Ian Van der Waag
Stellenbosch University
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Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2012
Ian Van der Waag
South Africa was ill prepared for the Second World War. Her war potential was limited and Hitler is reputed to have laughed when the South African declaration came on 6 September 1939. The Permanent and Active Citizen Forces were under strength: the first comprised only 350 officers and some five thousand men. There were a further 122 000 men in the Commandos, of whom only 18 000 were reasonably equipped, and, being rurally based and overwhelmingly Afrikaans, many of these men did not support the war effort. Furthermore, training and training facilities were inadequate, there was a shortage of uniforms and equipment and, like the rest of the British Commonwealth, much of the doctrine had not kept pace with technological developments. This predicament developed over the preceding twenty years. The mechanisation of ground forces and the application of new technology for war contrasted sharply with developments in Europe. Although South Africa had the industrial capacity for the development of armour and mechanised forces, arguments based upon the nature of potential enemy forces, poor infrastructure and terrain inaccessibility combined with government policy and financial stringency resulted in nothing being done. Southern Africa, the focus of South African defence policy, was also thought to be unfavourable for mechanised warfare. Inadequate roads and multifarious geographic features concentrated energy on the development of the air arm for operations in Africa and a system of coastal defences to repel a sea assault, as well as a mix of British and Boer-type infantry supported by field artillery. As a result, an expeditionary force had to be prepared from scratch and the first South Africans to serve in the Second World War only left the country in July 1940. Yet the close relationship between the projected role of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and the low priority given to force maintenance and weapons acquisition has been perceived by few writers.
First World War Studies | 2013
Ian Van der Waag
The German South-West Africa campaign and the battle at Sandfontein, which marked the first foreign deployment of the Union Defence Forces (UDF), as well as its first active participation in a war, are now largely forgotten. Yet this belies the importance of the campaign and of the first-battle experience at Sandfontein, for in many ways this was significantly unlike subsequent military operations of the German South-West Africa campaign and the wider South African participation in the First World War. This article uses the campaign as a lens through which to analyse the nature and organization of the UDF in 1914 and to assess the difficulties the South African staffs faced. South African military thinking, in terms of how it shaped Sandfontein and was in turn affected by that first-battle experience, is also investigated.The German South-West Africa campaign and the battle at Sandfontein, which marked the first foreign deployment of the Union Defence Forces (UDF), as well as its first active participation in a war, are now largely forgotten. Yet this belies the importance of the campaign and of the first-battle experience at Sandfontein, for in many ways this was significantly unlike subsequent military operations of the German South-West Africa campaign and the wider South African participation in the First World War. This article uses the campaign as a lens through which to analyse the nature and organization of the UDF in 1914 and to assess the difficulties the South African staffs faced. South African military thinking, in terms of how it shaped Sandfontein and was in turn affected by that first-battle experience, is also investigated.
Journal of Family History | 2007
Ian Van der Waag
Based largely on a study of two collections of private papers housed at Petworth House and Hagley Hall (United Kingdom), this article analyzes the domestic politics within an early twentieth-century South African household. It explores the apparent motives behind the creation by Hugh and Maud Wyndham of an ostentatious, gentrified lifestyle in urban Johannesburg, where their home soon became a cocoon of Britishness in an increasingly uncomfortable part of the empire. It reveals the often difficult relationships between them and their servants and among the servants themselves; from hiring and firing, to the servant hierarchy and their different duties, to the rapid and enduring impact of the First World War. Yet, as many servants realized, service in “a good house” held certain compensations and equipped some for transition to their own domestic life.Based largely on a study of two collections of private papers housed at Petworth House and Hagley Hall (United Kingdom), this article analyzes the domestic politics within an early twentieth-century South African household. It explores the apparent motives behind the creation by Hugh and Maud Wyndham of an ostentatious, gentrified lifestyle in urban Johannesburg, where their home soon became a cocoon of Britishness in an increasingly uncomfortable part of the empire. It reveals the often difficult relationships between them and their servants and among the servants themselves; from hiring and firing, to the servant hierarchy and their different duties, to the rapid and enduring impact of the First World War. Yet, as many servants realized, service in “a good house” held certain compensations and equipped some for transition to their own domestic life.
