Hugh J. Foley

Cognitive Operations and Decision Bias in Reality Monitoring

In each of the three experiments, a reality monitoring task required subjects to discriminate between words they generated and words presented by an experimenter. Each of the experiments included a manipulation designed to affect the amount of external control over what the subject generated, with the expectation that the more a response is determined by external cues, the less the memory will include information about cognitive operations that took place when the memory was established. In general, increasing cognitive operations increased accuracy of reality monitoring. In addition, when subjects falsely recognized new items as old, they were much more likely to attribute the items to external sources than to internal sources. These findings were discussed primarily in terms of the role that cognitive operations preserved in memory may play in identifying the origin of information in memory. A comparison of memory for the occurrence of experimenterpresented and subject-generated items, regardless of correct identification of origin, extended the generation effect found by Slamecka and Graf in 1978 to information only covertly generated by the subject (Experiment 1), and to retention intervals as long as 10 days (Experiment 2). The results of Experiment 3 suggested that the generation effect may not necessarily appear in situations in which what is generated is essentially a meaningful response to what is perceived.

Stimulus range, number of categories, and the “virtual” exponent

Three different stimulus modalities (line length, number, and sound pressure) were judged by magnitude scaling techniques and by 7-, 15-, 31-, and 75-point category scales. All of the 40 subjects were given the same number stimuli, but two different sound-pressure ranges were presented (each to 20 subjects) and four different line-length ranges were presented (each to 10 subjects). Analyses of lack of fit for various simple functions were performed to determine bestfitting functions. The simple power function was often found to be an adequate fit to the data for all the response modalities used, although all of the response modalities were sensitive to changes in stimulus range. For simple power functions, the category-scale exponent was a function of both the range of stimuli and the number of categories provided. Category scales did not always produce exponents smaller than those obtained with magnitude estimation, which calls into question the concept of a virtual exponent for category scales.

The calibration and cross-modal validation of ratio scales of political opinion in survey research☆

Abstract The aims of this paper are twofold: first, to set the ratio scaling of opinion in perspective by reviewing a series of laboratory and field experiments designed to build and validate ratio scales of political opinion; and second, to report in detail on the development of calibration procedures designed to obtain proportional judgments from respondents in a national survey. Paralleling explicitly a psychophysical paradigm established for the scaling of physical continua, these studies demonstrate that (1) the paradigm can be adapted to the scaling of sociopolitical opinions; (2) two measures suitable for use in surveys-magnitude estimation and line production-satisfy established psychophysical criteria for valid measures of response; (3) survey respondents can and do make reliable ratio estimates of strength of opinion; (4) scales measuring strength of political support, which are derived from the magnitude and line estimates of survey respondents, match closely the support scales derived in laboratory and field tests using such physical response modalities as handgrip and sound pressure; and (5) these calibration procedures can be incorporated in national opinion surveys. These results, especially the successful move from the laboratory to a conventional survey setting, provide social and behavioral scientists with a technique for generating response data that meet stringent measurement requirements. The calibration procedures described constitute a social metric that will enable researchers to test functional hypotheses in a more rigorous manner than is possible employing alternative scaling procedures.

Source-monitoring judgments about anagrams and their solutions: Evidence for the role of cognitive operations information in memory

Generating solutions to anagrams leads to a memory advantage for those solutions, with generated words remembered better than words simply read. However, an additional advantage is not typically found for solutions to difficult anagrams relative to solutions to easy ones, presenting a challenge for the cognitive effort explanation of the generation effect. In the present series of experiments, the effect of manipulating anagram difficulty is explored further by introducing two new source-monitoring judgments. These studies demonstrate that when attention is directed at test to the operations activated during encoding (by way of source-monitoring judgments focused on solving vs. constructing anagrams), a source advantage is observed for difficult anagrams. However, when attention is directed to the anagrams themselves, asking participants to remember the kinds of anagrams generated or solved (based on kind of rule rather than subjective impressions of difficulty), a similar source advantage is not observed. The present studies bring a new perspective to the investigation of difficulty manipulations on memory for problem solving by illustrating the impact of a shift in focus from the effort mediating cognitive operations to specifics about the cognitive operations themselves.

Investigations of closure processes: What source-monitoring judgments suggest about what is “closing”

On many occasions, the perception of an object is based on incomplete information because portions of the object are occluded from view. Nevertheless, people are able to identify an occluded object, suggesting that the identification is mediated by the activation of completion processes which “fill in” the missing information. Although these completion processes are invoked as causal mechanisms for many phenomena, the processes mediating the “completion” have not been specified. The present experiments tested two potential explanations for closure processes. In each experiment, participants were presented with pictures, complete or incomplete in form, and, on a surprise source-monitoring task, they were then asked to remember whether pictures had been presented complete or incomplete in form. Whether viewing pictures of objects, faces, or camouflaged objects, participants showed a pronounced tendency to claim that incomplete pictures were actually presented complete in form. This bias was evident after the participants described functions for objects (Experiments 1, 1A, and 2), after they evaluated properties of faces (Experiment 4), and after they searched for objects hidden in a complex scene (Experiment 5). However, this bias was not evident after they simply named objects portrayed in pictures (Experiment 3). This bias is interpreted as evidence for the activation of implicit imaginal processing. The results of these experiments are informative in their contribution to our understanding of the bases of closure, an intuitively appealing notion frequently invoked to account for object identification, but, as yet, not fully understood.

