management in Fisheries Enhance Profitability? Examination of Korea's Coastal Fisheries

800,000, including benefits of over

TURFs and clubs: empirical evidence of the effect of self-governance on profitability in South Korea's inshore (maul) fisheries

250,000 to non-sector vessels. JEL Classification Codes: Q22, Q58

Are Two Rents Better than None? When Monopolies Correct Ill-Defined Property Rights

Abstract Self management of natural resources has started to gain increasing attention as an alternative tool to command-and-control and market-based tools, but the fundamental question remains: is self management economically beneficial such that it should be promoted in the first place? This article uses a unique set of survey data from South Korea and applies an empirical strategy to provide some of the first quantitative evidence that self management is benefiting the fishermen. We find that positive benefits of fishery self management—an increase in fishery revenue and reduction in cost—are perceived by member fishermen, which is a good start considering the average number of years since the establishment of these self-management groups is only about seven. Empirical results of the magnitude of change in profit showed some consistent results, although the estimates were not as robust. These results suggest that the impact of fishery self management is still in progress. Thus, the government should maintain its current position to support self management as the countrys fishery management policy. JEL Classification Codes: Q22, D71

Evolution and future of the sustainable seafood market

Self-governance of natural resources has started to gain increasing attention as an alternative to command-and-control and market-based tools. However, a fundamental question remains: is self-governance economically beneficial, allowing it to serve as an alternative management tool? This paper uses a unique set of survey data from a territorial-user-right-based South Korean inshore ( maul ) fishery and applies an empirical strategy to provide some of the first quantitative evidence that self-governance benefits maul fishermen. We find that members of the self-governance group perceive the management system as having had a positive impact on four out of the eight criteria we tested: stock recovery, curtailed fishing effort, reduced disputes among fishermen and declining incidents of illegal fishing. Considering that these groups have been in existence on average for less than seven years, these results indicate that the management scheme has made good progress overall.

Agglomeration Index : Towards a New Measure of Urban Concentration

ABSTRACT We theoretically demonstrate the net change in welfare when moving from an open-access institution to a monopoly resource manager. A monopoly renewable resource manager, such as a harvester cooperative, may create a gain relative to a rent-dissipating sector because of its internalization of the impact of harvesting on the resource stock. As the monopolist reduces harvest, resource stocks recover and resource rent is generated through reduced harvesting costs. Thus, it is possible that the monopoly harvest exceeds the rent-dissipated harvest over time, leaving both producers and consumers better off. We argue that local resource management institutions that exert market power should not be considered violations of antitrust laws without first considering the costs and benefits of monopoly management. In cases where outside management has not had success, local management with monopoly power could represent a second-best solution. JEL Codes: Q2, L4.

Demand for ecolabeled seafood in the Japanese market: A conjoint analysis of the impact of information and interaction with other labels

The sustainable seafood movement is at a crossroads. Its core strategy, also known as a theory of change, is based on market-oriented initiatives such as third-party certification but does not motivate adequate levels of improved governance and environmental improvements needed in many fisheries, especially in developing countries. Price premiums for certified products are elusive, multiple forms of certification compete in a crowded marketplace and certifiers are increasingly asked to address social as well as ecological goals. This paper traces how the sustainable seafood movement has evolved over time to address new challenges while success remains limited. We conclude by exploring four alternative potential outcomes for the future theory of change, each with different contributions to creating a more sustainable global seafood supply.The decades-long movement for sustainable seafood is centred on a ‘theory of change’ that emphasizes third-party initiatives for certification and consumer signalling. The evolution of that theory, and its potential futures, shows the challenges of management and co-ordination with multiple actors.