Humberto Llavador

An Equal-Opportunity Approach to the Allocation of International Aid

How should international aid be distributed? The most common view is according to some utilitarian formula: in order to maximize the average growth rate of aid recipients or the growth rate of income of the class of recipient countries. Recently, the World Bank [7] has published a study demonstrating the importance of good economic management, within a recipient country, in transforming aid into economic growth. We identify good economic management with effort, and ask, how should aid be distributed to equalize opportunities [among recipient countries] for achieving growth, according to Roemers [5] theory of equal opportunity. In addition, we calculate how aid should be distributed according to a utilitarian view. Both the equal-opportunity and utilitarian recommendations are less compensatory than actual aid policy (they would give less to many African countries than present policy does). We discuss the results.

Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention

This paper distinguishes between electoral platforms and implemented policies through a non-trivial policy-setting process. Voters are sophisticated and may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Should we sustain? And if so, sustain what? Consumption or the quality of life? *

Sustainability has been largely replaced by discounted utilitarianism in contemporary climate-change economics. Our approach rejuvenates sustainability by expanding the conception of the quality of life, along the lines of the UN Human Development Reports, to include not only consumption, but also education, leisure, the stock of knowledge and the quality of the biosphere. We report on our results showing that the quality of life can be sustained forever at levels higher than present levels, while reducing GHG emissions to converge to carbon concentrations of 450 ppm. Here we repeat our optimization but substituting consumption for the quality of life. Our sustainability results carry over. As it should be expected, optimal consumption is higher when the objective is consumption rather than the quality of life, but not by much (7% higher). On the other hand, the stock of knowledge is twice as large, and education is four times as large. So if the ?true? social welfare index were consumption, a planner who ?mistakenly? maximized the quality of life would be making a relatively small error. But the converse error would be large. If the quality of life provides an appropriate welfare index, but the public policy aims at maximizing consumption, the quality of life would be reduced by 60%. The expansion of the concept of welfare beyond consumption renders possible responding to the climate-change challenge by moving away from energy-intensive commodities and towards less intensive ones, like knowledge, education, and leisure.

Voting with Preferences Over Margins of Victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Experiments in Political Economy

Voting and elections play dual roles as social choice systems. On the one hand, they act as a preference aggregation system: they are used to choose between different alternatives when citizens do not agree on their preferred choices. On the other hand, they act as an information aggregation system: when individuals share the same preferences but each has only partial information on the state of the world, a voting system can be used to aggregate the decentralized information, increasing the probability of choosing the best alternative.