Pervasiveness and magnitude of context effects: Evidence for the relativity of absolute magnitude estimation

To test the assertion that absolute magnitude estimation serves to minimize context effects, two experiments were conducted in which area stimuli were judged under differing conditions. In Experiment 1, four groups of subjects made magnitude estimations of triangles ranging in area from 1.5 to 3,072 cm2. No standard or modulus was used, and instructions were similar to those used in absolute magnitude estimation experiments. Each group first judged a different subrange of the stimuli (1.5–24; 48–768; 6–96; or 192-3,072 cm2). before making judgments of the remaining stimuli. In Experiment 2, two groups of subjects made magnitude estimations of triangles ranging in area from 1.5 to 12,288 cm2, with each group first judging a different subrange of stimuli (1.5–24 cm2 or 768-12,288 cm2). The design and instructions were virtually identical to those used in absolute magnitude estimation experiments. Our results indicate that the wording of the instructions is not crucial and that judgments are influenced in two ways that are not predicted by proponents of absolute magnitude estimation. First, the power functions fit to the initially presented subranges (e.g., 1.5–24 cm2), which were judged without contextual effects produced by previously presented stimuli, were inconsistent with one another. Second, judgments of the remaining stimuli were influenced by the subrange of stimuli judged initially. The prevalence of context effects in both experiments, in spite of instructional differences, suggests that although one should avoid using a standard and modulus, there is little else to be gained by adopting the absolute magnitude estimation procedure.

Anticipating partners' responses: Examining item and source memory following - interactive exchanges

Within the context of an interactive anagram-solving task, the present studies tested predictions about the role of cognitive anticipation in both source and item memory. After working in pairs to solve anagram problems, participants were surprised by a source-monitoring test focused on the source of solutions (self vs. partner, Experiment 1) or a standard recognition test focused on the solutions themselves (Experiment 2). With the intention of affecting the opportunity to anticipate partners’ solutions, two variables were manipulated: anagram difficulty (easy vs. hard) and the delay between the presentation of an anagram problem and the prompt that designated one member of each pair as the anagram solver. Consistent with predictions, as the opportunity to anticipate partners’ solutions increased, there was a decrease in source accuracy suggesting increased confusion about whether the solution had been self- or partner-generated. Generation-effect failures were observed in item memory. However, these failures reflected increases in item memory for partners’ responses rather than decreases in memory for self-generated ones. These studies suggest that when opportunities to anticipate partners’ responses are available, self-generative activities may be associated with both selfand partner-generated items, influencing the expression of the generation effect.

Anagram solving: Does effort have an effect?

The purpose of these studies was to explore the role of effort in remembering anagrams and their solutions. In Experiment 1, we compared the effects on memory of copying words, typing them as solutions for easy anagrams, or typing them as solutions for difficult anagrams. Solving anagrams involved more effort than did simply typing words, as indexed by response time. However, this effort facilitated recall for solutions to easy anagrams but not for solutions to difficult anagrams. In Experiment 2, we compared memory for anagrams and their solutions using a frequency-judgment task. Memory for solutions was better than memory for anagrams, and this difference was not affected by anagram difficulty. The results of these studies have implications for our understanding of the role of effort in remembering.

Remembering more than meets the eye: a study of memory confusions about incomplete visual information.

The purpose of this series of four experiments was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery in memory confusions about the way in which visual information had been experienced. After viewing pictures of familiar objects, complete or incomplete in visual form, participants were asked to remember the way in which the objects had been presented. Although, as predicted, memory for the objects themselves was quite good, participants falsely remembered seeing complete versions of pictures that were actually presented as incomplete. These false reports were observed across a variety of encoding and testing conditions. The results suggest that the false reports (referred to here as completion errors) are due to internal representations based on filling-in processes in response to the encoding of incomplete visual information. As such, the results also speak to alternative explanations for the completion errors and, more broadly, to theoretical perspectives that draw on filling-in processes when accounting for object identification and object memory.

Adapting a memory framework (source monitoring) to the study of closure processes

The present experiments adapt a memory framework (source monitoring) to the study of closure processes. Closure processes are invoked as explanatory mechanisms underlying the ability to identify objects under conditions of incomplete visual information. If closure processes are activated, filling in missing pieces of visual information, intriguing memory predictions follow. When making source judgments about the way in which visual information was experienced initially (e.g., complete or incomplete in form), a particular kind of memory error should be evident. Incomplete visual information should be remembered as complete in form, and indeed, this error is observed. The present experiments test alternative interpretations for the initial reports of this memory error in the context of a search task modeled after theWhere’s Waldo? children’s books. The effects of several new factors (e.g., familiarity) are reported, and alternative interpretations for the bias to reportcomplete are eliminated. Findings, therefore, have implications for understanding the mechanisms of closure processes, as well as for the source-monitoring framework itself.