Ilse Van Damme

Motivation Matters: Differing Effects of Pre-Goal and Post-Goal Emotions on Attention and Memory

People often show enhanced memory for information that is central to emotional events and impaired memory for peripheral details. The intensity of arousal elicited by an emotional event is commonly held to be the mechanism underlying memory narrowing, with the implication that all sources of emotional arousal should have comparable effects. Discrete emotions differ in their effects on memory, however, with some emotions broadening rather than narrowing the range of information attended to and remembered. Thus, features of emotion other than arousal appear to play a critical role in memory narrowing. We review theory and research on emotional memory narrowing and argue that motivation matters. Recent evidence suggests that emotions experienced prior to goal attainment or loss lead to memory narrowing whereas emotions experienced after goal attainment or loss broaden the range of information encoded in memory. The motivational component of emotion is an important but understudied feature that can help to clarify the conditions under which emotions enhance and impair attention and memory.

Emotion and False Memory

Emotional memories are vivid and lasting but not necessarily accurate. Under some conditions, emotion even increases people’s susceptibility to false memories. This review addresses when and why emotion leaves people vulnerable to misremembering events. Recent research suggests that pregoal emotions—those experienced before goal attainment or failure (e.g., hope, fear)—narrow the scope of people’s attention to information that is central to their goals. This narrow focus can impair memory for peripheral details, leaving people vulnerable to misinformation concerning those details. In contrast, postgoal emotions—those experienced after goal attainment or failure (e.g., happiness, sadness)—broaden the scope of attention leaving people more resistant to misinformation. Implications for legal contexts, such as emotion-related errors in eyewitness testimony, are discussed.

Mood and the DRM paradigm: An investigation of the effects of valence and arousal on false memory

Recent studies regarding the effect of mood on the DRM (Deese–Roediger–McDermott) illusion have not been able to clearly establish yet whether valence or arousal is most critical in determining sus...

Memory loss versus memory distortion: The role of encoding and retrieval deficits in Korsakoff patients’ false memories

Recent studies with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm have revealed that Korsakoff patients show reduced levels of false recognition and different patterns of false recall compared to controls. The present experiment examined whether this could be attributed to an encoding deficit, or rather to problems with explicitly retrieving thematic information at test. In a variation on the DRM paradigm, both patients and controls were presented with associative as well as categorised word lists, with the order of recall and recognition tests manipulated between-subjects. The results point to an important role for the automatic/controlled retrieval distinction: Korsakoff patients’ false memory was only diminished compared to controls’ when automatic or short-term memory processes could not be used to fulfil the task at hand. Hence, the patients’ explicit retrieval deficit appears to be crucial in explaining past and present data. Results are discussed in terms of fuzzy-trace and activation-monitoring theories.

Emotion and false memory: How goal-irrelevance can be relevant for what people remember

ABSTRACT Elaborating on misleading information concerning emotional events can lead people to form false memories. The present experiment compared participants’ susceptibility to false memories when they elaborated on information associated with positive versus negative emotion and pregoal versus postgoal emotion. Pregoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure is anticipated but has not yet occurred (e.g., hope and fear). Postgoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure has already occurred (e.g., happiness and devastation). Participants watched a slideshow depicting an interaction between a couple and were asked to empathise with the protagonists feelings of hope (positive pregoal), happiness (positive postgoal), fear (negative pregoal), or devastation (negative postgoal); in control conditions, no emotion was mentioned. Participants were then asked to reflect on details of the interaction that had occurred (true) or had not occurred (false), and that were relevant or irrelevant to the protagonists goal. Irrespective of emotional valence, participants in the pregoal conditions were more susceptible to false memories concerning goal-irrelevant details than were participants in the other conditions. These findings support the view that pregoal emotions narrow attention to information relevant to goal pursuit, increasing susceptibility to false memories for irrelevant information.

The effect of articulatory suppression on implicit and explicit false memory in the DRM paradigm

Several studies have shown that reliable implicit false memory can be obtained in the DRM paradigm. There has been considerable debate, however, about whether or not conscious activation of critical lures during study is a necessary condition for this. Recent findings have revealed that articulatory suppression prevents subsequent false priming in an anagram task (Lövdén & Johansson, 2003). The present experiment sought to replicate and extend these findings to an implicit word stem completion task, and to additionally investigate the effect of articulatory suppression on explicit false memory. Results showed an inhibitory effect of articulatory suppression on veridical memory, as well as on implicit false memory, whereas the level of explicit false memory was heightened. This suggests that articulatory suppression did not merely eliminate conscious lure activation, but had a more general capacity-delimiting effect. The drop in veridical memory can be attributed to diminished encoding of item-specific information. Superficial encoding also limited the spreading of semantic activation during study, which inhibited later false priming. In addition, the lack of item-specific and phenomenological details caused impaired source monitoring at test, resulting in heightened explicit false memory.

A cognitive neuropsychological approach to false memory: Korsakoff patients and the DRM paradigm

Although false memories have been studied extensively within the field of cognitive psychology, the role of cognitive neuropsychology in false memory research has been rather limited. Therefore, the present article aims at giving an integrated overview of both the neuropsychological study of amnesia and research on false memories. After considering some of the most important predecessors in the study of memory distortions/illusions, a list-learning paradigm designed to elicit and investigate false memories is described (i.e., the DRM paradigm), and theoretical accounts for the phenomenon are provided. Subsequently, the neuropsychological framework is presented, with an emphasis on Korsakoff patients’ performance in the earlier described paradigm. Several experimental manipulations, as well as the results, are discussed and interpreted in the light of both encoding and retrieval factors. (Netherlands Journal of Psychology, 64: 96-111.)