Holly M. Smith

Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit

A parallel account of praiseworthiness would stipulate that the agent had a commendable configuration of desires and aversions that gave rise to an objectively right act. An account of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness should answer two questions: it should tell us what makes a person responsible for what she does, and it should tell us what makes a person good or bad for what she does. I now think that the accounts just described do not provide fully satisfactory answers to the question of what makes a person responsible for what she does. For example, these accounts incorporate no conditions on the genesis of the agents desires and aversions. Thus they permit an agent to count as blameworthy even though her reprehensible desires might have been instilled in her by a hypnotist or mad neuroscientist. Many theorists, otherwise sympathetic to these accounts, would find this result unacceptable, because they would believe such an agent not to be responsible for what she does. This worry suggests that the accounts

Making Moral Decisions

One component of a moral theory consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions-principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Consideration of such principles suggests that they play several different roles. The first such role may be viewed as theoretical. In this role, moral principles specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. For example, they tell us that an act is right because it maximizes happiness, or is wrong because it violates a promise. Understood in this way, such principles are (roughly) comparable to a scientific theory which specifies the factors governing the state of a given physical system. Thus the gas laws tell us that the volume of a body of gas depends on its pressure and temperature. Such a scientific law can be illuminating even though it may be impossible, at least in particular cases, to ascertain what the pressure and temperature of a given body of gas are. Similarly (or so it appears) moral principles may be illuminating as theories even though it may be impossible, at least in particular cases, to ascertain whether a given action has one of the characteristics (such as maximizing happiness) that determine its moral status. The second function for moral principles may be thought of as practical. This encompasses two subfunctions. On the one hand, there is the second person practical use of moral principles-their use as standards by reference to which an observer can guide another persons behavior by recommending or advising against various courses of action. On the other hand, there is the first person practical use of moral principles-their use as a standard by reference to which a person can guide his or her own behavior: a standard to help the

The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting

The requirement that moral theories be usable for making decisions runs afoul of the fact that decision makers often lack sufficient information about their options to derive any accurate prescriptions from the standard theories. Many theorists attempt to solve this problem by adopting subjective moral theories—ones that ground obligations on the agent’s beliefs about the features of her options, rather than on the options’ actual features. I argue that subjective deontological theories (such as Prichard’s and Ross’s) suffer a fatal flaw, since they cannot appropriately require agents to gather information before acting.

The Zimmerman-Graham Debate on Objectivism versus Prospectivism

In Living with Uncertainty Michael Zimmerman argues against the Objective view and for the Prospective view of morality. He claims that the conscientious agent would always choose the act that maximizes projected value, and that this is incompatible with Objectivism. Peter Graham defends Objectivism against Zimmerman’s attack. He argues that a conscientious agent must balance fulfilling obligations against avoiding the worst wrong-doings, and that this stance is consistent with Objectivism and with the agent’s choosing an act she believes to be Objectively wrong. In Ignorance and Moral Obligation Zimmerman argues that Graham’s “Objectivism” is only terminologically distinct from his Prospectivism. I argue that Graham faces a dilemma: if his theory delivers different prescriptions from Zimmerman’s, those prescriptions are implausible. On the other hand, if his theory avoids such implausible recommendations, it now generates exactly the same recommendations as Zimmerman’s theory, and so does not constitute a serious challenge to it.

Whose Body Is It, Anyway?

Opponents of abortion must typicallyl establish two separate claims. first, that the fetus has a significant right to life, and second, that the fetus has the right to utilize its mothers body for the support and nourishment of that life One strategy sometimes used to bridge the gap between these two claims involves the general assertion that when an individual has a right to something, and another person can provide him with that thing at only moderate personal sacrifice, then the individual has a right to assistance from the second person. It is then asserted that pregnancy does not require too great a sacrifice on the part of the mother, so that she has an obligation to assist the fetus by allowing it to use her body for nourishment. But this strategy is a troubled one, since many reject the basic principle on which it relies. Cases such as Judith Thomsons famous violinist example have convinced many either that the principle itself is false, or else that pregnancy involves too great a sacrifice to fall under it.2 So opponents of abortion need some more effective way of arguing for the transition from the first claim to the second One of the most common attempts to provide such an argument consists in showing that the pregnant woman has given the fetus that right by engaging in the act of sexual intercourse which created the fetus and made it dependent on her. But filling out this argument involves settling extremely complex issues about what counts as giving someone a right. How voluntary must the act of intercourse have been in order for it to count as the womans giving the fetus the right to her body? Is it necessary (or sufficient) that the woman knew at the time of intercourse that she might become pregnant? Does the degree of probability of her becoming pregnant affect whether or not she gave the right to the fetus? If she took steps to avoid becoming pregnant can she claim she did not give the fetus a right? Can the woman make her gift of the right conditional, for example, can she specify that it becomes void if the pregnancy threatens her life or health? Answering all these questions is very difficult,