Howard Rosenthal

A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis

A general nonlinear logit model is used to analyze political choice data. The model assumes probabilistic voting based on a spatial utility function. The parameters of the utility function and the spatial coordinates of the choices and the choosers can all be estimated on the basis of observed choices. Ordinary Guttman scaling is a degenerate case of this model. Estimation of the model is implemented in the NOMINATE program for one dimensional analysis of two alternative choices with no nonvoting. The robustness and face validity of the program outputs are evaluated on the basis of roll call voting data for the U.S. House and Senate.

PATTERNS OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING

Congressional roll call voting has been highly structured for most of U.S. history. The structure is revealed by a dynamic, spatial analysis of the entire roll call voting record from 1789 to 1985. The space is characterized by a predominant major dimension with, at times, a significant, but less important second dimension. In the modern era, spatial positions are very stable. This stability is such that, under certain conditions, short run forecasting of roll call votes is possible. Since the end of World War II, changes in congressional voting patterns have occurred almost entirely through the process of replacement of retiring or defeated legislators with new members. Politically, selection is far more important than adaptation.

Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

I. The setters problem under certainty and the importance of the reversion point, 565.—II. Budget-maximizing with uncertain turnout, 571.—III. Exploiting a sequence of elections, 579.—IV. Implications for empirical research, 581.—Appendix, 585.

Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty

The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.

A Strategic Calculus of Voting

ConclusionThere are several major insights which this game theoretic analysis has produced. First, we have shown that equilibria exist with substantial turnout even when both the majority is much larger than the minority and the costs of voting are exceptionally high. For example, in large electorates using the status quo rule, we show mixed-pure equilibria with turnout roughly equal to twice the size of the minority when the cost is nearly equal to 37% (e−1 × 100) of the reward (B). Second, with large electorates the many equilibria appear to reduce to just two types, the type just mentioned and a type with almost no turnout. Third, we have shown that turnout may rise as the costs of voting rise. This results when all members of a team “adjust” their turnout probabilities so that the probability of being pivotal increases to match the increased cost of voting. We have also shown that turnout is nearly invariant with costs in large electorates where turnout probabilities approach one or zero. Fourth, the actual split of the vote is likely to be a biased measure of the actual distribution of preferences in the electorate. Because majorities have greater incentives to free-ride, they will turn out less heavily than minorities. Elections can be relatively close, even when one alternative is supported by a substantial majority of the electorate. The probability that the majority will win does not seem to be closely related to the size of the electorate or its size relative to the minority. However, turnout is quite strongly correlated with the relative sizes of the minority and the majority.

The Elusive Median Voter

Abstract While some political scientists have maintained that politics has little, if anything, to do with governmental output, economists have looked at expenditures as reflecting median voter outcomes. They have used the median voter framework extensively, both in theoretical work and in empirical analysis. This paper reviews the empirical work, concluding that the studies fail to indicate that actual expenditures correspond in general to those desired by the median voter. The economic studies fail to identify whether expenditures are at the level desired by the median voter or at some multiple of this level. They also fail to identify whether the median voter is pivotal or a voter at some other fractile is pivotal. Moreover, the basic median voter model is rarely tested against competing theoretical or statistical models. In some studies parameter estimates are not consistent with the theoretical model designed on the basis of the median voter hypothesis. The economic studies suggest that expenditures depend not only on the preferences of voters but also on the structure of political institutions. The presence of bureaucratic threats is offered as an institutional setting that can result in expenditures significantly in excess of those desired by the median voter.

The Polarization of American Politics

Elected officials in the United States appear to represent relatively extreme support coalitions rather than the interests of middle-of-the-road voters. This contention is supported by analysis of variance of liberal-conservative positions in the United States Senate from 1959 to 1980. Within both the Democratic and the Republican parties, there is considerable variation in liberal-conservative positions, but two senators from the same state and party tend to be very similar. In contrast, senators from the same state but from different parties are highly dissimilar, suggesting that each party represents an extreme support coalition in the state. Moreover, the distribution of senators is now consistent with the hypothesis that, in the long run, both parties have an equal chance of winning any seat in the Senate. This result suggests that there is now competition between equally balanced but extreme support coalitions throughout most of the United States.

Asymmetric information and agenda control: The bases of monopoly power in public spending☆

Abstract A pervasive empirical finding, widely known as the ‘flypaper effect’, is that lump-sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction. Moreover, such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process. We posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid. The empirical results are consistent with ‘flypaper’ and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants.

Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism

This paper analyzes the provision of discrete public goods when individuals have altruistic preferences which others do not precisely know. The problem is formulated and solved as a Bayesian game. In contrast to standard social psychological approaches, based on such natural language terms as greed, fear, and trust, the Bayesian approach provides a rigorous mathematical treatment of social participation. This theory is shown to make strong testable predictions that can integrate data collected across a wide variety of natural and experimental settings. The altruism model is shown to be supported by existing experimental data on binary voluntary contribution games.

Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study

An experiment was conducted to test whether discounted repeated play leads to greater cooperation and coordination than one-shot play in a public good environment with incomplete information. The experiment was designed so that, theoretically, repeated play can sustain equilibria with substantially higher group earnings than result in the one-shot Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The design varied a number of environmental parameters, including the size of the group, and the statistical distribution of marginal rates of substitution between the public and private good. Marginal rates of substitution were private information but the statistical distribution was common knowledge. The results indicate that repetition leads to greater cooperation, and that the magnitude of these gains depends systematically both on the ability of players to monitor each others strategy and on the environmental parameters.