Hussein Kassim

Exploring Governance in a Multi-Level Polity: A Policy Instruments Approach

The study of public policy instruments in national settings has contributed significantly to our understanding of policy, political systems, and relations between state and citizen. Its promise for the EU, where instrument-centred research has hitherto been limited in coverage and method, remains by contrast largely unfulfilled. This article discusses the political sociology approach to instruments, developed by Lascoumes and Le Galès as an alternative to the traditional functionalist perspective, and highlights its value in opening new perspectives on EU policy-making and its consequences. It presents an overview of the findings of an original set of case studies, which demonstrate the usefulness of the approach in providing new insights on classic questions of EU decision-making, uncovering hidden dimensions of EU policy development, and revealing the limits of the organisational capacity of the EU as a system, as well as challenging established narratives.

Policy networks, networks and European Union policy making: A sceptical view

The policy network approach and the networks model are the most recent conceptual frameworks to be applied to the policy‐making processes of the European Union and are regarded by many as the most appropriate. This article, while acknowledging their appeal, puts forward a sceptical view about the usefulness of their application to the EU. Three contentions are advanced about these approaches: first, that the fluidity of EU processes eludes their capture; second, that they are insufficiently sensitive to the EUs institutional complexity and fail to recognise the importance of EU institutions; and third, that they underestimate the difficulty of delineating networks involving the EU.1

‘Mission impossible’, but mission accomplished: the Kinnock reforms and the European Commission

The Kinnock reforms have unsurprisingly attracted attention, but important aspects have been overlooked in existing accounts. Closer inspection reveals three puzzles: an atypical pattern of administrative change, where a ‘big bang’ reform followed four decades of inaction; the adoption of a more radical set of measures by the Commission than was demanded of it; and the successful implementation of a far-reaching reform programme in defiance of the expectations of leading theories of administrative change. This article argues that these puzzles contradict the conclusion suggested by a casual reading of the developments. They reveal not an arrogant institution oblivious to its shortcomings and forced to change by external diktat, but an organization in a reform predicament: aware of its failings, but unable to remedy them through its own action. When crisis forced member governments to intervene, the Commission in a case of self-reform under delegation seized the ‘once-in-a-generation’ opportunity to implement an internal reform agenda.

The Kinnock Reforms in Perspective: Why Reforming the Commission is an Heroic, But Thankless, Task

The European Commission is a latecomer to administrative reform. Virtually alone among public administrations, it was untouched by the tide of management reforms that were a feature of the 1980s and early 1990s. Although modest attempts at modernisation were undertaken by the Santer Commission, these were limited, fragmentary and partially successful at best (Pollitt and Bourkaert, 2000; Stevens and Stevens, 2001). Since 1999, however, the Commission has adopted a far-reaching reform programme that, in relation to that bodys size, tasks and responsibilities, is more comprehensive and radical than that undertaken by any other administration (Kassim, 2004). This article puts the reform programme implemented under the Prodi Commission into historical perspective. It argues, first, that only by approaching the Commission as an international organisation is it possible to explain both why reform failed to feature on its agenda for so long (see Siotis, 1965; Michelmann 1978; Claude 1971), and why the situation changed in 1999. It contends, second, that, though externally imposed and with elements prescribed by an outside body, the reform represents a significant achievement on the part of the Commission and, in particular, the reform Vice President, Neil Kinnock. The feat is all the more remarkable given the complexity of the EUs institutional environment and the short timescale within which the reform package was formulated and adopted. The article identifies problems, actual and potential, that may affect the ultimate success of the reform - a third aim. Finally, it contends that, in contrast to administrative reform at the national level (see Pollitt and Bourkeaert, 2000, p.6), there is little political capital to be made from Commission reform. The article is organised into four sections. The first discusses the non-occurrence of Commission reform for four decades after 1958. The second looks at the circumstances that brought about the Kinnock reforms, outlining the part played by the European Parliament and the European Council. The third examines the content of the reform programme and the nature of the reform strategy devised by the reform Vice President, focusing on how Kinnock sought to assert ownership over the reform, while at the same time using the opportunity to implement a full-scale modernisation programme. Potential difficulties are highlighted in the fourth.

