Ibolya Schindele

Theft and Syndication in Venture Capital Finance

We analyze the incentive problems that arise from the possibility for idea theft in the venture capital context, where the success of a start-up firm hinges on the unobservable efforts of both an entrepreneur, and a venture capitalist. The risk of idea theft is shown to destroy the entrepreneurs research effort incentives, thereby reducing the likelihood of innovation, and the value of the start-up firm ex ante. When idea theft is potentially verifiable ex post, the threat of litigation can solve the incentive problems for some projects. However, it is insufficient whenever a projects profit potential is sufficiently large, and whenever the ex ante probability that theft will be verifiable ex post is too small. Investment syndication is shown to offer a potential solution for the latter type of projects. The models novel empirical predictions pertain to the relationship between the project characteristics, the size and the structure of a VC syndicate, and the probability of successful innovation.

Social Capital and the Viability of Stakeholder-Oriented Firms: Evidence from Norwegian Savings Banks

Stakeholder oriented governance systems are often thought to hamper efficiency. We show that social capital improves the viability of stakeholder-oriented firms in competitive markets. Studying exits from the population of Norwegian savings banks after deregulations, we find that banks located in communities with high social capital have a higher probability of survival. We propose that social capital facilitates collective decision-making, ensuring that banks internalize the preferences of the community in return for continued community patronage. Consistently, we find that in high social capital areas banks operate with lower interest rate margins, lower returns on assets, and lower loan losses.

In Lands of Foreign Currency Credit, Bank Lending Channels Run Through?

We analyze the differential impact of domestic and foreign monetary policy on the local supply of bank credit in domestic and foreign currencies. We analyze a novel, supervisory dataset from Hungary that records all bank lending to firms including its currency denomination. Accounting for time-varying firm-specific heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that a lower domestic interest rate expands the supply of credit in the domestic but not in the foreign currency. A lower foreign interest rate on the other hand expands lending by lowly versus highly capitalized banks relatively more in the foreign than in the domestic currency.

Pricing Initial Public Offerings in Premature Capital Markets: The Case of Hungary

This paper investigates the determinants of underpricing at initial public offerings in the Hungarian Initial Public Offerings (IPO) market in 1990-1998, a period of transition from socialist to market economy and immaturity of the domestic capital market. The evidence suggests that political issues played a significant role in the process: we have found greater discount at privatization IPOs than at private issues, and a positive relation between underpricing and the proportion of shares offered for compensation coupons. These findings reinforce the hypothesis that governments in transition may pursue political objectives by selling shares at discount. Besides, the results show larger initial returns at early IPOs compared to later issues, which implies a negative relation between the discount and the maturing of the capital market. Most of the asymmetric information theories, empirically justified for well-developed stock markets, receive no support. Some results suggest that the transition related determinants of underpricing disappear as the securities market becomes more mature.

Monetáris politika és a bankok hitelkínálata. Vállalati adatokon alapuló elemzés

Noveli-e az alacsony kamatlab a banki hitelkinalatot? Tanulmanyunkban egy magyar, vallalati szintű hiteladatbazis panelstrukturaban tortenő elemzesevel keressuk a valaszt a kerdesre. Kashyap-Stein [2000] identifikacios modszeret vallalati es idő fix hatasokkal kiegeszitve teszteljuk a feltetelezest, hogy a kamatok csokkenese kulonbozőkeppen befolyasolja-e az alacsony es a magas sajattőke- hanyaddal rendelkező bankok hitelkinalatat. Azt talaljuk, hogy a kamatlab csokkeneset kovetően az alacsony tőkehanyadu bankok nagyobb valoszinűseggel nyujtanak hitelt uj felvevőknek, es novelik kihelyezett hitelosszegeiket mar meglevő adosaik szamara, mint a magas tőkehanyadu bankok. Robusztussagi becsleseink azt tanusitjak, hogy valoban a bankok sajattőke-hanyada, nem pedig likviditasi hanyada, teljes eszkozerteke vagy tulajdonosi szerkezete korrelal a hitelkinalati reakcio erőssegevel. Megmutatjuk, hogy ezek az eredmenyeink fennalltak a valsag előtti időszakban is, es fuggetlenek a mintankban szereplő cegek meretetől. Elemzeseinkből arra kovetkeztetunk, hogy Magyarorszagon a vizsgalt időszakban (2005-2011) a kamatlab befolyasolta a hitelkinalat merteket.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Kod: E51, E52, G21.