Ilka Weber

Electronic Negotiations – A Generic Approach with Action Systems

This paper proposes a domain-independent generic trading platform that provides various auction and negotiation types. Requirements of the platform in the “generic” context, e.g. domain-independency, reusability, and flexibility, are identified and characterised. We propose two comprehensive concepts provided by the generic platform: (i) a basic order structure, and (ii) a basic transaction process. The generic order presents a domain-independent structure defined by multiple attributes. The basic transaction process is modelled at a high level of abstraction respectively various auction and negotiation protocols. Considering the basic transaction process as an action system leads to a finite sequence of states. Hence, the sequence of states is not fixed, and each state can be individually parameterised. These characteristics enable an individual configuration of an abstract execution model for negotiation processes and thus provides genericity in electronic negotiations.

Second-Best Combinatorial Auctions - The Case of the Pricing-Per-Column Mechanism

One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-proof and more importantly allocative efficient. The VCG mechanism retains its properties for combinatorial allocation problems. From a computational perspective the VCG has to solve two problems: (1) the winner-determination (2) the determination of the prices. However, both problems are complex (NP-hard), when complementarities are present. The pricing-per-column (PPC) auction is another approach to solve the combinatorial allocation problem. In essence, it applies the Vickrey principle to any possible combination of goods and determines the overall winning bids. PPC is computationally less demanding, however, it can be shown that PPC is not necessarily efficient. Apparently, solving the tension between computational and game-theoretic properties is a challenging task in mechanism design. Engineering auctions suggests to lower requirements upon the auction. In this paper the evaluation of the PPC concerning approximate efficiency is presented - in an analytical and simulative evaluation the PPC is compared to the VCG and it is shown that the efficiency losses incurred by the PPC mechanism are very small

Online Auctions: Insights into the First Bidder Discount

Internet auctions like Amazon or eBay use an ascending bid auction as the basic auction format. This basic auction format can be augmented by various price features: the First Bidder Discount is one example. In a First Bidder Discount auction the bidder receives a discount on the price to pay if the bidder was the first to place a bid. The objective of this paper is to analyse this mechanism and to present a theoretical model describing the rules of a discount auction. Furthermore, an analysis of bidder behaviour and the timing of bids in internet auctions that include an added discount is investigated.

Implementing complex market structures with metamarkets

One theoretical approach to designing and constructing complex market structures is the concept of Cascading Dynamic Market Models (cDMMs). CDMMs allow the configuration and combination of multiple market models. MetaMarkets is presented here as an implementation concept for complex market structures. MetaMarkets form a concatenation of a set of markets and rules that represent relations between single market structures and their environment. Various market model combinations and their representation are discussed, and a communication method with the environment presented. MetaMarkets lead to a layered software architecture that we briefly depict.

CAME-Toolsuite meet2trade - auf dem Weg zum Computer Aided Market Engineering. Abschlussbericht des Projekts Electronic Financial Brokerage als wissensintensive Dienstleistung - ein generischer Ansatz (EFB)

Die zunehmende Verbreitung von elektronischen Markten aber auch die Fehlentwicklungen der letzten Jahre zeigen, dass eine strukturierte Vorgehensweise bei der Gestaltung und Implementierung elektronischer Markte nicht nur sinnvoll, sondern auch notwendig ist. Ein wichtiger Schritt in diese Richtung wurde mit der im Rahmen des Projekts Electronic Financial Brokerage (EFB) entwickelten CAME-Toolsuite meet2trade gegangen.meet2trade unterstutzt den gesamten Prozess des Market Engineering von der Planung und dem Design eines elektronischen Marktes bis hin zu seiner Einfuhrung.