Hsiao-Chi Chen

Imitation, local interaction, and coordination

This paper analyzes players’ long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imitation and one-dimensional local interaction. Players are assumed to interact with their two neighbors and to imitate actions with the highest average payoffs. We find that the payoff-dominant equilibrium survives in the long run with positive probability. The results derive the conditions under which both risk-dominant-strategy and payoff-dominant-strategy takers co-exist in the long run. The risk-dominant equilibrium is the unique long-run equilibrium for the remaining cases. This study extends and complements the analyses of Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157–179, 1998) and Vega-Redondo (Evolution, games, and economic behaviour, 1996). Combining Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer’s (Econ Lett 93:163–168, 2006; J Econ Theory 14:251–274, 2008) and our results, we conclude that players’ long-run behavior varies with imitation rules and information collecting modes. Finally, we show the convergence rate to all the long-run equilibria.

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System

This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively.

Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximize traffic volumes

This article analyzes optimal concession contracts offered by a landlord port authority to competing operators of container terminals. The port authority pursues traffic-volume maximization. Three contract schemes considered are fixed-fee, unit-fee, and two-part tariff. A two-stage game is constructed to characterize interactions between the port authority and two terminal operators. We discover that the fixed-fee contract is the best choice for the authority. Terminal operators’ congestion costs and competition modes have no impact on this contract choice. Our results demonstrate that port authority’s goal is an important factor in determining optimal concession contracts.

DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER NO COMMITMENT TO PERIODIC AUDITING AND A RETROSPECTIVE PENALTY SYSTEM

This study extends Khalils (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), No. 4, pp. 629-640) model to a multiperiod one under no principals commitment to periodic auditing and a retrospective penalty system. The optimal dynamic contracts may not exist. When they exist, there is no sure first-period auditing and either the first-best or a single contract is offered in the second period. The Khalil-type (1997) and Baron-Myerson-type (Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), No. 4, pp. 911-930) contracts could serve the first-period contracts of the hybrid and separating equilibria, respectively. However, optimal dynamic contracts cannot be duplicated by these static contracts. Finally, players may prefer our pooling equilibrium to Laffont and Tiroles (European Economic Review, Vol. 31 (1987), No. 4, pp. 901-926). And the pooling equilibrium may weakly Pareto dominate the separating one. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester, 2006.

Tradeable-permit pollution control systems with and without commitment to auditing

This article analyzes and compares behaviors of a regulator and polluting firms in tradeable permit systems with and without commitment to auditing. If all firms are compliant, the equilibria under both of the schemes are the same. In contrast, if noncompliant firms exist, the equilibria under the two systems differ. The optimal permit number could affect the equilibrium auditing probability in the no-commitment case, while this impact would not appear in the commitment case. Moreover, the regulator will audit more under no commitment to auditing. The system with no commitment to auditing is less efficient than that with commitment to auditing.

INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER IMPERFECT AUDITING

In this paper we analyze the optimal incentive contracts under imperfect auditing. Both principals commitment and no commitment to auditing cases are investigated. In the commitment case, the Baron-Besanko-type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 (1984), pp. 447-470) contract would fail under imperfect auditing. In the no-commitment case, the Baron-Myerson (Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 911-930) and the Khalil-type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 629-640) contracts could survive under specific misjudging probabilities. In addition, there exists a separate equilibrium with the agents full compliance and the principals sure ex post auditing. Copyright

An emission tax pollution control system with imperfect monitoring

This article analyzes regulator and polluting firm behavior in an emission tax system with imperfect monitoring, and contrasts the associated results with those under perfect monitoring. It is found that the firm’s optimal emissions may depend on either monitoring probability or emission tax for perfect monitoring, while they are affected by both monitoring probability and emission tax in imperfect monitoring. Moreover, as monitoring probability increases, the firm could abate fewer emissions in imperfect monitoring. The relative sizes of equilibrium monitoring probability in the two monitoring setups are uncertain.

Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities with different pursuing goals

ABSTRACT This paper investigates how landlord port authorities should offer concession contracts to their terminal operators under two different goals, by building a two-stage game for each goal. If maximizing the weighted sum of fee revenues and throughout benefits is port authorities’ goal, then the optimal concession contract can be any of the two-part tariff, the unit-fee, and the fixed-fee contracts. Accordingly, our special cases include previous works assuming that port authorities maximize either fee revenues or throughput benefits. By contrast, if maximizing the social welfare is the goal, then we find that subsidizing terminal operators, instead of charging them, is port authorities’ best choice. This result is not yet discovered in the literature.

To Merge or to License: Implications of Information Sharing for Optimal Merger Policy

We investigate the antitrust authoritys optimal merger policy in a duopoly model with cost asymmetry and asymmetric information regarding uncertain demand. Technology can be transferred either through a merger or a license, while market information is shared only through a merger. We show that the optimal merger policy differs under Cournot and Bertrand competition. If firms compete in Bertrand fashion, then mergers should never be allowed. If firms compete in Cournot fashion, then mergers are permitted if market volatility is high or if volatility is in the intermediate range and the size of innovations is large enough.