Hugh Rockoff

The "Wizard of Oz" as a Monetary Allegory

The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, perhaps Americas favorite childrens story, is also an informed comment on the battle over free silver in the 1890s. The characters in the story represent real figures such as William Jennings Bryan. This paper interprets the allegory for economists and economic historians, illuminating a number of elements left unexplained by critics concerned with the politics of the allegory. It also reexamines Bryan and the case for free silver. Far from being monetary cranks, the advocates of free silver had a strong argument on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

The U.S. Banking System From a Northern Exposure: Stability versus Efficiency

This article asks whether the vaunted comparative stability of the Canadian banking system has been purchased at the cost of creating an oligopoly. We assembled a data set that compares bank failures, lending rates, interest paid on deposits, and related variables over the period 1920 to 1980. Our principal findings are (1) interest rates paid on deposits were generally higher in Canada; (2) interest income received on securities was generally slightly higher in Canada; (3) interest rates charged on loans were generally quite similar; and (4) net rates of return to equity were generally higher in Canada than in the United States. ne of the most important functions of economic history is the isolation of natural experiments that can help resolve theoretical and policy debates among economists. In the past two decades a major policy debate has raged in the United States over reforming the banking system. Several problems in the American banking system have been identified. These include: (1) restrictions on the activities banks can engage in (in part a consequence of the Glass-Steagall Act [1933] that separated commercial from investment banking), (2) limits in certain states on the number of branches a bank can have, (3) limits on interstate branching, and (4) deposit insurance. This article illustrates the contribution that economic history can make to policy analysis by showing how a long-term comparison of banking in the United States and Canada can clarify a number of issues related to the appropriate role of government in the regulation of banking. There is an immediate and important difference between the Canadian and United States banking systems. The Canadian experience has been one of considerable stability. There has been only one major bank failure since World War I, and there were no failures during the Great Depression. In contrast, the American system has been characterized by a number of periods of instability. Rates of bank failures were high in the 1920s, and of course the entire system collapsed during the 1930s.

Why Didn't Canada Have a Banking Crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907, or …)?

The financial crisis of 2008 engulfed the banking system of the United States and many large European countries. Canada was a notable exception. In this paper we argue that the structure of financial systems is path dependent. The relative stability of the Canadian banks in the recent crisis compared to the United States in our view reflected the original institutional foundations laid in place in the early 19th century in the two countries. The Canadian concentrated banking system that had evolved by the end of the twentieth century had absorbed the key sources of systemic risk -- the mortgage market and investment banking -- and was tightly regulated by one overarching regulator. In contrast the relatively weak, fragmented, and crisis prone U.S. banking system that had evolved since the early nineteenth century, led to the rise of securities markets, investment banks and money market mutual funds (the shadow banking system) combined with multiple competing regulatory authorities. The consequence was that the systemic risk that led to the crisis of 2007-2008 was not contained.

A Comparison of the Stability and Efficiency of the Canadian and American Banking Systems 1870-1925

In this paper we compare the performance of the U.S. and Canadian banking systems from 1870-1925 in terms of stability and efficiency. In an earlier study we found that the Canadian banking system, based on nationwide branch banking, dominated the U.S. system, based on unit banking, on both criteria in the period 1920-1980. In this study we find that there is little significant difference between the two systems in the preceding 50 years. The difference between the two periods we attribute to the merger movement in Canada after 1900 which allowed the Canadian banking system to evolve from a system with incomplete regional diversification, and hence subject to a significant risk of an occasional failure by a large bank, to one characterized by national diversification and greater stability. The greater stability in turn allowed the financial structure of the banking system to evolve in a more efficient direction.

Prodigals and Projecture: An Economic History of Usury Laws in the United States from Colonial Times to 1900

During the Colonial era usury laws in the United States were strict both in terms of the maximum rate that could be charged and the penalties that would be imposed. In Massachusetts in eighteenth century, for example, the maximum rate was 6 percent, and both principal and interest were forfeited if usury could be proved against the lender. The laws were eased during the early national period, and in many states they were repealed, although the United States never completely abandoned its system of usury laws. By 1870, when a limited reaction set in, the liberalization had reached the point where the great bulk of commercial transactions must have been largely unaffected by the usury laws, at least in non-crisis years. Two factors seem to have been paramount in producing the liberalization: changes in ideas about the effectiveness of government regulation in general and about the effectiveness of usury laws in particular, and competition among the states for capital. This history suggests that the usury laws, when tightly drawn, may have had a larger impact than economic historians have generally recognized.

Until it's Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I

The process by which the US economy was mobilized during World War I was the subject of considerable criticism both at the time and since. Nevertheless, when viewed in the aggregate the degree of mobilization achieved during the short period of active US involvement was remarkable. The United States entered the war in 1917 having made only limited preparations. In 1918 the armed forces were expanded to include 2.9 million sailors, soldiers, and marines; 6 percent of the labor force in the 15 to 44 age bracket. Overall in 1918, one fifth or more of the nations resources was devoted to the war effort. By the time the Armistice was signed in 1919 a profusion of new weapons was flowing from American factories. This essay describes how mobilization was achieved so quickly, including how it was financed, and some of the long-term consequences.

Gresham's Law in Nineteenth-Century America

This paper examines several nineteenth-century American tests of Greshams law. These tests include both the conflict between the U.S. silver dollar and foreign silver dollars in the early national period and the conflict between the greenback dollar and the gold dollar during the Civil War and its aftermath. The authors find that Greshams law worked well and that a rival view, which considers the natural outcome of such conflicts to be the concurrent circulation of cheap money at face value and dear money at a varying premium, did not. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.

Compliance with Price Controls in the United States and the United Kingdom During World War II

We are concerned here with the evasion of price controls in the United States and the United Kingdom in World War II. The evidence suggests that controls produced less evasive activity in the United Kingdom. After considering several explanations we conclude that the key was the degree of regimentation. The British controlled all stages of production, limited the range of products available at each stage, and allocated relatively more resources to managing and enforcing controls.

Price and Wage Controls in Four Wartime Periods

The debate over wage and price controls has taken a highly stylized form. Advocates of controls stress the direct effect on the obvious problem, inflation, whereas critics stress the side effects. This paper measures and compares the effects of controls during the four periods when controls have been used in the United States in the twentieth century. Although tentative conclusions are drawn concerning the price effects, the size of the administrative bureaucracies, and so forth, the clearest lesson, as usual, is that the issue warrants further investigation by economic historians because it is important, and because the historical record is surprisingly rich.

Varieties of Banking and Regional Economic Development in the United States, 1840–1860

It is sometimes asserted that a laissez-faire policy toward financial intermediaries tends to deepen financial development and accelerate economic growth. The two decades preceding the American Civil War provide a challenging case for this proposition because they witnessed something approaching a natural experiment. During those years the Federal government withdrew from the regulation of banking, a policy that was the final outcome of Andrew Jacksons war with the Second Bank of the United States. A wide range of experiments concerning entry into commercial banking were tried, from “free” banking to “socialized” banking. Moreover, other kinds of legislation affecting banking varied from state to state as well. While the regions of the United States differed in terms of economic structure, a common language, a common legal tradition, and, to some extent, a common culture permeated all regions. Thus, the period provides excellent conditions for observing the effects of financial legislation on the extent of financial intermediation. In this paper I will assess the impact on financial development of the three most important forms of regulation: the commercial banking laws, the usury laws, and the mutual savings banking laws.