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2017
Ian Van der Waag
The Union of South Africa was a twentieth century experiment in state formation. Forged in May 1910, the Union lasted until its submergence into the Republic of South Africa fifty-one years later. The period might conveniently be considered in four timespans. The first was the age of Botha and Smuts (1910-24) and their policy of reconciliation between English and Afrikaans South Africans, who had come recently through a violent war, the latter seeing their two republics subsumed first into the British Empire and then into the Union in 1910. The second time span, of similar length, was marked by the prime ministership of Hertzog (1924-39) and his South Africa First policy. Hertzog’s fifteen years in power was arguably the quietest in terms of military activity. The return of Smuts to power (1939-48) marks the third period, while the advent of the first Nationalist governments under Malan and then Strydom and Verwoerd (1948-61) to the coming of the republic marks the fifth
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2017
Ian Van der Waag
The First World War marked a revolt against the traditional mode of official history as conceived and written by the General Staffs and taught at the Staff Colleges. After 1918, the publics in various countries, having experienced massed mobilisation and the impact of total warfare, demanded an explanation for the sacrifices so many had been called on to make. This more inclusive approach rejected the nineteenth-century, Staff College predilection for campaign narratives focussing narrowly on “lessons learned”. The South African tradition of official history dates from this period. This article outlines the creation of the first military archival organisation in Pretoria and analyses the South African First World War official history programme. It explores the apparent motives behind the programme and reveals the often-difficult relationships between the historians and their principals at Defence Headquarters and the tensions between the two modes of official history.
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2017
Ian Van der Waag
It was with great sadness that we heard of the sudden passing of Professor Jeffrey Grey in Canberra on 26 July 2016. Jeff was a model military historian. He represented the best of our profession and espoused, often stridently, the merits of history as a discipline, its relevance to armed forces as organisations, and as its importance as a pillar in the education of military and naval officers. We were most fortunate to have had Jeff on our editorial board at Scientia Militaria from 2000.
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2016
Ian Van der Waag
We learned with great sadness that Lieutenant Colonel Deon Visser, who joined the Military Academy community in 1986, passed away on 23 May 2016. Deon was a close colleague, a kind and loyal friend, a respected military officer, and an esteemed military historian. He was these things to all who knew him.
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2013
Ian Van der Waag
South Africa’s decision to enter the First World War was not easy. After a difficult interplay between Whitehall and Tuinhuis, the Botha government agreed to secure limited strategic objectives in neighbouring German South West Africa. An armed insurrection had to be suppressed first. When both these objects were achieved, and following a further British appeal, South African troops moved further afield. This move, representing South Africa’s second ‘little bit’, was a dangerous step for the Botha government. The despatch of troops to France was controversial. Yet, by the end of 1915, South African expeditionary forces were en route to Europe and East Africa. This paper investigates the political crisis in South Africa and the difficult decision to send troops out of Africa, their deployment in an environment entirely foreign to the South African way of war, and the impact of the Western Front on the drawing of ‘lessons’ by post-war Union authorities.
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2013
Ian Van der Waag; Deon Visser
2012 has a double significance for this year sees the centenary of the founding of the African National Congress (8 January) and of the creation of the Union Defence Forces (1 July), two organisations that have for much of the twentieth century shared a contested history. Yet, in a remarkable bouleversement, South Africa has come through this difficult past and, over the past two decades, a new South African society has been recreated following an interesting period of adjustment following the end of the Cold War and the growth of democracy in the developing world. These changes have necessarily affected her armed forces and the roles defined for them. Some commentators, particularly in the years immediately following 1994, asserted that military power had lost all of its vaunted, Cold-War importance in a new postmodern environment. Others still, recognising future challenges, argued that South Africa, beset with far-reaching socio-economic crises, could no longer afford the burden of military forces. Most scholars agree now that these perspectives were short-sighted and that, while the risk of major conflict has receded, the events of 9/11, and its consequences, demonstrate that the continental and international landscapes are less certain, less stable and less predictable, than that for which many had hoped. Clearly, South African interests are intertwined inextricably in regional and global affairs and if she is to protect these interests and ensure her security, she must maintain credible military force capable of meeting an array of contingencies. It was with this in mind that the strategic arms deal, since the subject of much debate, was passed by parliament: [i] the promise of a full technological transformation, to accompany the human transformation, offered. [i] J Sylvester & A Seegers. “South Africa’s Strategic Arms Package: A Critical Analysis”. Scientia Militaria 36/1. 2008. 52-77.
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies | 2012
Ian Van der Waag
The need for a South African expeditionary force was again experienced only twoyears after the end of the First World War. The border conflicts and minor warswhich followed the treaties signed in Paris in 1919 and 1920, emphasized the factthat South Africa required infantry, artillery and engineer units which could bemobilized into an effective task force. The war in Asia Minor (1920-1923), inparticular, revealed severe inadequacies in both the organization of the UnionDefence Force and the defence policy of the Empire.