Huib Pellikaan

Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design

Preface Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action 1.1. Can something be done? 1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action 1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actors perspective: rational choice 1.4. How motives speak to preferences 1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour 1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands 1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional? 1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design 2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation 2.3. The social instruments 2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma 2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based? 3. The actors perspective on collective action 3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory 3.2. Problems of collective action 3.3. Social dilemmas 3.4. The actors perspective Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement 4.1. Three potential social dilemmas 4.2. Measuring preference orderings 4.3. Three different environmental problems 4.4. Avoiding response effects 5. Rational choice 5.1. Conditions of rational choice 5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice 5.3. Choice of strategy 5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule 5.5. Conclusion 6. Consistency of motives and preferences 6.1. A model of reasoned choice 6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness 6.3. The test of consistent preferences 6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases 6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter? 6.6. Conclusion 7. The non-equivalence of the cases 7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma 7.2. The model of the hardest case 7.3. The scalability of the cases 7.4. Conclusion 8. Reported behaviour 8.1. Determinants of behaviour 8.2. The sociocultural model 8.3. An alternative model 8.4. From motives to behaviour Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy? 9.1. Introduction to Part III 9.2. Acceptance and agreement 9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation 9.4. Conclusion 10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos? 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos 10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights? 10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences 10.5. The agreement response 10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview 11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation 11.1. Ranking preference orderings 11.2. The meta-ranking approach 11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment 11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking 11.5. An environmental meta-ranking 12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas 12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation 12.2. The reciprocity thesis 12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas 13. Assessing self regulation policies 13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas 13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation 13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases 13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos 13.5. Individual cost and collective gain 13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases 13.7. The dimension of private significance 13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real? 13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility 13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation Bibliography Index.

Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design: Conclusions: theory and policy

Preface Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action 1.1. Can something be done? 1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action 1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actors perspective: rational choice 1.4. How motives speak to preferences 1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour 1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands 1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional? 1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design 2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation 2.3. The social instruments 2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma 2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based? 3. The actors perspective on collective action 3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory 3.2. Problems of collective action 3.3. Social dilemmas 3.4. The actors perspective Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement 4.1. Three potential social dilemmas 4.2. Measuring preference orderings 4.3. Three different environmental problems 4.4. Avoiding response effects 5. Rational choice 5.1. Conditions of rational choice 5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice 5.3. Choice of strategy 5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule 5.5. Conclusion 6. Consistency of motives and preferences 6.1. A model of reasoned choice 6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness 6.3. The test of consistent preferences 6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases 6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter? 6.6. Conclusion 7. The non-equivalence of the cases 7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma 7.2. The model of the hardest case 7.3. The scalability of the cases 7.4. Conclusion 8. Reported behaviour 8.1. Determinants of behaviour 8.2. The sociocultural model 8.3. An alternative model 8.4. From motives to behaviour Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy? 9.1. Introduction to Part III 9.2. Acceptance and agreement 9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation 9.4. Conclusion 10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos? 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos 10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights? 10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences 10.5. The agreement response 10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview 11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation 11.1. Ranking preference orderings 11.2. The meta-ranking approach 11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment 11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking 11.5. An environmental meta-ranking 12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas 12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation 12.2. The reciprocity thesis 12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas 13. Assessing self regulation policies 13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas 13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation 13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases 13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos 13.5. Individual cost and collective gain 13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases 13.7. The dimension of private significance 13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real? 13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility 13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation Bibliography Index.

Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design: Frontmatter

Preface Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action 1.1. Can something be done? 1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action 1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actors perspective: rational choice 1.4. How motives speak to preferences 1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour 1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands 1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional? 1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design 2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation 2.3. The social instruments 2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma 2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based? 3. The actors perspective on collective action 3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory 3.2. Problems of collective action 3.3. Social dilemmas 3.4. The actors perspective Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement 4.1. Three potential social dilemmas 4.2. Measuring preference orderings 4.3. Three different environmental problems 4.4. Avoiding response effects 5. Rational choice 5.1. Conditions of rational choice 5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice 5.3. Choice of strategy 5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule 5.5. Conclusion 6. Consistency of motives and preferences 6.1. A model of reasoned choice 6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness 6.3. The test of consistent preferences 6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases 6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter? 6.6. Conclusion 7. The non-equivalence of the cases 7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma 7.2. The model of the hardest case 7.3. The scalability of the cases 7.4. Conclusion 8. Reported behaviour 8.1. Determinants of behaviour 8.2. The sociocultural model 8.3. An alternative model 8.4. From motives to behaviour Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy? 9.1. Introduction to Part III 9.2. Acceptance and agreement 9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation 9.4. Conclusion 10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos? 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos 10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights? 10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences 10.5. The agreement response 10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview 11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation 11.1. Ranking preference orderings 11.2. The meta-ranking approach 11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment 11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking 11.5. An environmental meta-ranking 12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas 12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation 12.2. The reciprocity thesis 12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas 13. Assessing self regulation policies 13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas 13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation 13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases 13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos 13.5. Individual cost and collective gain 13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases 13.7. The dimension of private significance 13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real? 13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility 13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation Bibliography Index.

Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design: Index

Preface Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action 1.1. Can something be done? 1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action 1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actors perspective: rational choice 1.4. How motives speak to preferences 1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour 1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands 1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional? 1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design 2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation 2.3. The social instruments 2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma 2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based? 3. The actors perspective on collective action 3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory 3.2. Problems of collective action 3.3. Social dilemmas 3.4. The actors perspective Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement 4.1. Three potential social dilemmas 4.2. Measuring preference orderings 4.3. Three different environmental problems 4.4. Avoiding response effects 5. Rational choice 5.1. Conditions of rational choice 5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice 5.3. Choice of strategy 5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule 5.5. Conclusion 6. Consistency of motives and preferences 6.1. A model of reasoned choice 6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness 6.3. The test of consistent preferences 6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases 6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter? 6.6. Conclusion 7. The non-equivalence of the cases 7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma 7.2. The model of the hardest case 7.3. The scalability of the cases 7.4. Conclusion 8. Reported behaviour 8.1. Determinants of behaviour 8.2. The sociocultural model 8.3. An alternative model 8.4. From motives to behaviour Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy? 9.1. Introduction to Part III 9.2. Acceptance and agreement 9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation 9.4. Conclusion 10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos? 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos 10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights? 10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences 10.5. The agreement response 10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview 11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation 11.1. Ranking preference orderings 11.2. The meta-ranking approach 11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment 11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking 11.5. An environmental meta-ranking 12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas 12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation 12.2. The reciprocity thesis 12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas 13. Assessing self regulation policies 13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas 13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation 13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases 13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos 13.5. Individual cost and collective gain 13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases 13.7. The dimension of private significance 13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real? 13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility 13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation Bibliography Index.

Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design: List of figures

Preface Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action 1.1. Can something be done? 1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action 1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actors perspective: rational choice 1.4. How motives speak to preferences 1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour 1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands 1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional? 1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design 2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation 2.3. The social instruments 2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma 2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based? 3. The actors perspective on collective action 3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory 3.2. Problems of collective action 3.3. Social dilemmas 3.4. The actors perspective Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement 4.1. Three potential social dilemmas 4.2. Measuring preference orderings 4.3. Three different environmental problems 4.4. Avoiding response effects 5. Rational choice 5.1. Conditions of rational choice 5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice 5.3. Choice of strategy 5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule 5.5. Conclusion 6. Consistency of motives and preferences 6.1. A model of reasoned choice 6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness 6.3. The test of consistent preferences 6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases 6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter? 6.6. Conclusion 7. The non-equivalence of the cases 7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma 7.2. The model of the hardest case 7.3. The scalability of the cases 7.4. Conclusion 8. Reported behaviour 8.1. Determinants of behaviour 8.2. The sociocultural model 8.3. An alternative model 8.4. From motives to behaviour Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy? 9.1. Introduction to Part III 9.2. Acceptance and agreement 9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation 9.4. Conclusion 10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos? 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos 10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights? 10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences 10.5. The agreement response 10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview 11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation 11.1. Ranking preference orderings 11.2. The meta-ranking approach 11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment 11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking 11.5. An environmental meta-ranking 12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas 12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation 12.2. The reciprocity thesis 12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas 13. Assessing self regulation policies 13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas 13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation 13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases 13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos 13.5. Individual cost and collective gain 13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases 13.7. The dimension of private significance 13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real? 13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility 13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation Bibliography Index.

Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design: Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action

Can something be done? The concern about environmental pollution in public policy and public opinion in the USA originates, according to former Vice President Al Gore, with the publication of Rachel Carsons Silent Spring (1962). Its publication made everyone aware of the negative effect of pesticides (DDT) on agricultural production. The environmental movement in Europe got off the ground with The Limits to Growth (1972), the report of the Club of Rome. Concern with the natural environment is nothing new. It dates back to seventeenth-century air pollution in London and to Thomas Malthuss warnings in the eighteenth century about the negative effects of population growth. However, there is an important difference between early and modern concerns. In the early days the public had no influence on the decisions of the political elite in handling environmental affairs. Nowadays, what politicians and policymakers propose or decide is closely followed by public opinion. The publication of Silent Spring created a shock effect in the USA. As a result DDT was banned and laws protecting clean air, land and water were introduced. The notion of limits to growth of the Club of Rome created a political climate that made environmental politics and policy both possible and necessary. Since 1972, many other studies have been published on the ozone layer, global warming and the greenhouse effect, and the irreversible decline of biodiversity. But no report has yet been able to match the impact of Silent Spring or The Limits to Growth .