Ian Worthington

A companion to Greek rhetoric

nouns, 53 Academy (Plato’s), 70, 108, 112, 118, 135, 360, 384, 386, 390 Academy (Isocrates’), 384, 386 Acanthus/Acanthians, 224 Achaean League, 274–275, 278, 280

The duration of an Athenian political trial

The procedures involved in, and duration of, Athenian trials have been the subject of much attention, and it is the communis opinio that a public trial in Athens lasted for one day only. Yet the evidence for this is mostly circumstantial and difficulties arise when one tries to reconcile a lengthy trial, as evidenced by the existence of very long speeches, with a one-day trial period. The purpose of this note is to question the standard view and to put forward the suggestion that certain trials could extend up to two or three days in length. By way of introduction we may summarize what evidence we have. According to AP 67.1 only one public (as distinct from private) case per day was tried in a court of law and the modern assumption is that the issue had to be resolved by the end of that day. Therefore, the speeches of both prosecution and defence were of a fixed length of time and measured by the κλeψύδρα . This was a large amphora with a plugged hole at the bottom which was filled with water.

The chronology of the Harpalus affair

In this article I propose an alternative and, I hope, more precise chronological scheme for the Harpalus affair (324/3) than the schemes advanced before, notably by Badian, Jaschinski and Will. The major events of the period, such as the flight of Harpalus from Athens, the date of publication of the Areopagus’ ảπoφασισ and the subsequent trials of those accused of taking bribes from Harpalus are, I believe, linked to the departure of the Athenian embassy to Alexander over the Exiles Decree and its return.

The First Flight of Harpalus Reconsidered

The first flight of Harpalus is an enigma, more so than his second flight taking place some ten years later in 324, the motives for which are more apparent.

Audience Reaction, Performance and the Exploitation of Delivery in the Courts and Assembly

The similarities between performance in the theatre and in the law courts and Assembly have beenwell studied.1 All three venueswere quite different inwhat they represented andwhat an audience expected—noonewas actually on trial in a theatre, even though trials formed part of the plots of both tragedies and comedies, and while domestic and foreign affairs were often an integral part of a forensic speech, no judge when casting his vote knew that he was influencing his city’s public policy. Despite the differences in what these three venues were about, there is the one common denominator of the performer—the actor on stage, the politician on the bēma and the prosecutor or the defendant before the judges. It has been rightly concluded that the orator in court or in the Assembly was often as much an actor as his professional counterpart on stage—nothing has changed over the centuries, as Reagan’s famous quip, “How can a president not be an actor?”, testifies. Performance mattered, something ancient critics made clear. Thus Dionysius of Halicarnassus, like Aristotle in Rh. 3.12 and Demetrius in Eloc. 271, argued that debate and especially delivery, which included intonation, gesture, gaze and movement—in other words, acting—were essential parts of political and forensic speeches. Performance and delivery were arguably so inextricably linked that they were even synonymous, with both involving all aspects of how a speech was given to, and especially received by, its audience. In this chapter, I focus on the means of delivery that speakers used to exploit their audience’s reaction in the court or the Assembly for the optimum rhetorical effect. Given the importance