Hodaka Morita

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

We study the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer such that the seller makes relation-specific investments in each period. We show that where, under spot transaction, formal contracts have no value because of the cooperative nature of investment, writing a simple fixed-price contract can be valuable under repeated transactions: There is a range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal price contract is written and combined with a relational contract. We also show that there are cases in which not writing a formal contract but entirely relying on a relational contract increases the total surplus of the buyer and the seller. The key condition is how the investment affects the renegotiation price in general, and the alternative-use value in particular.

Multi-Skilling, Delegation and Continuous Process Improvement: A Comparative Analysis of Us-Japanese Work Organizations

This paper focuses on the following U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market practices: in Japanese firms, (i) real decision-making authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical levels, (ii) employees are multiple-skilled, (iii) human capital accumulation is more firm-specific, (iv) labor turnover rate is lower, and (v) continuous process improvement is more prevalent. I present a model that addresses interconnections among three key features of work organizations (multiskilling, delegation, and continuous process improvement), and analyses ways in which they are related to labor market practices. It analyses strategic interactions among firms concerning their choices of the nature of work organizations, and shows that strategic complementarity due to labor market externality can yield the multiplicity of equilibria, which provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese differences.

Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external recruitment, using a job-assignment model involving competing firms with heterogeneous productivities and two-level job hierarchies with one managerial position. The model predicts that, controlling for the number of managers, increasing the number of lower-level workers is associated with (1) greater internal promotion as opposed to external recruitment, (2) higher profit, and (3) more general training. Empirical analysis of a large cross section of British employers is consistent with these predictions.

FDI in Post-Production Services and Product Market Competition

Post-production services, such as sales, distribution, and maintenance, comprise a crucial element of business activity. A foreign firm faces a higher cost to perform such services than its domestic rival because of the lack of proximity to customers. We explore an international duopoly model in which a foreign firm can reduce its cost for post-production services by foreign direct investment (FDI), or alternatively can outsource such services to its domestic rival. Trade liberalization, if not accompanied by liberalization of service FDI, can hurt domestic consumers and decrease world welfare, but the negative welfare impacts can be mitigated and eventually turned into positive ones as service FDI is also liberalized. This finding yields important policy implications, given the reality that the progress of liberalization in service sectors is limited compared to the substantial progress already made in trade liberalization.

Competitor collaboration and product distinctiveness

Competitors often collaborate by sharing a part of value-creating activities such as technology development, product design, and distribution, which are important elements for creating product distinctiveness. Competitor collaborations have recently been regarded as crucial issues by antitrust authorities. Although collaboration between competitors reduces their product distinctiveness, it may increase the distinctiveness between their products and a non-collaborators product. Also, intensified competition between collaborators lowers their prices and imposes downward pressure on non-collaborators pricing strategy. We demonstrated that the interaction between these effects yields rich antitrust implications for competitor collaborations and a new perspective on welfare consequences of partial ownership arrangements.

Partial Ownership Induces Customised Investments Under Repeated Interaction: An Explanation of Japanese Manufacturer‐Suppliers Relationships

A dominant manufacturing firm often holds partial shares of its suppliers, and the suppliers are willing to make investments customised to the manufacturer. Furthermore, this type of manufacturer-suppliers relationship is often long-term and stable. This paper provides an explanation for this phenomenon by modelling repeated interaction between a downstream manufacturer and upstream suppliers. In the model, the manufacturer could avoid, by partially owning a supplier, hold-up problems which would arise from the suppliers customised investment. The model distinguishes between two sources of appropriable quasi-rents, and yields new empirical predictions concerning the relationship between appropriable quasi-rents and vertical integration. Copyright 2001 by Scottish Economic Society.

FDI and Technology Spillovers under Vertical Product Di erentiation

When Northern firms undertake FDI in the South, the superior technology they bring to their Southern operations spills over to Southern firms. Technology spillovers accompanied by FDI often enable Southern firms to enhance their product quality. This paper explores a model that incorporates quality-enhancing spillovers in an international duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. We find that the Northern firm, when it chooses to undertake FDI, strategically reduces its product quality to reduce the amount of technology that spills over to the Southern firm. This strategic quality reduction, which is often observed in reality, plays a critical role in welfare consequences and policy implications of quality-enhancing technology spillovers.

Knowledge Transfer and Partial Equity Ownership

When firms form an alliance, it often involves one firm acquiring an equity stake in its alliance partner. Such an alliance weakens competition, but induces knowledge transfer between partner firms. We explore oligopoly models that capture the link between knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership (PEO), where alliance partners can choose the level of PEO to connect themselves. PEO, merger and independence are all nested in our model, where PEO can arise in equilibrium and the endogenously determined level of PEO can benefit consumers and/or society. We identify conditions under which antitrust authorities would prohibit, partially permit, or permit PEO.

Trade Liberalization and Aftermarket Services for Imports

We analyze the provision of repair services (aftermarket services that are required for a certain fraction of durable units after sales) through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. Trade liberalization in goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) in services, induces the domestic firm to establish service facilities for repairing the foreign firm’s products. This weakens the firms’ competition in the product market, and the resulting anti-competitive effect hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. Despite the anti-competitive effect, trade liberalization may also hurt the foreign firm because the repairs reduce the sales of the imported good in the product market. Liberalization of service FDI helps resolve the problem because it induces the foreign firm to establish service facilities for its own products.

Compensation and Intrinsic Motivation in Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations

We develop a theoretical model in which for-profit and nonprofit employers compete to hire a worker who derives intrinsic motivation from the nonprofit’s social mission. We also use a unique data set of California establishments to provide new evidence on sectoral differences in pay and HRM systems, finding a greater incidence of training and benefits in nonprofits, lower wages (with the wage gap increasing in skill level), and less incentive pay than in for-profits. The model is used to interpret both this new evidence and other empirical results from the literature, including the inconclusive sign of the FP-NP wage differential.