Bringing Regulatory Processes Back In: The Reform of EU Antitrust and Merger Control

The dominant view in the literature depicts the modernisation of the antitrust rules and the reform of the Merger Regulation as a struggle for control between the European Commission and the member states, from which the Commission emerged triumphant. This article rejects this ‘power politics’ interpretation, arguing that its proponents misrepresent the reform process, overstate the power of the Commission, and overlook the wider ideational context that influences competition law and policy. Drawing on original research conducted by the authors, it argues that a regulatory processes perspective is more sensitive to the dynamics of decision-making and policy change in this key area. Re-interpreting the two reforms, it demonstrates that more was at play than a simple power struggle between the Commission and the member states, that the reforms were influenced by an international expert community, and that the outcome was shaped by classic techniques of regulatory conflict management.

Myths and Myth-Making in the European Union: The Institutionalization and Interpretation of EU Competition Policy

EU competition policy has become so strongly institutionalized that it is easy to overlook its precarious status in earlier decades. This article argues, first, that the Commission responded to the imperative arising from the extraordinary powers created by the treaty and the novelty of competition policy in post-war Europe by developing a series of myths to provide justification for its prerogatives. Second, these myths have played a key role in securing acceptance of EU policy, though other factors have also been important. Third, the official mythology has been supplemented by an interpretation which has become dominant in the law and political science literatures; namely, that EU competition policy has ordoliberal origins. This article challenges this view.

Managing the house: the Presidency, agenda control and policy activism in the European Commission

ABSTRACT Although the importance of international organizations is well-established, the specific contribution made to their policy outputs by administrative as opposed to political actors is rarely investigated. Still less attention is paid to how intra-organizational factors within international administrations affect the latter’s capacity to influence those outputs. Even in the case of the European Union, where the European Commission’s power over decisional outputs has been a long-standing interest, this issue has not been fully explored. Scholars have focused on horizontal factors, but have not addressed how vertical relations affect the Commission’s policy activism and therefore its influence on EU outputs. By examining how the transformation of power relations within the Commission has changed as a consequence of the strengthening of the Commission Presidency, this contribution fills that lacuna. Showing how a strong President has been able to control the Commission’s output, it demonstrates the importance of vertical relations as a variable.

The European Commission and the future of Europe

Abstract This article examines the Commissions preferences and preference formation in relation to the Convention and the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty. Opposing rational choice accounts, which explain Commission action in terms of the tendency of bureaucratic actors to seek to maximize power, status and opportunities, it argues that the Commission is best seen as an internally differentiated arena, from which preferences emerge as a result of complex interactions that entail the use of power, institutionalized myths and routines. It contends that the Commission was an ineffective performer in the debate on the future of Europe. As well as committing tactical and strategic mistakes, the Commission was disadvantaged by the explicitly political nature of the exercise and the opportunity structure of the Convention compared to previous IGCs. A third argument is that the ratification and post-ratification process reveal the current limitations on the Commissions ability to influence debates about the future of the Union. Its historic vocation as the engine of integration implies one course of action, while being cast as part of the problem suggests another.

French autonomy and the European Union

Abstract This article considers the changing nature of Frances relationship with the EC/EU. It looks at how Frances ability to define the shape and direction of integration for much of the postwar period has been eroded since the implementation of the Single European Act, and how German unification has altered the balance of power within the Franco‐German alliance, so precipitating a crisis in France about ‘Europe’. Though the impact of the EU has often been exaggerated, the consequences of European action have been significant, contributing to the change in French economic policy and the transformation of the capacities of the French state.

The Commission: boxed in and constrained, but still an engine of integration

Abstract In the debate about the impact of the eurozone crisis on the EU’s institutional balance, antagonists have often argued past each other. Supporters of the new intergovernmentalism contend that the European Council has supplanted the European Commission in policy leadership, while scholars who hold that the EU executive has been a winner of the crisis highlight the new management functions it has acquired. This article argues, first, that an accurate assessment of the institutional balance requires a more global evaluation of the Commission, acknowledging external and internal dynamics. Second, it contends that the crisis did not cause a Commission retreat but accelerated a process already underway that finds its origins in the presidentialisation of policy control. The adoption of fewer legislative proposals during the crisis was due to the ability and choice of a strong president to focus the attention on crisis-related areas. The broader lesson is that rather than marking a further step in the decline of the Commission, the crisis reveals how the centralisation of power within the institution and its expanded management duties have enhanced its capacity to take strategic action. The Commission’s role as an engine of integration will therefore endure, but in a different guise.