Husain Sarkar

Empirical equivalence and underdetermination

Jarrett Leplin in A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism (1997) argues that if the thesis of empirical equivalence is cogent, then the thesis of underdetermination cannot even get off the ground. Part of Leplins argument rests on the claim that auxiliary hypotheses can be independently confirmed, thus enabling us to determine the epistemic worth of a theory. This, in turn, helps in determining about what we should be realists. Leplins claims are demonstrated to be problematic. Leplin wants, inconsistently, to use only those auxiliary hypotheses which dovetail with confirmed theories. Finally, a detail of Leplins argument is found wanting.

Annas: Virtuous Person, Relativism, and the Circularity Objection

This paper is informed by two principles: the Partiality Principle and the Impartiality Principle. Relying upon a relatively-unknown argument in Kant, the latter principle is stated and defended. The former principle is shown to be connected to Annas’ claim, in her theory of virtue ethics, that no mature, responsible adult wants to be told what to do, as well as to her developmental account of teaching and learning of virtue. I argue that Annas’ theory of virtue ethics is susceptible, as Kant’s theory is not, either to the Circularity Objection or (inclusive) to the Relativism Objection.

The Lockean Proviso

Within Robert Nozicks theory of justice as presented in his Anarchy, State and Utopia^ does the Lockean proviso dovetail with the theory of entitlement? The main burden of this paper is to establish that far from dovetailing, there is a serious conflict between the two. Nozicks theory of justice consists of at least three principles, namely, the principle of justice in acquisition, the principle of justice in transfer, and the principle of rectification of injustice. These principles treat the topics of how unheld things came to be held, how they came to be transferred, and how injustice in respect to them came to be corrected or rectified. Although Nozick does not provide a detailed philosophical picture of these principles of justice, he says enough about each of them by way of examples and explanations to constitute a powerful, criticizable doctrine.

Methodological appraisals, advice, and historiographical models

In the paper I examine (Section I) the best defense for the claim that methodologies shouldnot function heuristically (thesis-LW) as it appears in John Worrall. I then evaluate (Section II) his proposal of a criterion*M which is offered as a criterion for evaluating competing methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism, methodology of research programmes. etc. Finally, I consider (Section III) the consequences of arguments presented earlier (Section I and II) as they bear on the problem of selecting a historiographical model.I argue, among other things, (I) that thesis-LW is defended on some very dubious assumptions; (II) that Worralls criterion*M falters under three clear cases two of which at least*M should accomodate, and that part of*Ms failure can be linked to its being hooked to thesis-LW. By arguments analogous to the ones which serve*M, I show thatcontra John Worrall and John Watkins, thesis-LW is testable; finally, (III) if we accept arguments for thesis-LW and*M we are left with a skeptical conclusion with respect to the choice of a historiographical model which Worrall by parity of reasoning should accept, but does not.