Ignacio Requejo

Do Family Firms Use Dividend Policy as a Governance Mechanism? Evidence from the Euro Zone

Manuscript Type. Empirical. Research Question/Issue. This study investigates whether family firms use dividend policy as a corporate governance mechanism to overcome agency problems between the controlling family and minority investors. We further account for deviations between ownership and control and consider the presence and identity of other large shareholders in family companies. Research Findings/Insights. Based on a sample of firms from nine Eurozone countries and using a panel data method, we find that family firms distribute higher and more stable dividends to alleviate expropriation concerns of minority investors. However, the higher dividend payments are mainly explained by family firms with no separation between the largest owners voting and cash flow rights and those with non‐family second blockholders. Theoretical/Academic Implications. We contribute to the literature by shedding light on how the family business model affects companies’ dividend preferences. Our research also highlights the importance of taking into account the identity of large shareholders, especially in a context in which concentrated ownership structures are commonplace. The reported differences in dividend policies between family and non‐family firms help to clarify the variant performances of family businesses found in previous studies. Practitioner/Policy Implications. Family firms should regard dividend policy as a governance tool that allows them to attract prospective investors and enlarge their shareholder base. Simultaneously, minority investors can benefit from family firms’ dividend decisions. Our evidence also suggests that European policy makers should lay the necessary foundations to prevent controlling families from adopting ownership structures that serve their own personal interests.

Does Family Control Shape Corporate Capital Structure? An Empirical Analysis of Eurozone Firms

This study investigates the relationship between family control and corporate capital structure considering the dynamic nature of the debt policy and the ownership structure of family firms. Our results show that the sensitivity of debt to fluctuations in cash flow is less pronounced in family firms and highlight that family control increases the speed of adjustment toward target debt. Four dimensions of the family business model explain these results: deviations of voting from cash flow rights, the presence of a second blockholder in the company, involvement of family members in management, and the generation in charge of the business. The weaker negative impact of cash flow on debt is driven by family firms with no control-enhancing mechanisms, companies with active family participation in management and family businesses that are still controlled by the first generation. By contrast, the more severe agency conflicts between owners and creditors in family firms with a second blockholder lead to more pronounced pecking order behaviour. Furthermore, the higher flexibility in corporate decision-making of family firms managed by the family and under the influence of the first generation explains why family companies are able to rebalance their capital structure faster.

Governance and Family Firms

This authoritative collection provides a broad overview of the role that family firms, both those publicly listed and privately held, play in the global economy. The editors have selected seminal papers which investigate how the family business model affects firm performance and corporate decision making, and contribute to disentangling the interrelations that exist between family control of corporations and other governance mechanisms. Given the relevance of corporate governance and family firms for the economy and society as a whole, the present collection constitutes a point of reference for family business researchers, practitioners and policymakers alike. A better understanding of family firms is of paramount importance because these companies are the main drivers of economic growth all over the world. The volume, with an original introduction by the editors, will be an excellent source of reference for students, practitioners and researchers in the field of governance and family firms.