Ida Claudia Panetta

IT Governance: Who Cares More? First Evidence from EU Banks and Supervisors

This chapter analyses IT governance disclosure for a sample of 12 EU banks (from Italy, Germany, France and Spain) to observe if, how and where banks report on their IT governance issues and to verify if after the crises, banks have started to pay more attention to IT governance. Since IT governance (like other aspects of banking business) can be influenced by the regulatory environment we examine whether any differences in Supervisors’ attitude to IT issues induce differences in IT governance across countries. Regarding IT governance transparency, as a key mechanism of corporate governance, we: i) outline an original IT governance framework; ii) perform a content analysis on banks public disclosure and a selected number of Supervisors’ official documents (2008–2015) to build up IT governance indices; and iii) run a multidimensional analysis to detect causal relationships between variables.

Regulatory Framework and Supervisory Authorities in Microcredit Sector: A Comparative Analysis

The microcredit system in Morocco is considered one of the best and most advanced in all North Africa. It is regulated by Law No. 18-97 (published in the Official Gazette of 1 April 1999), whose art. 1 establishes: “Microcredit associations are those created in compliance with the provisions of Dahir No. 1-58-376 of 3 January (15 November 1958), which regulates the right of association aimed at providing micro-loans”. Articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 18-97: Define micro-loans as loans granted to economically disadvantaged individuals and aimed at starting or supporting enterprises, achieving thus their economic inclusion (art. 2); Set the maximum amount of micro-loans (established with special decree) in the amount of 50,000 Dirhams (DH, around 5,000 USD, art. 2); Establish that non-profit associations created pursuant the 1958 Dahir Act are entitled to engage in the microcredit business; All microcredit associations must be authorised by the Ministry of Finance to carry out the microcredit business as well as all complementary and instrumental activities, such as training, technical support and assistance, but they cannot engage in traditional banking services by receiving public money on current account, savings or similar (in accordance with article 2 of the Dahir No. 1-93-147 of 6 July 1993).

Mapping Microcredit Institutions/Operators: A Comparative Analysis

The microcredit sector developed in the early 1990s under the impulse of the national legislator and the international aid programme.’ The existence of Apex organizations for centralizing international aid and redistributing funds has probably improved international donors’ participation (Allaire et al., 2009). In fact, financial contributions by international agencies EIB and USAID2 were the key for the growth of the microcredit industry in Morocco.

The Microcredit Guarantee Funds an Institutions. A Comparative Analysis

Credit guarantee schemes are one option to facilitate microenterprises and SME’s in accessing the credit market. The credit guarantee schemes represent a vast and heterogeneous number of realities worldwide, usually classified into two main categories: guarantee companies (or institutions) and guarantee programmes.

Key Factors in Delisting Process in Italy: Empirical Evidence

We investigated the characteristics and motives of Italian voluntary delisting observing a period of eleven years, 2001 to 2011. The final sample is made up of 53 industrial companies, compared with a control sample of 106 companies still listed in the period. Main goal is to assess if any signals can predict a delisting operation for listed companies in Italy and if Italian market shows differences with previous investigation in Continental Europe and US. Practical implications of results achieved can help to highlight on Public to Private phenomenon in Italy, still not enough observed considering the high number of delisted companies in the last decade relating to a relative small number of listed companies

Credit Guarantee Institutions, Performance and Risk Analysis: An Experimental Scoring

The credit guarantee consortia (known as Confidi) are a major phenomenon in Italy, since they play different roles in the relationship between banks and enterprises. They offer mutualistic guarantees aimed at alleviating financial constraints on their small or medium-sized (SMEs) shareholding or syndicated enterprises.

The Guarantee System in Spain

There has always been a significant presence of SMEs in Spain, both in numerical terms and as far as their contribution to the development of the economy is concerned; however, it was only in 1978 that the so-called Sociedades de Guarantia Reciproca (SGRs) were introduced in the country as non-profit-making mutualistic companies whose mission is to support SMEs through guarantee-granting activities. In spite of their having a rather recent history, Spanish SGRs represent today an interesting interpretation of the mutualistic guarantee institution model, combining the interests of policy-makers, SMEs and banks. Today, SGRs are supervised financial intermediaries offering guarantees to their own shareholders, subject to the supervisory activity of the Bank of Spain (BoS). The starting point of the analysis conducted in the present chapter is the legal and regulatory framework of reference, which, on the one hand, defines the scope of action and the operational procedures of the field and, on the other hand, proves useful for comprehending the role assigned by policy-makers to this ‘instrument’ in supporting SMEs. An in-depth examination follows, regarding the morphology of the guarantee system, including considerations of the relations established with enterprises (such as shareholders and users of services provided), with the public sector (both national and local) and with the banking system. Moreover, after having clarified their operational procedures, the performance of SGRs has been analysed in order to evaluate, on the basis of the limited data available, the benefits enjoyed by SMEs and the economic and financial sustainability of guarantee institutions. Finally, the last section provides an analysis of the interventions implemented by policy-makers supporting SMEs during the recent crisis, employing SGRs as a means of transmission.

Going Dark in Italy: Empirical Evidence on Last Decade

The purpose of the paper is to examine the characteristics and motives of Italian voluntary Public to Private transactions (PTPs) between 2001 and 2011 observing a final sample of more than 53 industrial companies, compared with a control sample of 106 companies still listed in the period. Main goal is to assess if any signals can predict a going private operation for listed companies in Italy and, if positive, Italian market shows differences with previous investigation in Continental Europe and US. Most of going private research is based on US samples, starting from 1980s, and on UK sample, both characterize by distinctive features related to governance (i.e., degree of openness of share capital, ability to control shareholder capital with low percentage). On the contrary, Italian market is closely characterized by presence of large shareholder, as family owner or historical owner, as observed for a large number of listed companies in Continental Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002). After having briefly reviewed main contribution from most recent literature, this work provides test of different hypotheses trying to explain the delisting phenomenon In Italy considering a wide range of motivations. Practical implications of results achieved can help to highlight on Public to Private phenomenon in Italy, still not enough observed considering the high number of delisted companies in the last decade relating to a relative small number of listed companies.